Forecasting the need and cost : an exploration of the system dynamics of legal aid by Mu, Shihong
FORECASTING THE NEED AND COST: 
AN EXPLORATION OF THE SYSTEM DYNMIICS OF LEGAL AID 
by 
Shihong Mu 
DISSERTATION IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in the School 
of 
Criminology 
OShihong Mu 1996 
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 
April 1996 
Al1 rights reserved Tiis work may not be reproduced 
in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, 
without permission of the author. 
National Library 1*1 of Canada Bibliotheque nationale du Canada 
Acquif itions and Direction des acquisitions et 
Bibliograph~c Services Branch des services bibliographiques 
395 We!!~ng?m Stre! 395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa, Ontario Ottawa (Ontario) 
K I A  OP34 K I A  ON4 
The author has granted an 
irrevocabie mn-exclusive licence 
allowing the National Library of 
Canada to reproduce, loan, 
distribute or sell copies of 
his/ner thesis by any means and 
in any form or format, making 
this thesis available to interested 
persons. 
Your f f b  Votre refgrence 
Our Me Nolre reference 
L'auteur a accord6 une licence 
irr6vocable et non exclusive 
permettant a la Bibliotheque 
nationale du Canada de 
reproduire, pr&ter, distribuer ou - 
vendre des copies de sa these 
de quelque maniere et sous 
quelque forme que ce soit pour 
mettre des exemplaires de cette 
these B la disposition des 
personnes interessees. 
The author retains ownership of L'auteur conserve la propriete du 
the copyright in his/her thesis. droit d'auteur qui protege sa 
Neither the thesis nor substantial these. Ni la these ni des extraits 
extracts from it may be printed or substantiels de celle-ci ne 
otherwise reproduced without doivent etre imprimes ou 
his/her permission. autrement reproduits sans son - 
autorisation. 
ISBN 0-612-17023-3 
PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE 
I hereby grant to Simon Fraser Universi the right to lend my 
thesis, pro'ect or extended essay (the title o which is shown below) r' 7 to users o the Simon Fraser Unixrersity Libray, and to make 
partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a 
request from the library of any other university, or other 
educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I 
further agree that permission for ~nultiple copying of this work for 
scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate 
Studies. I t  is understood that copying or publication of this work 
for financial gain shall not be allowed Wthout my written 
permission. 
Forecas t i ng  t h e  Need and Cost:  An E x p l o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  System 
Dynamics o f  Legal  A i d  
Author: 
(signature) 
APPROVAL 
Name: 
Degree: 
Title of Thesis: 
Examining Committee: 
Chair: 
Date Approved: 
Shihong Mu 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Forecasting the Need and Cost: 
An Exploration of the System Dynamics of Legal Aid 
Joan Brockrnan, LL.M. 
- 
Paul J. ~ r d t i n ~ h a m ,  J. 
Professor 
Seaior st.J.@ryisd 
- -  - - - -  - 
Margaret k. Jackson, PL.D.- 
- 
Assqciate Professor 
r / 
DanieYC PrCfontaine, Q.C. 
Internal Examiner 
Director, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform 
and Criminal Justice Policy 
- 
Catherine ~ z b P h . 1 -  
External Examiner 
Senior Policy Advisor 
Department of Indian and Northern AtlFairs 
Government of Canada 
ABSTRACT 
This exploratory study examines legal aid in the context of the criminal justicc 
system and aims to develop a planning tool to forecast the impact of changcs in the 
criminal justice system on the need for and cost of legal aid in criminal matters in British 
Columbia. Systems analysis and simulation modelmg are utilized to explore the system 
dynamics of the criminal justice system and the legal aid subsystem, to cxaminc the 
relatio~ships between various components of the system, and to reveal how changcs in 
other parts of the system affect the legal aid subsystem. 
This study examines such major actors in the criminal justice system as the police, 
the prosecution, the courts, and the corrections. It argues that the legal aid as a subsystem 
is directly or indirectly influenced by the behavior of the prime actors in the whole systcm. 
Conceptual and simulation models of the need for legai aid in criminal matters arc 
constructed based on available local, provincial and federal data. The DYNAMO 
simulation model of legal aid is developed following the base patterns and applied to a set 
of hypothetical scenarios to show how the operations of the legal aid systcm react to and 
act upon other criminal justice components. 
This study concludes that the simulation modeling is better fitted to fbrccast thc 
impacts of change at some decision points in the system on the other parts of the system 
and on the whole system than to forecast the long term future state of the system. The 
various scenarios made in this study demonstrate that the simulation modeling is able to 
forecast the impact of changes in certain part(s) of the criminal justice system including the 
legal aid subsystem itself on the need for and cost of legal aid. The DYNAMO simulation 
mode! that has been built in this study can be used tc help the legal aid planner understand 
that the provjsion of legal aid should not be planned in isolation of the criminal justice 
system and increase his/her ability to work within a co~llplex system while resources are 
restricted. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
This exploratory study aims to develop a planning tool to forecast the nced for and 
cost of legal aid in British Columbia. There have been some studies on legal aid in Cmnada 
in general and in British Columbia in particular, but few of them exanline legal aid in the 
context of the whole criminal justice system. Through systematically examining thc 
relationships between various components of the criminal justice system and how changcs 
in other parts of the system affect the legal aid subsystem, this study uses simulation 
modeling techniques to forecast the need for and cost of legal aid in British Columbia. 
The legal aid system in Canada has expanded dramatically over the past two 
decades. However, it is believed that such a growth has taken place without provoking the 
attention it deserves. Thus, the provision of legal aid has recently been described as a 
volcano waiting to erupt into the public consciousness (Easton, Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 1992: 1). 
It is held that the 1990's have proven to be years in which both federal and 
provincial governments have been struggling with deficits and debts (Griffiths and 
Verdun- Jones, l993:285). Govemme~t programs of all descriptions have becn subject to 
review. The Justice sector has not been exempted from this review, nor has the delivery of 
legal aid as an integral component of the administration of justice (National Review of 
Legal Aid, 1993:45). As it is pointed out by the authors of Legal Aid and the Poor, the 
report by the National Council of Welfare, "Legal aid is in trouble everywhere in Canada 
(1995:l)". In British Columbia, the Legal Services Society acknowledges that it fixes 
many challenges (Annual Report of Legal Services Society of B.C., 1991-1992). In 
general, the widely held concerns are, the rapidly increasing costs of delivering legal aid 
services in Canada over the last two decades, which far outstrip the increase in population, 
and the predicted crisis in funding for legal aid plans (Grfiths and Verdun-Jones, 
1993:285-6; Legal Aid and the Poor, 1995; Predicting Legal Aid Costs, 1993:7 1). 
In the f ~ c a l  year of 1991192, total expenditures in legal aid in Canada were $514 
million, representing a 25% increase over the previous year and a constant dollar increase 
of 29%. From 1987-88 to 1991-92, expenditures in legal aid in constant dollars have 
increased an average of 13% per year in comparison to 4% in the five years previous to 
this period (National Review of Legal Aid, 1993:76). It is argued that expenditures in the 
three largest provinces--Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia have the greatest potential 
for actual impact nationally (Predicting Legal Aid Costs, 1993:71; National Review of 
Legal Aid, 1993:49). These three largest provinces account for about 80% of the actual 
approved applications for legal aid in the country and absorb around 80% of all legal aid 
dollars spent in Canada (Easton, Brantingharn and Brantingham, 1992:49). It is said that 
Ontario's legal aid plan will have a $65 million deficit in the 1994195 fiscal year (Fine, in 
GriiEths and Verdun-Jones, 1993:286). British Columbia will not be an exception to t h  
f%mncial challenge. 
According to Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (1985, 1993), the cost of legal 
aid in British Columbia was $829,000 in 1971. In 1993, the cost went up to 96 million 
dollars, more than 100 times the cost over two decades before. Expenditures in legal aid 
almost doubled in real terms between 1985 and 1991, and rose even more sharply, to morc 
than $55 xdhon, during the 1331-92 fiscal year as tk costs of the I992 revisioii of the 
criminal law tariff began to be felt (Predicting Legal Aid Costs, 1992:lg). During April 
1992 through March 1994, the Society administered annual expenditures of $92 million 
and $101 million respectively (Annual Report, Legal Services Society of British Columbia, 
1992-93 and 1993-94:4). The former Board of the Legal Services Society approved a 
budget on May 13, 1994 that contained two expenditure components. These components 
were: a base operation expenditure of $97.2 -on, and a reform expenditure of $8.6 
million (Board Orientation Manual, Legal Services Society, 1995:23). 
While the cost of legal aid is sky-rocketing, the demand for legal aid services has 
also been growing at an unprecedented rate (Annual Report, Legal Services Society of 
British Columbia, 1992-93 and 1993-94). Therefore, the Legal Services Society of British 
Columbia is faced with the dilemma of how to meet the need for increased service while 
implementing the cost containment measures required to reduce the Society's growing 
deficit (Annual Report, Legal Services Society of British Columbia, 1992-93 and 1993- 
94). 
The National Review of Legal Aid concludes that the level of service presently 
provided by legal aid plans in Canada is essentially the level of service required by the 
Charter of Rights and Freedom. It cautions that reducing the level of service presently 
provided would give rise to the risk of sigdcant court intervention in legal aid delivery 
(1993:73). In the meantime, the Legal Services Society maintains that its commitment to 
the people of British Columbia remains to provide good, efficient, equitable service to 
clients throughout the province, and to responsibly and effectively manage the delivery of 
legal aid and public legal education in British Columbia (Annual Report, Legal Services 
Society of British Columbia, 1992-93 and 1993-949). 
It is argued that legal aid in criminal matters has been given excessive funding, to 
the detriment of other services, e.g. services in f a d y  matters (Agg, 1992:~). This shows 
that criminal legal aid occupies a very important position in the overall legal aid plan. 
Criminal legal aid covers all indictable offences and those summary conviction offences in 
which imprisonment or loss of livehhood is likely upon conviction. It is cautioned that, 
while court mandated services in criminal matters would leave other services vulnerable, 
elimination of criminal legal aid for certain offences would lead to further court challenges 
(Agg, 1992:vi). For example, the British Columbia Court of Appeal declared illegal an 
attempt by the society to reduce coverage for summary conviction matters in response to a 
budget cut in 1983 (Predicting Legal Aid Costr, 1993: 16). 
In view of the situation of legal aid in Canada, it is obvious that some assessment 
of the current regime needs to be undertaken (Predicting Legal Aid Costs, 1993: 1). The 
Legal Services Society of British Columbia operates the most complex legal aid plan in 
Canada (Easton, Brantingham and Brantingham, 199239). It has been argued that a 
thorough overhaul of the legal aid system is required, but one which builds on the best 
elements of existing services (Agg, 1992:~). The Society must overcome a history of 
financial, management and service delivery problems caused by years of divided 
leadership, chronic underfunding, inadequate service priorities and insensitivity to client 
and community needs (Agg, 1992). The society itself agrees that reforming legal iud 
delivery has become a priority and has been preparing for a reform with the primary 
objective to deliver high quality service for clients throughout the province responsibly and 
cost-effectively (Annual Report, Legal Services Society of British Columbia, 1992-93 and 
1993-94:2). 
It is argued that what legal aid needs is not so much more money as better 
management and that little else will change until there are significant improvements to thc 
management of the Legal Services Society (Agg, 1992:24; Legal Aid and the Paor, 
1995:2).). To improve the volume, accessibility and quality of services at current rates of 
expenditure, the society must reorder its priorities, and must reallocate resources to 
provide a more effective service (Agg, 1992:vi). With the goal of legal aid to provide 
eacient, high quality services, there is definitely a need to understand the fwtors 
influencing the increase in expenditures. Therefore, more studies that examine legal aid 
costs and expenditures are warranted. 
However, as it is pointed out in National Review of Legal Aid (1993), the complex 
interaction of various factors makes the study of legal aid costs a daunting task. In 
Ontario, for example, when the economy deteriorated rapidly, applications for legal aid 
increased by approximately 25% a year, which shows that the economy obviously plays a 
vital role in driving the cost of legal aid. However, there are also offsetting Fictors relating 
to economic change. In a bad economy, for example, there is a climate which is receptive 
to salary and tariff reductions, which will in turn reduce costs (1993:47). 
This dissertation explores the possibility of forecasting changes in the need for and 
cost of legal aid in criminal matters. It aims to help legal aid planners understand the 
intertwining factors that affect the demand and cost of legal aid services and apply present 
knowledge to anticipation of future trends. Moreover, it is also hoped that this study will 
help planners explore alternative futures and assess the potential impacts of proposed 
changes in advance. A better understanding may lead to favourabie organizational changes 
which will improve the efficiency of the system and control costs and expenditures. 
For this study, the approaches of systems analysis and simulation modeling are 
used to emphasize the interconnectedness of the legal aid plan with different components 
of the criminal justice system in the province. It examines how changes in resources and in 
the performance of other components of the system may cause changes in the need for 
legal aid. It is believed that the approach of systems analysis can be used to explore the 
complexity of the whole criminal justice system and uncover structures which increase our 
understanding of the nature of legal aid in the province. 
Ekstedt and Griffths (1988) argue that there are two types of planning--reactive 
and proactive. According to them, reactive planning occurs when a management level 
decision has been taken which wili require an orgaaizationai response in preparation for 
the future, while proactive planning occurs when the future circumstance at issue cannot 
be fully anticipated (1988:139. See also Prince and Chenier, 1980522). The focus of this 
study is to provide an information database for proactive planning of legal services. 
Systems analysis and modeling are considered tools capable of providing new insights and 
develop techniques for proactive planning. 
Planners working within the field of legal aid services have two m++r problems in 
making predictions and exploring the impacts of change. First, there has never been any 
conceptual model of the operation of the system which has an orientation towards 
planning. Second, tools to explore time dependent changes are not readily available. To fill 
the gap, this study attempts to construct useful conqeptual and simulation models for 
conducting actual analyses and for exploring changes. Specific'ally, it consists of the 
development of descriptive simulation models of the need for legal aid in criminal matters 
in British Columbia, based on available local, provincial and federal data. Then the 
information gained from the analysis and descriptive model building is wed to build a 
dynamic simulation of the system. Moving beyond the con.ceptua1 Icvel, quantitative 
models are built to make projections of need for legal aid in criminal matters. 
Different components within the criminal justice system wdl be exarnincd to show 
how they operate and how they are interdependent. This will be followed by a description 
of what happens in the legal aid system and how the operations of the legal aid system 
react to and act upon other efiminal justice components. The study WIU then explore both 
the information feedback and the legal and financial constraints that influence the dynamics 
and the processes of legal aid. In general, factors that affect the need for and cost of legal 
aid in criminal matters come from three main systems: the social-demographic system, the 
criminal justice system, and the legal aid system. Planners must become aware of how 
information and people flow so that they can identify methods for improving the 
performance of the system. They must also explore the consequences of currently popular 
schemes for change or reform of the system. This study examines the three systems in a 
systemic manner. Though forecasting the future need for legal aid, it explores both 
current function and performance and the feasibility of change in order to increase the 
ability of legal aid planners to work within a complex system while resources are 
restricted. 
Chapter II presents an overview of legal aid in British Columbia in terms of the 
evolution of legal aid, the mandates and funding of the Legal Services Society, services 
provided by the society, profile of legal aid recipients. More emphasis is given to analyzing 
the costs of delivering legal services, and the impact of restraint programs on legal 
services. Legislation and court decisions on legal aid are also discussed. Finally, it 
examines the role that the legal profession has played in delivering legal services. In 
general, this chapter attempts to show various aspects and actors in the legal aid system, 
the interdependence and interconnectedness between all the parts within thc system at 
different levels of hierarchy. 
Chapter 111 discusses different components in the criminal justice system from a 
systems point of view. In the system, all different parts are considered interconnected, 
although they may pursue conflicting goals. Any change in one part may cause changes in 
other parts of the whole system. Four major actors, the police, the prosecutor, the court 
and the corrections are examined both individually and as a whole. The enrphasis is on the 
interdependence and interconnectedness of the various parts of the criminal justice systcm. 
The discretions of the major actors in the criminal justice system are examined. k g a l  ;id, 
as one component of the criminal justice system, is inevitably influenced by the behavior of 
other components of the system. All the major actors in the criminal .justice systcm 
produce direct and indirect input into the legal aid subsystem. The analysis leads to the 
impact of changes in practices of the police, prosecution, court, and corrections on the 
demand and cost of legal aid. 
Chapter IV raises research questions and discusses the methodology used by and 
data collected for this study. The approaches of systems analysis and computer simulation 
modeling are examined to explain why they are adopted in this study. As this study Is to 
test the feasibility of using computer simulation modeling to forecast the need for and cost 
of legal aid, some previous criminal justice system models are examined in this chapter. 
These include the JUSSIM developed by Blumstein and his associates (1974) and, more 
importantly, the dynamic modeling of a court system by Brantingham (1977). It is  also 
indicated what constitute the basis of the models constructed in this present study, 
JUSSIM is basically a fixed flow model. The structure of typical flows of cases 
through the American criminal justice system was developed and computerized. Outpu~s 
of case flows to any branch of the model are derived from a base input number. Given a 
certain number of crime known to the police, for instance, the model estimates how many 
people will be sent to jail or put on probation. This basic flow simulation was changed and 
adapted for Canada during the CANJUS project of the late 1970's. The hitation of this 
model is thst the functiorung of any part of the system is assumed to work independently 
of any other part (Brantingham, 1977). Moreover, the system is assumed to be at 
equilihrium. Thus, it has no capacity to handle changes over time. 
To overcome such limitations, Brantingham's model was designed to be dynamic 
rather than static. In her study, Brantingham (1977) used the systems approach and 
simulation modeling techniques to examine a criminal court system in an American seate. 
Her model reveals the complex interconnections and the dynamic, changhg relatimships 
within a criminal justice system. Basically, in addition to analyzing the need for legal aid 
from a systems perspective, the present study is an extension of Brantingham's study 
(1977) and an application of the technique of dynamic simulation modeling to the study of 
legal aid. 
Chapter V tries to develop a conceptual model on the basis of the discussions in 
Chapter I1 and Chapter HI, as it is thought to be necessary to conceptualize a simulation 
model before it is programmed. The conceptual model delineates the way in which 
variables described in the earlier chapters are interconnected and explores others that may 
illso be related and &ect legal aid. In this chapter, the conceptualization of the model is 
achieved through the search for causal relationshps, feedback structures and the 
development of flow charting diagrams, causal loop diagrams and the DYNAMO flow 
diagram. It is a simulation of the system dynamics of legal aid, which shows the 
interconnectedness in the system. The discussion and dustration of various modules in this 
chapter demonstrate the dynamic interactions between legal aid administration rtnd the 
criminal justice system. However, it is noted that the DYNAMO tlowcharts arc only 
simplified representations of the program per se, as it is not feasiblc to represent a multi- 
dimentional model with a two-dimensional format. 
Chapter VI presents an empirical analysis of legal aid in British Columbia, for thc 
development of simulation modelmg requires an understanding of the whole system both 
conceptually and empirically. It analyzes the behavior of the various major actors and thcir 
interrelations in the legal aid system using empirical data for the variables dcscribcd in 
Chapter V. The need for legal aid is a function of various factors. The analysis in this 
chapter is made based on three major sets of empirical data, which include demographic 
and other crime generating variables, variables for the m+.or components of thc criminal 
justice system discussed in earlier chapters, and those for the system of legal services. 
Chapter VII explores the applicabdity of the simulation model developed in thc 
DYNAMO simulation language to the legal aid system. Output at various stagcs in the 
legal aid system is produced on the basis of base flow patterns of crime, charges, court 
procedures, application for legal aid and legal aid expenditures, using the historical data 
from 1984 to 1990. The DYNAMO simulation model of legal aid in British Columbia is 
developed following the base pattern and applied to various hypothetical scenarios, which 
include patterns under increased crime, patterns under increased resources, policy 
alternatives by the Legal Services Society, and projection of the future. The discussion of 
the scenarios shows the impact of changes in crime pattern on legal aid delivery with 
restrained and unrestrained budget for Legal Services Society, the consequences of 
hypothetical policy alternatives in the criminal justice system on legal aid, and the results 
of such hypothetical policy alternatives adopted by the Legal Services Society as legal aid 
eligibility expansion, and dBerent legal aid tariffs. Moreover, several different projections 
of the need for and cost of legal aid in the near future are demonstrated. 
In summation, this study consists of the development of descriptive simulation 
models of the need for legal aid in criminal matters in British Columbia, based on available 
local, provincial and federal data. The information gained from the analysis and descriptive 
model building is then used to build a dynamic simulation of the system. Moving beyond 
the conceptual level, it further builds quantitative models to make projections of need for 
legal aid in criminal matters. In general, these models will improve the understanding of 
the legal services system from a planner's viewpoint. 
This study concludes that the simulation modeling is better fitted to forecast the 
impacts of change at some decision points in the system on the other parts of the system 
and on the whole system than to forecast the long term future state of the system. It is 
believed that a simulation model can be used not only to see "what is", but also to explore 
the impact of a series of "what if'' questions. In this study, however, the emphasis is on the 
latter. For example, it is more desirable for the simulation model to be used to explore 
whether there would be any change in the need for legal aid if the Crown counsel changes 
charging patterns than to predict the exact volume of the need for legal aid in ten years 
from now. However this study cautions that, as it is relatively crude, more work is nccdcd 
to refine the model before it  can be used a planning tool. 
CHAPTER 11. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL AID IN BRITISH 
COLUMBIA 
Provision for assistance in legal matters to the poor has been in operation in British 
Columbia for several decades (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984; Cawley, 1991). Over 
these decades, the legal aid program has evolved from a mere charity activity on the part 
of the legd profession into a mostly government-funded multi-million dollar business. 
While more and more people have received legal aid, the per capita cost of providing legal 
aid has also increased rapidly. Many factors contribute to the increase in the need for and 
cost of leg4 aid. Thjs chapter will review the contributing factors found within the British 
Columbia legal aid system. These include the historical development of legal aid, the 
operations of the legal aid plan, the mode of providing legal aid, the scope of services, and 
several others. The chapter's focus will be on those aspects of the system th; Lave most 
influenced the need for and cost of legd aid in British Columbia. 
Legal aid in the province of British Columbia is now administered by the Legal 
Services Society of British Columbia, which was created in 1979 by provincial legislation 
which amalgamated two extant legd aid providers: the Legal Services Commission and 
the k g d  Aid Society @rantingham and Brantingham, 1984; Cawley, 1991). 
2 % ~  Legd Sen&= So&q j io f  British Cokibia ( U S )  is, both frinctiomlly and by 
statute, independent of the provincial government and the legal profession. "It is not an 
agent of the Crown or of the law society' (Legal Services Society Act. Chapter 227, 
Section 4.2). The statutory objects of the Society are: ( I )  to ensure that legal services arc 
given to individuals who would not otherwise receive them because of financial or other 
reasons, and (2) that education, advice and information about the law are provided to h e  
people of British Columbia. These objectives make legal aid a right for f"mmcially eligible 
individuals under certain circumstances. Based on the statutory objectives, it is the 
Society's agenda to provide more and better legal aid services to more poor people. This 
agenda is also one of the major reasons for the ever increasing cost of legal aid in British 
Columbia. The Society also determines the priorities and criteria for services it provides or 
a funded agency provides under the Act (CCJS, 1994: 10.5). 
According to the Legal Services Society Act, it is the Board of Directors that has 
the duty to ensure that the goals and objective of the Society as estabhhed by the Act arc 
reached. The Board also has a responsibility to the public to question and critically analyze 
any proposals or information brought forth by management. 
The Board of ~irectors' consists of fourteen members. Seven are appointed by the 
Lieutenant Governor in Council and seven by the Law Society in consultation with the 
executive of the British Columbia branch of the Canadian Bar Association. At least two of' 
1 The Legislative Assembly of British Columbia passed a bill in 1994, which, when 
proclaimed, will amend Section 5 of the Legad Services Society Act. According to the new 
legislation the Board of Directors will consist of fifteen directors. Five wiU bc appointed 
by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, five by the Law Society, two by the Native 
Community Law Office Association of BC (NCLO), two by the Community Law Offices 
of BC (CLO) and one by the directors appointed by NCLO and CLO. 
those appointed by both the Lieutenant Governor in Council and the Law Society (a total 
of four) ars to be non-lawyers. Directors hold ooffice for two-year terns and may not hold 
ir for longer than six consecutive years. (Legal Services Society Act, Section 5 )  
Befbre the Legal Services Society was created in 1979, legal services in British 
Columbia were administered by the Legal Aid Society and the Legal Services 
Commission. The Legal Aid Society basically followed a judicare model, (which will be 
discussed later) in which its centrally controlled offices and Area Directors made fee for 
service referrals to lawyers in private practice for both criminal and civil matters. The 
Legal Services Commission, on the other hand, acted as a policy maker to supervise local 
legal service projects and to provide funding and back-up for community law offices, 
which were decentralized and would allow each community to choose the type of legal aid 
services it needed (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984:40; Cawley, 1991). 
Because of these historical roots, the Legal Services Society of British Columbia 
(LSS) provides a variety of services through what Easton et al. (1992:39) called "the 
most complex legal aid plan in Canada". As of January 1, 1993 the LSS provided services 
through staff lawyers and paralegals in 16 branch offices, through 10 Community Law 
Offices and 7 Native Community Law Offices that contracted with the LSS; through two 
Native Legal Information Offices; through a Prison Liaison Office; through private 
lawyers appointed as administrative Area Directors in 21 additional communities; and 
through panels of over 2000 private lawyers who take cases on referral (CCJS, 1994). 
The LSS branch offices are normally located in the largest communities in the: 
province. The employees in these offices are LSS employees. Each branch has a Managing 
lawyer, and is staffed by lawyers, paralegals, and other support staff. The branch ofices 
located at: Burnaby, Campbell River, Chilliwack, Courtenay, Dawson Creek, Fort St. 
John, Grand Forks, Kamloops, Kelowna, Nanaimo, Nelson, Prince George, Prince Rupert, 
Richmond, Smithers, Surrey, Vancouver, and Wfiams Lake. Prisoners' Legal Services at 
Abbotsford, and Community Law Clinic and Immigration & Refugee Law Clinic at 
Vancocver are also LSS' branch offices. 
Community Law Offices (CLOs) have developed out of the former Legal Services 
Commission md are normally located in smaller and medium-sized communities. They arc 
privately incorporated societies which are funded, in whole or in part, by LSS. These are 
located at Abbotsford, Cranbrook, Fort Nelson, Langley, Maple Ridge, Nanaimo, New 
Westminster, North Vancouver, Penticton, Port Coquitlam, Powell River, Quesnd, 
Vernon, and Victoria. 
Native Community Law Offices (NCLOs), similar to the CLOs, are also privately 
incorporated societies that exist in communities with sizable native populations. They 
focus their efforts on the local native population. The offices are in Burns Lake, Duncan, 
Fort St. James, Fort St. John, Hazelton, Lillooet, Lytton, Masset, Merritt, New Aiyansh, 
Port Alberni, Prince George, Skidegate, Terrace, and Vancouver. 
Area Directors are members of the private bar contracted to do intake work on 
behalf of the LSS LI s m d  cowmunities without a field ofice presence. They are 
positioned at Armstrong, Chetwynd, Ezclerby, Fernie, Golden, Invermere, Kaslo, 
Ladysmith, Parksville, Port Alberni, Revelstoke, Salmon Arm, Sechelt, Squamish, 
Ucluelet, and Vernon. 
In addition, LSS have also funded a variety of other agencies to help with intake or 
service delivery. These include the Community Legal Assistance Society (CLAS), the 
Salvation Army and the Elizabeth Fry Society. 
Before 1964, legal aid services were provided through volunteer work by 
individual lawyers and local bar associations, with administrative support from the Law 
Society. Costs for the services were covered by the law profession (Rrantingham and 
Brantingham, 1984; Cawley, 1991). In 1964, the provincial government started to fund 
legal aid through the Ministry of Attorney General and the Law Society. However, the 
fimding was fairly minimal. It was, for example, "an honorarium of $25 per day for 
lawyers handling criminal cases" (LSS Board Orientation Manual, 19%: 14). 
Although the federal government had funded legal aid in British Columbia in many 
legal aid projects, formal funding from the federal government started in 1972, when the 
federal and provincial governments negotiated a cost sharing agreement for criminal legal 
aid. The province received about 50% of its costs for criminal legal aid from the federal 
Department of Justice. Services were to be provided to financially eligihIe clicnts whcn 
there was a likelihood of imprisonment on conviction. At the same time, community 
groups, including civil liberties and anti-poverty groups also received funds for legal 
assistance and education programs, prirndy from the federal government ( B o d  
Orientation Manual, 1995: 15). 
'I'ahle 1 Funding Resources for Legal Aid in British Columbia (In thousands of dollars) 
Year Total Fecierai Provinciail Legal Clients' other2 
- 
Revenue Government Government Profession Contribution 
Source: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (1989 and 1995) 
In 1990 the federal government froze its contribution level to criminal legal aid and 
capped civil legal aid (LSS, 1995:18). Since the cost of legal aid continued to increase 
after the federal government's funding freeze, the federal share of funding decreased 
sharply and the provincial government's share increased. In the fiscal year of 1992193, the 
federal government's contribution accounted for about 24 percent of the total revenue and 
the provincial government contributed over 70 percent (Table 1). Although the impact of 
the federal govelamentYs changes in funding level for legal aid provision was not felt 
"Other" revenue usually includes funds from interest, publication sales, government 
donated services and miscellaneous (CCJS, 1993) 
immediately in British Columbia, it would definitely aft'ect legal aid services in the 
province in the long run. As the cost of legal aid has becn increasing dramatically the 
provincial government will soon find it difficult to absorb all the increase in cost by itself 
and will react accordingly. 
The legal profession in British Columbia has long made substantial contributions to 
the legal aid system in BC. In addition to regular contributions. the legal profession has 
sometimes made special grants to assure the system f~inctions smoothly. In 1986, for 
example, a special grant from the Law Foundation of BC restored the tar& to its I98 I 
level. In April, 1991 the private bar withdrew services to legal aid clicnts, demanding 
higher pay for providing legal aid services. After negotiations between the Legal Aid 
Liaison Committee, the Attorney General, the Law Foundation and the LSS, the tariff was 
doubled. The provincial government provided an additional $6 million for the fiscal year, 
half of the estimated cost increase for the fiscal year of 1991192, and informed LSS that is 
plamed to review models of delivering legal services. A one-time grant from the Law 
Foundation of $6 million supported the 100% increase of the legal aid tariff for the liscal 
year 1991192. Since the direct beneficiaries of these malor grants were the private bar 
lawyers who ended up getting higher pay, it can be argued that contributions from thc 
Law Foundation are, at least partly, to benefit the lawyers providing legal aid. 
3 The legal aid tariff is a fee schedule according to which the private bar lawyers are paid 
for the legal aid services they provide. Detailed description of the legal aid tariff can be 
found in the TarifSsection in the latter part of this chapter. 
According to the LSS' contribution policy, most of the legal aid clients, i.e., those 
who receive a t a r s  service (except H U ~ ~ I I  Rights and court-directed counsel) and those 
who receive staff services lasting more than two hours are supposed to pay a m u m  of 
$10 user fee (LSS, 19%). A reading of Table I comparing the volume of clients that have 
been served and the amount of clients' contribution suggests that this policy was not been 
implemented. Facing increasing legal aid costs and limited resources, LSS has recently 
been considering implementation of a recovery project that will make legal aid clients who 
have received legal aid services pay user fees and contributions. 
SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE LSS 
The formal objectives of the Society are set out as follows in the Legal Services 
Society Act (R.S.B.C. 1979 c. 227) Section 3.(1): 
The objectives of the society are to ensure that 
(a) services ordinarily provided by a lawyer are afforded to individuals who would not 
otherwise receive them because of financial or other reasons; and 
(b) education, advice and information about law are provided for the people of British 
Columbia 
In order to meet these objectives the LSS administers both the legal aid plan and a 
wide range of other legal services for the poor and general public in British Columbia. 
This section will briefly describe these services in general and then discuss more 
specifically the representational services in criminal law matters. 
Representahahonal services 
This is the area that people most often think of in connection with legal services. 
This is also the area where most of the expenditure of the LSS goes each ycar. Lcgal 
representation is provided for eligible people who are charged with any criminal offcncc 
for which a person might go to jail or lose employment (This will also he discussed later in 
the section on coverage policies); who have family problems such as separation, custody 
md access, maintenance, property division, divorce, family violence; who have refugee 
claims and serious immigration problems; human rights and discrimination cases. The 
Society normally refers such cases to private bar lawyers and pays the lawyers' legal fees 
according to an established tariff. Branch office and community law office staff may 
represent clients in other types of cases, such as landlord and tenant disputes; first Nations 
hunting and fishing cases; income replacementJpension appeals involving social assistance; 
Canada pension and disability pension matters, workers' rights disputes involving 
worker's compensation, disability pensions, and unemployment insurance; Mental Health 
Act review board hearings; Criminal Injuries Compensation; debt problems including law 
suits, collection practices, foreclosures, and bankruptcies. Some civil cases such as those 
involving bankruptcy are referred to the private bar on apro bono 'oasis. In these cases the 
lawyer works for no fee and the Society covers the lawyer's expenses. 
In the early years of legal aid, criminal representational services dominated the mix 
of representational services provided (Table 2). In 1983, for example, over 66% of all 
representational services involved criminal matters while 15% involved family matters. 
Over the years, however, representational services for civil matters increased steadily both 
in volume and in proportion. In the meantime, although the volume of criminal law 
representation increased (before 1993), the proportion of criminal law representation 
shows a continuous decrease. It is shown in Table 2 that the proportion of criminal law 
representation decreased to about 52% in 1994 while the family law representation went 
up to over 36%. Both the volume and proportion of representation for immigration cases 
went up from less than 1 % before 199 1 to over 3% as a result of the decision by the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia in the case of Gonzalez-Davis vs. Legal Services 
Society ([I9911 81 D.L.R. [4th] 12 B.C.C.A.). 
'fable 2 Representation Service Delivery by Type (Ail Approved Applications) 
Year Criminal Family Immigration Other Civil 
Count % Count % Count % Count % 
1983 18,982 66.1% 4,389 15.3% 166 0.6% 5,181 18.0% 
Source: The Management Infomation System of the Legal Services Society Of British Columbia. 
Other Services 
In addition to legal representation, the Legal Services Society proviclcs a wide 
range of other legal services to the people in British Columbia. It provides duty counscl" 
services in almost all criminal courts and in some youth courts. These services, however, 
are not generally available. in family court. There are some duty counsel serviccs for. 
apprehension of children cases under the Family Child Services Act. Prc-court duty 
counsel services are provided to inmates prior to their first appearance. Subject to time 
avadabitity, duty counsel may provide summary advice to people not in custody on their 
f ~ s t  appearance. 
Legal Services Society is also responsible for a number of special programs: public 
legal and information services, native services, the do-your-own-divorce program and 
prison services. One of the LSS mandates is to ensure that "education, advice and 
information about law are provided for the people of British Columbia" so that all British 
Columbians have equal access to the law. Thus, the Society operates several programs to 
oversee this mandate. Legal education, advice and information about the law is provided 
to the people of British Columbia by the Library Services Program and the Publication 
Legal Education and Information Program and the Schools Program. 
The Library Program of the LSS provides services and reference material on 
poverty law, aboriginal law, immigration law and other community law issues, to LSS 
Duty counsel are either members of the private bar retained on a per diem rate or LSS 
staff. Duty counsel are available to unrepresented defendants, primarily for bail hearings of 
persons in custody, and as time permits, for first appearances by people not in custody. 
offices, public libraries, advocacy groups, management and program staff, and to the 
general public. The Legal Resource Centre operated by the Library Program is open to the 
public and provides funding and selection assistance, training and field support. Tne 
Library Programs conducts legal research for LSS field staff around the province, which 
includes access to the national Quick Law computer-based legal reference service. The 
Program also provides support and guidelines for collections for branch offices as well as 
training and field support. The Program runs a Law Line open to the public for people 
seeking legal information and referrals. In 1994, staff on the Law Line answered over 
15,000 calls (LSS Board Orientation Manual, 1995). 
Working primarily with community groups and LSS offices, the Public Legal 
Education 6t Information Program provides funding for specific public legal education 
projects; maintains and distributes legal information publication; helps groups both to 
identlfjr their concerns about the justice system and to recommend solutions to problems 
they encounter when trying to use it; lobbies government agencies to include the clients' 
perspectives in making program decisions; and works with other agencies and institutions 
to create support for the Society's mission statement (Board Orientation Manual, 1992). 
In 1994, the Program funded 54 speclfc public legal education projects; the 
audience included women, people from diverse cultural communities, people with 
disabilities, low income people, youth, witness/victims, lesbians and gay men, and 
advocates. The program also provides small grants for LSS branch offices and community 
law offices to do public legal education work in their local communities. In the past, t h  
work has included workshops, production of pamphlets and posters, a cable television 
show on the law, and translation of public legal education materials into other languages, 
among other ventures. The Program assists staff in branch and other officcs to develop 
outreach and public legal education activities, particularly with diverse cultural 
communities as well as other legal aid client groups (LSS, 1995). 
The Society operated a Schools Program from 1975 to 1994 in response to the 
lack of suitable legal educational materials and law-related teacher training in the public 
school system. The SchooLs Program provided workshops, curriculum materials on legal 
topics, legal education resource network for teachers. It provided support, curriculum 
development and legal review for the Faculties of Education and provided curriculum 
review, consultation and advocacy for the Ministry of Education. 
The Publishing Program provides editing, design and revision of current 
publications, distribu;ion and planning assistance for all program areas. It dm providcs 
advice on plain language and the publishing process to external agencies. 
Prison services run by the Legal Services Society ensure that prisoners have awcss 
to the same legal services that are available to other citizens. Staff lawyers and other 
personnel provide prisoners with legal information about criminal and family law matlcrs 
md  a wide range of other problems. In order to protect the rights of detained persuns 
d e r  the Charter of Rights aid Frtxxkms, the Society operztes a hat line program, 
which, through a 24-hour duty collnsel province-wide telephone line, provided access to 
legal advice to persons in police custody who have been charged with a criminal ofice or 
who ;ire under i~vestigation. 
In addition to handling routine applications for legal aid in family law, criminal law 
and immigration, the U S  branch offices and community law offices provide extensive 
summary legal advice on a wide range of topics. 
In order to provide legal services and education to the aboriginal people in British 
Columbia, the Legal Services Society has operated a Native Program since 1975, which 
plays the role of advocate for the aboriginal community. The Native Programs Department 
funds native communities to operate and provide legal services in the communities. The 
Department produces and funds, both on its own and in conjunction with the Community 
Program and Library, legal materials and workshops for native peoples. It also provides 
assistance to individuals requiring idormation on Indian law. 
Tfte Native Programs' staff liaise with aboriginal organizations, LSS field offices, 
and other funded agencies on matters relating to the Society's mandate. They also conduct 
p rehkary  andysis of service delivery deficiencies to aboriginal people and coordinate 
redress of these deficiencies through the relevant departments and committees. To ensure 
that all aboriginal people have equal access to the law, the Native Programs Department 
provides grmts for public legal education and produces publications on legal issues 
specific to aboriginal people. It provides information on a broad range of issues to 
individuals and organizations in the aboriginal and the general public. Native Programs 
also furnishes information to external agencies such as the Ministry of the Attorney 
General, the Judiciary, Crown Counsel, and to aboriginal and nan-aborigind 
organizations. In addition to operational services, the Native Programs Department also 
provides s~pporting services to other departments within the Society. In its support 
function, Native Programs develops, coordinates and implements policy and other 
initiatives for the delivery of mandated legal services to the aboriginal people of BC and 
evaluates the overall legal service delivery to aboriginal people. 
Criminal legal aid representation is primarily provided by members of the private 
bar who receive payment under a general fee-for-service tariff. The delivery of legal aid, 
the maintenance of lists of lawyers, the assignment of counsel and the payment of counsel 
are administratively controlled by the Legal Services Society. 
THE ADMINISTRATION F LEGAL AID AND THE COST OF LEGAL AID 
Although it is generally believed that effective administration will lead to a 
reduction in the cost of service, it is not so simple with the provision of legal aid services. 
As mentioned earlier, the mandate of the Legal Services Society is to provide more 
service to more people who are poor. Other things being equal successfully carrying out 
this mandate will likely lead to higher cost. 
As well, the LSS can determine the priorities for services it provides. If the L3S 
determines to give higher priority to public legal education and does it effectively, more 
people may become aware of the avaihbihty of legal aid and ask for legal aid; more people 
may identify their problems as legal ones and ask for legal aid; and more crime may be 
reported to the police which may lead to more criminal charges and more demand for legal 
aid. All of this means the translation from successful administration into higher cost. 
Two major legal aid systems have historically influenced the mode of providing 
legal aid in British Columbia: the judicare system in England and the public defender 
system in the United States (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984; Cawley, 1991; Easton 
et al., 1992). "The Society provides services (full service, summary service) through a 
mixed deliverj system employing staff professionals and private lawyers. Eligible clients 
not handled by staff professionals are referred to private lawyers or may choose any 
lawyer in the community who is willing to act. However, when the offence has a 
mandatory punishment of life imprisonment, the applicant may choose any private lawyer 
belonging to the British Columbia Bar" (CCJS, 1994: 10.7). Although the legal aid plan 
can be described as a mixed delivery model, it should be noted that the private bar handles 
most of the representational services as will be discussed later. 
The Legal Aid Society, created in 1970 with financial support from the Law 
Foundation and the provincial government, started a pure judicare system by referring 
cases to the private bar lawyers, who were paid the "tariff" by the province. In 1972, the 
Legal Aid Society proposed a diversification of its delivery methods by using staff lawyers 
in providing legal aid in the province. In the following four years 30 staff lawyers were 
hired in 15 offices throughout the province to "provide summary advice on criminal and 
family law problems, represent clients, act as duty counsel in criminal courts and makc 
referrals to the private bar" (Brantingharn and Brantingham, 1984:37). This marked the 
start of a mixed model by using both private bar lawyers and staff lawyers and more staff 
lawvers were hired in later years, including the Burnaby public defense office set up in 
1979. However, the Legal Aid Society encouraged staff to "concentrate on civil non- 
family matters7' and the main delivery method continued to be referral to the private bar. Tu 
fact, the use of staff lawyers for direct representation generally decreased in the decade 
1983 until 1993 when the Legal Services Society started to implement several mixed 
model pilot teams in Greater Vancouver. 
Table 3 shows proportions of direct representation cases handled by the private bar 
and staff lawyers for the period from 1984 to 1994. Generally, private lawyers handled 
about 84% of the total caseload, while staff lawyers handled the rest. Hawcver, the 
pattern for criminal matters is quite different from that for civil matters. In the Ibcal year 
of 1993-94, private lawyers handled 95% of the criminal caseload and 73% of the civil 
caseload, while staff lawyers handled the balance. In comparison, however, staff lawyers 
handled about 10% of the criminal caseload and almost 60% of the civil caseload in the 
early 1980's. This trend represents a major movement from the staff model toward the 
judicare model in British Columbia in the decade before 1993. 
'Table 3 Number of Cases Handled by Private Bar and Staff (Criminal and Civil Law) 
Criminal Law Civil Law % sf all 
Staff Cases 
Year Private Staff % of Staff Private Staff % of Staff 
Bar Bar 
1984-85 22,959 2,373 9.4% 5,753 8,031 58.3% 26.6% 
1985-86 23,000 2,400 9.4% 6,500 7,300 52.9% 24.7% 
1986-87 26,800 1,611 5.7% 8,933 6,700 42.9% 18.9% 
1987-88 26,148 1,323 4.8% 10,033 6,144 38.0% 17.1% 
1988-89 29,280 1,326 4.3% 11,040 6,749 37.9% 16.7% 
1989-90 28,911 1,152 3.8% 13,678 6,537 32.3% 15.3% 
1990-91 32,338 1,192 3.6% 16,500 6,739 29.0% 14.0% 
1991-92 42,640 1,240 2.8% 20,035 6,725 25.1% 11.3% 
1992-93 42,521 1,139 2.6% 22,971 7,077 23.6% 11.1% 
1993-94 39,877 2,178 5.2% 22,158 8,357 27.4% 14.5% 
Grand 
Total 314,474 15,934 4.8% 137,601 70,359 33.8 7% 16.0% 
Source: CCJS, 1995:115 
The cost effectiveness of using staff lawyers rather than judicare has been a topic 
for debate in recent years. Evaluations of the legal aid plans in Nova Scotia (Department 
of Justice, Canada, 1985), Quebec (Canadian Bar Association, 1987), Manitoba 
(Department of Justice, Canada, 1987) and Saskatchewan (DPA Group Inc., 1988) 
indicate that "staff models typically cost between one-third and one half as much as 
judicare models per case due to higher productivity, lower administrative costs and fewer 
trials" (Lau, 199355). Using 1990-91 fiscal year data aggregated at the provincial level, 
Easton et a!. (1992) analyzed the relationship between the cost per case and percent of 
cases handled by staff across the ten provinces and two territories in Canada and 
conchded that "the cost per case falls with the use of staff' (p.56). 
The cost effectiveness of using staff versus the private bar in British Columbia is 
not that conclusive. An evaluation of the Burnaby Public Defender Project, conducted in 
198 1 by Brantingham and her research team found that the average cost for judicare cases 
was $225 in Burnaby and $264 in Vancouver, while the average cost for a public defender 
case was $235. Therefore, "the average cost per case for public defender cases was $9 
more than for judicare cases in Burnaby, but $25 less than judicare cases in Vancouver" 
(Brantingham, 1982a:9). The cost effectiveness of the staff model versus judicare, as 
pointed out by Brantingham et al., is dependent on many conditions, such as staff salary 
structure, judicare tariff rate, and workloads. 
In 1993, the LSS set up several staff pilot teams in Greater Vancouver. In an 
interim report on the performance of the pilot teams, it was found that the average cost 
per staff case was higher than the average cost per judicare case (LSS, 1994). However, it 
was too early to come to any conclusion of the cost effectiveness by the pilot teams since 
they had been in operation for too short a time period to maintain a steady case flow. 
The characteristics of people who received legal aid is an important question for 
planning legal services. In addition to the financial situation of the legal aid clients, which 
is one of the criteria to determine the financial eligitidity, it is equally important to 
understand the pattern of poverty, other socio-ecosio~mic and demographic factors of 
legal aid clients, such as their age, gender, employment status and education. Knowing the 
pattern of the age of the legal aid clients, for example, will enable the planner to forecast 
the potential need for legal aid when the demographic pattern of the population in general 
changes. People of different age groups would likely need different types of legal aid 
services. 
Generally speaking, legal aid clients tend to be younger than the general population 
and poorer, and also more likely to be single, unemployed, and male (except for family law 
clients) (see Table 4). In comparison with clients of other types of law, criminal law clients 
are younger. The average age is 28 years old for criminal law clients and over 30 for 
other clients. Criminal law clients are more likely to be single than other clients. Only 
17% of them are married or in common law relationship as compared with more than 20 
% of those for other clients. Criminal law clients are poorer than other clients5. They have 
the lowest average income and least assets among all legal aid clients, with the exception 
of immigration law clients, who are mostly refugee claimants. The criminal law clients are 
also more likely to be unemployed than other clients except for immigration law clients6. 
In regard to the high proportion of the unemployed for immigration clients, it should be 
noted that the majority of immigration law clients are refugee claimants who are not 
allowed to work. Interestingly, it is also shown in Table 4 that criminal law clients tend to 
be much better educated than other types of clients. 
S It should be noted that illegal income is not considered in this discussion. 
6 Immigration clients, most of whom are refugee claimants, may be barred by law from 
working. 
Table 4 Profile of Legal aid Applicants in 1994 
Bofrie Type of Law 
Characteristics Criminal Family Immigration Other Civil 
Average Age 28yrs 34yrs 32yrs 38yrs 
Education: % less than gr. 9 36% 55% 72% 62% 
Maritid Status: 17.2% 20.8% 38.9% 28.1% 
% marriedkommon law 
Average Monthly Income $782 $1,108 $737 $964 
Adjusted Income * $583 $826 $549 $718 
Total Assets (of the family) $2,594 $1 4,463 $5 37 $6,998 
Adjusted Assests* $1,933 $10,777 $400 $5,215 
Percent Employed 14.4% 30.5% 8.7% 62.7% 
Gender (% Male) 85.3% 31.3% 73.7% 62.7% 
Source: The Management Information System of the Legal Services Society of BC 
* Adjusted income and assets are based on the Consumer Price Index for British Columbia, all-items, 
1986=100 (Statistics Canada- Cat. No. 62001, xxv) 
There has been little research on the profile of legal aid clients. Brantinghm and 
Brantingham's evaluation of legal aid conducted in 1984 analyzed the profiles of kgal aid 
clients in British Columbia in 1982. Their analysis makes it possible to compare the 
profile of legal aid clients in recent years with that of clients over ten years ago. 
Table 5 Profile of Legal Aid Applicants in 1982 
-- 
Profile 
-- 
Type of Law 
Characteristics Criminal Family Civil 
Average Age 27 yrs. 32 yrs. 40 yrs. 
Education: % less than gr. 10 70% 53% 5 2% 
Marital Status: 24% 37% 59% 
% of marriedkommon law 
Average Monthly Income $500 $670 $754 
Adjusted Income * $582 $780 $878 
Total Assets (of the family) $818 $3,935 $5,307 
Adjusted Assets* $952 $4,581 $6,178 
Source: Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984a. 
* Adjusted income and assets are based on the Consumer Price Index for British Columbia, all-items, 
1986=100 (Statistics Canada- Cat. No. 62001, xxv) 
Comparing the profdes of the legal aid clients produces interesting patterns. First, 
criminal law and family law legal aid clients in 1994, who accounted for more than 90 
perc.:nt of all legal aid clients, (Table 4), are fmancrally better off than those in 1982 
(Table 5 )  with more substantial difference in assets than in take-home income7. The 
immigration law clients in 1994, most of whom are refugee claimants, and the other civil 
law clients in 1994, most of whom are poverty law clients, are poorer tnan those in 1982. 
In comparison with clients of other types of law, criminal law legal aid clients tend to be 
poorer than civil law clients, with the exception of immigration clients. 
In terms of the age of the clients, there is no ~ i g ~ c a n t  difference between the two 
groups, i.e., it is the simiIar age groups of people that needed and received legal aid in 
both periods of time. Generally, criminal law clients were the youngest in both time 
periods. In regard to education, the earlier study found that criminal law clients were more 
poorly educated than clients of other types of law (see Table 5),  while the 1994 data show 
that ccriminal law clients were better educated than most clients of other types of law (see 
Table 4). It should be noted, however, that there is some discrepancy in the measurement 
adopted for the two periods. The Brantingham and Brantingham study used grade 10 as 
the measuring criterion. In the Management Information System of the LSS, code '9" 
stands for both grade 9 and university education, which makes it impossible to have an 
accurate count of people with less than grade 10 educate and the closest cutoff point is 
Grade 9. With the dserent cutoff points, the figures suggest that criminal law and family 
law legal aid clients in '1994 are likely to be better educated than those in 1982. Comparing 
7 The total assets for 1993 legal aid clients are pure assets, with debt deducted. 
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clients of different types of law, the pattern in 1994 is also different from that in 1982. 
Immigration legal aid clients (most of them are refugee ciahxants) are the least educated, 
which is followed by other civil law clients. The difference between criminal law clicnts 
and family law clients in 1994 is no longer as obvious as that in 1982. This pattern o f  
better educated clients is likely to correlate with the fact that the Canadian population as n 
whole is now better educated than it was over 10 years ago. Legal aid clients in 1994 arc 
less likely to be married (or in common law relationship) than 1982 clients for all types of 
law. Similarly to the 1982 pattern, criminal law clients are least likely married in 1994. 
The research report of Brantingham and Brantingham does not give specific 
figures about the gender of legal aid clients in 1982. However, the pattern identified in 
1982 is very similar to that in 1994, i.e., the majority of legal aid clients for criminal law 
matters are male (84.6%) and those for family law matters are female (70%). 
Table 6 Profile of LegaJ Aid Applicants in 1993 
Profile Type of Law 
Characteristics Criminal Family Immigration Other Civil 
Average Age 
Education: % less than gr. 9 
Marital Status: 
% marriedkornmon law 
Average Monthly Income 
Adjusted Income* 
Total Assets (of the family) 
Adjusted Assets* 
Percent Employed 
Gender (% of Male) 84.6% 29.9% 76.2% 51.6% 
Source: The Management Information System of the Legal Services Society of BC 
* Adjusted income and assets are based on the Consumer Price Index for British Columbia, all-items, 
1986=100 (Statistics Canada- Cat. No. 62001, xxv) 
In October, 1993 the LSS started to implement stricter financial eligibility criteria 
for criminal law and family law matters. It is interesting to compare the profile 
characteristics of the legal aid clients before and after the implementation of the new 
policy. Using the Management Information System of the Legal Services Society of BC 
the profde of 1993 legal aid clients is analyzed (see Table 6). Thus, the effect of the 1991 
eligibihty policy can be reiidily revealed by comparing the profile of legal aid clients in 
1993 with that in 1994 (see Table 4). By comparing the monthly income adjusted to 
constant dollars, legal aid clients under the stricter fmancial eligibility in 1994 tended to 
have less income (especially for criminal law clients). They were also less educated, and 
less employed. In terms of assets, however, legal aid clients in 1994 tended to be a little 
better off than the clients in 1993. The difference in income and assets found hers is 
consistent with the Legal Services Society's eligibility policy in 1993, which used income 
as the major criterion in determining the eligibility of legal aid clients, without much 
emphasis to the amount of assets. 
Expenditures for legal aid in British Columbia have followed an erratic path. It is 
shown in Figure 1 that, along with the general pattern of increase, the expenditures for 
legal aid went up substantially in the early 1980s, and then declined for a couple of years 
in the mid-80s. After a slow and steady increase that lasted for several years, the 
expenditures rose rapidly after 1990 as the effects of revised family law and criminal law 
tariffs and a newly imposed duty to represent persons in immigration hearings took hold". 
The expenditures showed an even more dramatic increase, skyrocketing to more than $65 
million, during the 1991-92 fiscal year as the costs of the 1992 revision of the crirninitl law 
tariff began to be felt. In the fiscal year 1993-94, the cost of legal aid exceeded 100 
million dollars. 
8 The expansion of legal aid to cover immigration matters will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Figure 1 Legal Aid Expenditure in British Columbia 
Source: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (1985 ... 1993). Resource and Caseload statistics for Legal 
A id in Canada 
Many factors within the legal aid system may affect the cost of legal aid in general 
and may contribute to rapid increases in the cost of legal aid in British Columbia. These 
indude: 
--volume of clients; 
--financial eligibility criteria; 
--service coverage policy; 
--accessibility (number and location of office); 
--tariff system and staff salaries; 
--range of  service:^ (such as PLE, duty counsel, Brydges), and 
--administrative practices. 
This chapter provides an analysis of some of the factors listed above. 
Financial Eligibility 
In order to receive legal aid representational services iii Bridsh Columbia, an 
individual must be both financially eligible and have a problem covered by the Legal 
Services Society (LSS, 1992:2). The detailed criteria used to define financial eligibility and 
problem coverage basically determine the need for legal aid, whch in turn affects thc 
demand for legal aid. The areas of law covered by the LSS will be discussed in the next 
section in this chapter. Financial eligibility is the major consideration in this section. 
In terms of financial eligibdity, there are two formal definitions which haw somc 
binding effect on the Legal Services Society in defining the need for legal aid. The Legal 
Services Society Act of 1979 sets out a formal d e f ~ t i o n  of fmancid eligibility: a person is 
eligible for legal aid if, for financial reasons, he would not otherwise receive legal services 
provided by a lawyer (Section 3.1.a). The cost sharing agreement between the Federal 
Department of Justice and the Ministry of the Attorney General in British Columbia has a 
more specific defmition of the financial eligibility: 
... (in determining financial eligibihty the provincial agency) shall apply 
flexible rules that take into account whether the applicant can retain 
counsel at his own expense without him or his dependents (if any) suffering 
undue financial hardships such as incurring heavy indebtedness or being 
required to dispose of modest necessary assets. (Government of Cawada, 
1978:4-5) 
These provisions are fairly general and allow the LSS much room to define the 
specifics of financial eligibility. The U S ,  in response to funding difficulties, hiis rredefmcd 
the need for legd aid by modifying the financial eligibility policy several times in the past 
two decades. 
Before 1982, the LSS followed a flexible financial eligibility policy: 
Persons are financially eligible for legal aid when requiring them to 
pay legal fees would impair their ability to provide themselves and their 
dependents with the essentials necessary to keep them adequately fed, 
clothed, sheltered and living together as a family. 
The test is designed to be flexible. It takes into account an 
applicant's entire financial situation, including the probable cost of the 
services required ... 
Those not fmancially eligible for service may nevertheless be 
assisted if the needed services cannot be obtained from another source 
(LSS, 1982:8). 
In response to a funding cut from the government, the LSS introduced a restraint 
prrtgrm with a relatively aex ib le  income cut-off test in October, 1982, which lasted till 
1990. According to this test, applicants whose net f&- income exceeded the established 
standards were not eligible for legal aid. The income cut-offs were tied to poverty levels 
published by the National Councii on Welfare and varied by the size of the applicant's 
family and the size of the community where the applicant resided. However, "those not 
fmcial ly  eligible for service may nevertheless be assisted if the needed service cannot be 
obtained from another source'" (LSS, 1984:9) Efforts were made to give as much legal 
infomation and advice as gcssibk to ineligible persons who cannot afford a lawyer (LSS, 
In 1990, a flexible eligibility test was introduced for all matters (CCJS. 1993: 
10.12). Under the flexible eligibility test even if an applicant's income was above the 
poverty guideline helshe might quahfj for legal aid when it was judged that requiring 
W h e r  to pay for counsel would impair hislher ability to furnish self and family with the 
essentials necessary to keep them decently clothed, sheltered and living together as a 
family. The eligibihty test was flexible enough to allow the plan to also consider: thc 
complexity of the legal matter, the urgency of the situation, the nature of the service 
applied for, the quantum of the claim, the cost of the proceeding and whether a reasonable 
person who had to pay a lawyer would spend the money to advance this case (CCJS, 
1994: 10.13). 
In September of 1993, the Society again tightened its financial guidelines for 
people with family or criminal law problems who apply for legal aid by removing thc 
flexible test, at least on an interim basis. All legal aid clients, according to the new policy, 
"must have incomes below the 1992 low income guidehes set by the National Council of' 
Welfare" (Casting, 1993:3), except for family law emergency cases and serious criminal 
charges involving complex issues of fact and law where the Society may use discretion to 
provide legal aid services. For those whose incomes are above the low income guideline 
and who have family law emergency matters, such as applications for interim custody, 
interim maintenance, occupancy or restraining orders, defense in child apprehension, etc. 
only limited lawyer services will be provided to alleviate the emergency situation. 
Table 7 Low Monthly Net Income Cut-off Table as the Basic Guideline to Test Eligibility for 
Legal Aid (1992) 
Family Vancouver Victoria 30,000-99,000 iess than 30,000 
Size Population Population 
1 $1,090 $970 $950 $880 
2 1,540 1,390 1,360 1,260 
3 1,900 1,700 1,670 1,540 
4 2,140 1,930 1,890 1,750 
5 2,300 2,100 2,050 1,900 
6 2,460 2,240 2,210 2,050 
7 or more 2,610 2,380 2,340 2,190 
Source: Legal Services Society of British Columbia Policy Manual (1992) 
Note: Net income equals gross income minus tax, unemployment insurance, Canada Pension plan, 
medical benefits and maintenance payments. 
Coverage Policy 
In addition to being financially eligible, a person also has to have a legal issue for 
which the LSS agrees to provide legal counsel, which is generally referred to as legal aid 
coverage policy. The LSS covers a wide range of legal issues, including criminal law and 
civil law which includes family law, immigration law, mental health law, prison law, human 
rights issues and "poverty law", a generic term the LSS uses to refer to wide range of 
legal issues such as unemployment insurance claims, workers compensation, etc. In almost 
all of these legal areas, the LSS has specific policies about what is covered and what is 
not. In addition, the LSS modified its policy and redefined the need for legal aid several 
times for various reasons, one of which was to respond to the changes in the cost of legal 
aid and changes in funding resources in the past two decades. This section will first briefly 
describe the coverage policy for civil law then will discuss the criminal law coverage 
policy in greater detail. 
Civil Law Coverrage 
The formal civil law coverage policy is set by the Legal Service Society Act, 
Section 3: 
The society shall ensure ... that legal services are available for 3 qualifying 
individual who ... 
(b) may be imprisoned or confined through civil proceedings; 
(c) is or may be a party to a proceeding respecting a domestic dispute that 
affects his physical or mental safety or health or that of his children; or 
(d) has a legal problem that threatens (i) his family's physical or mental 
safety or health; (ii) his ability to feed, clothe and provide shelter for 
himself and his dependents; or (iii) his livelihood. 
To meet the statutory mandate, the LSS covers, in respect to family law, all 
financially eligible people with custody and access matters, maintenance matters, fiin~ily 
violence issues and those financially eligible people who have an urgent issue of 
application to vary maintenance downward; adoption; uncontested divorce; division of 
property, including enforcement; etc. (LSS, 1992). 
In regard to other civil law coverage (non-fimily), legal aid is available for 
immigration matters where the basic rule is that a financially eligible person is an 
immigration inquiry or hearing which may result in deportation, and the service is not 
otherwise available. In other civil matters legal aid is available for those matters where an 
unfavomble outcome to a proceeding affects the physical or mental safety or health of the 
applicant and/or the applicants' children, or endangers the applicants; Livehhood or hislher 
ability to feed, clothe or provide shelter for self or dependents. The types of civil litigation 
(non-family) which may be covered by legal aid include: defense in motor vehicle 
negligence, damage actions, landlord-tenant disputes, worker's compensation claims, 
wrongful dismissal, personal injury, social assistance, consumer protection, unemployment 
insuranse, foreclosures, and bankruptcy. The LSS has a tariff for family law matters and 
immigration law matters. However, there is no tariff for civil (non-family) matters; 
assistance is provided by staff of branch offices, cornunity law offices or native 
community law offices, or on a pro bonog referral to a member of the private bar. A pro 
bono referral covers disbursements, but does not pay fees (LSS, 1992). 
Human rights issues are also covered when legal representation is needed for 
proceedings before the Human Rights Council. Legal Aid for these proceedings are funded 
by the Human Rights Council, but administered by the Legal Services Society. 
Criminal Law Coverage 
Similar to the guidelines for the eligibility policy, there are two formal definitions 
of criminal law '%overage7' policy. One is the Legal Services Society Act that states that an 
individual qualifies for legal services if he "is a defendant in criminal proceedings that 
Pro bono pu6lico services are provided free of charge by legal professionals. 
could lead to his imprisonment'' (Section 3.2.b). The other formal definition is stated in the 
early federal provincial cost sharing agreements, which spec@ those matters rehted to 
criminal law for which legal aid must be provided for eligible persons: 
indictable offences; 
federal summary conviction offences or proceedings under the Juvenile 
Delinquent ~ c t "  where there is a likehhood, in the opinion of the 
provincial agency that there will be imprisonment or loss of means of 
earning a livelihood; 
proceedings pursuant to the Extradition Act and the Fugitive Offenders 
Act; 
appeals by the Crown in any of the above matters; 
appeals by the accused in any of the above matters, if the provincial 
agency deterinines that the appeal has merit or where the court 
appealed to requests the appointment of counsel on behalf of the 
appellant. (Government of Canada: 197 8) 
Prior to October, 1982, the LSS had a relatively more lenient coverage policy. The 
criminal law tariff covered: "all indictable o ffeaces; summary conviction offences where 
there is a definite likelihood that, if convicted, the accused wdl receive a prison sentence 
or lose the means of earning a living ... etc." (LSS, 19839). This basically meant, in 
practice, that legal aid was available for summary offences where there was a "possibility" 
of imprisonment. From August 31 till November 21, 1983, "because of a further reduction 
in funding, the Society was obliged to reduce its services below the minimum set out in 
s.3(2) of the Legal Services Society Act. All coverage was elinmated for anyone facing a 
summary conviction charge (where the maximum sentence is six months' imprisonment), 
10 The Juvenile Delinquency Act has bcen superseded by the Young Offenders Act, which 
means that this section needs to be updated. 
unless that individual was likely to go jail and did not have a related prior record. In effect, 
this ehinated coverage in thirty percent of cases. This meant that many individuals facing 
incarcerations as a result of a conviction were denied counsel" (LSS, 1984:8). 
The LSS reinstituted coverage in summary conviction matters on November 21, 
1983, in response to the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in the case of 
Mountain vs. the Legal Services Society of BC ([1983],5 D.L.R. [4TH] 170 [B.C.C.A.]). 
'The Society now provides services in areas under s.3(2) of the Act. In 
criminal matters, counsel is provided for all indictable matters, for summary 
conviction matters where the accused is likely to be imprisoned or to lose 
the means of earning a livelihood as a result of the charges he or she is 
facing; for charges under the Young OfSenders Act" (LSS, 1 984: 8). 
The Legal Services Society followed this policy for over ten years until the August 
of 1994, when the Society had to reduce the cost of providing legal aid, which more than 
doubled in the 1992/93 f ~ c a l  year as a result of a doubling tanff in the summer of 199 1. 
Instead of providing legal aid for all indictable offences "whether or not jad is likely result 
of conviction" (LSS Policy Handbook, 1993), the Society decided in August, 1994 that 
the LSS would appoint counsel for an accused only when the accused was facing "a 
reasonable chance of jail", no matter whether the charge was indictable, summary or 
hybrid. Provincial offences are covered on the same basis. While the chances of 
imprisonment are dependent on the circumstances of the offence, the record of the 
accused, and the sentencing patterns of each individual community, the intake staff of legal 
aid are instructed to "check with the local Crown counsel to get their opinions" (LSS 
Policy Handbook, 1994) if they are unsure of the likelihood of imprisonment. In rcgud to 
appeals, Crown initiated appeals are generally covered by legal aid while coveragc in 
accused initiated appeals is based on merit. 
In exceptional cases coverage will be extended to individuals who tnay not have 
the emotional, intellectual or linguistic capacity to pursue a matter on their own accord. 
The following are some of the possible exceptions to the coverage criteria: ( 1 )  the 
applicant can not obtain the needed legal services from another source; and (2) thc 
applicant agrees to make a frnancial contribution where possible; a d  (3) the applicant 
satisfies one or more of the following criteria: (a) the applicant has special ethnic, cultural 
or linguistic need; or (b) the applicant is geographically isolated from legal services; or (c) 
the applicant has a case which could benefit individuals, the majority of whom would he 
financially eligible for legal aid and which could not proceed without assis~mce from Legal 
Services; or (d) the applicant is physically or mentally disabled and thereby unable to 
obtain legal services elsewhere; or (e) the applicant is a nonprolit organization, where the 
services are determined to be in the best interest of individuals, a majority of whom would 
be financially eligible (LSS, 1992). 
Tariffs 
The Legal Services Society of British Columbia has been using tariff' schcdulcs 
since 1972. At present, most of criminal law, family law, immigration law and human 
rights cases are referred to the private bar on tariffs which set the amount of Sees payable, 
Some civil (other than family and immigration law) matters are referred out on a pro bono, 
disbursements only basis. 
Since the introduction of the first tanff schedule in 1972, the tariffs have 
undergone periodic adjustments, which, as will be discussed later in this study, account for 
most of the increases in the cost of providing legal aid in BC. The following is a relatively 
static 'snap-shot' view of the tariff structure in 1993. 
Family law, immigration law and human rights cases are paid for on an hourly basis 
at the rate of $80 per hour for general preparation, court preparation, court appearances 
and other services up to specified maximums. For family law matters the maximum billable 
hours are 26 hours for general preparation, 5 hours for court preparation. For immigration 
law cases, the maximum billable hours are 9 hours for general preparation, 5 hours for 
court hearing preparation and no limit for actual court appearance time. 
Criminal law tariff structure is a lot more complicated than the civil law tariff. 
First, the t a r8  pays different fees for services rendered, depending on the type of charges 
which are grouped into four categories on the basis of seriousness, consequences and the 
amount of work required. Following are some examples to illustrate the categorization. 
Offences related to court process and peace bond, such as violation of judicial interim 
release or breach of recognizance are grouped in Category 1 ; common assault, theft, fraud 
under $1,000 in Category 2; break-and-enter, assault causing bodily hann and similar 
offences are grouped in Category 3; murder, robbery, kidnapping a d  other most serious 
offences are grouped into Category 4. 
The fees are also based on block payments for billable items which are tied to 
various court proceedings such as prehmary hearing, guilty pledtrial, sentencing and so 
on. Tariff rates vary according to the seriousness of the charges. Block fees are based on 
the average amount of time required for a proceeding, including court attendance, 
preparation, interviews, meetings and telephone calls. Since the actual amount of time 
required to complete a matter varies from case to case, the reasoning behind block fecs is 
that referral lawyers gain on some cases and lose on others. Table 8 includes some billable 
items with some extent of over-simplLfication to illustrate the manner in which the tariff 
functions. 
Table 8 Examples of Criminal Law Tariff (effective Dec. 1,1992) 
BILLABLE ITEM CHARGE TYPE 
Category Category Category Category 
I I1 I11 IV 
Early Termination $50 $70 $90 $140 
Guilty Plea $180 $220 $260 $400 
First Half Day of Hearing $360 $450 $540 $720 
Bail Review (fust half-day) $140 $140 $180 $1 80 
Sentencing (first half-day) $180 $220 $260 $400 
As mentioned earlier, the tariff has undergone numerous adjustments since it was 
introduced in 1972. These adjustments, most of which have been increases, have had 
major impacts on the cost of legal aid in BC. Table 9 lists all the tariff changes and all the 
expenditures on legal aid in British Columbia from 1977 to 1993. Table 9 clearly illustrates 
the impact of' tariff change on the cost of legal aid. Following most changes in_ tariff, the 
cost would change accordingly in the following years. When there was an increase of 8% 
of tariff in January, 1979, for example, the expenditure in the following fscal year 
increased by a b u t  18%. When t a r s  was decreased by 12.5% in October, 1982, the cost 
of legal aid decreased in the following year, too. When the biggest tariff increase in legal 
aid history took place in June, 1991, the impact is also the most striking: while the 
expenditure increased by 50% in the same f s c d  year of the tarsincrease in comparison to 
the previous fical year, the cost in the following year was more than doubled that of the 
year before the tariff increase. When tariff changes take place, they normally affect the 
cases that are assigned to the private bar after the effective date of the tariff change. The 
tariff change in 1991, however, was different from all other changes in that all the cases 
that were not completed could be reassigned so that the hrgher tanff rate could be applied. 
This practice resulted in an immediate increase of cost. However, with downward changes 
in tariff, the impact will not be seen until a ysar or two years later. 
Table 9 Tariff Changes and Cost of Legal Aid in BC 
Year TOW Expenditure Tariff Change 
$'OOO (Compound) 
$9,808 +8% 
$1 1,572 
$10,905 +8% 
$15,446 +38% 
$20,333 -12.5% 
$17,328 
$16,564 
$18,656 +14.3% 
$20,643 
$22,8 13 +25 % 
+32% (Family 
Tariff Only) 
$27,000 +8% 
$33,088 +5 % 
$42,018 +6% 
$65,522 +loo% 
$88,346 -15% 
$100,894 +lo% (Family 
Effective Date of 
Change 
Jan. 1,1979 
June 1, 1980 
Sept. 1, 198 1 
Oct. 1, 1982 
Jan. 1,1986 
Aug. 1,1987 
Jan. 1,1988 
Oct. 1, 1988 
Oct. 1, 1989 
Jan. 1,1991 
June 1,1991 
Dec. 1, 1992 
April 1, 1993 
Source: CCJS (1986,1995) and LSS (1995) 
Accessibility to Legal Aid Sewices 
Accessibility is crucial in the provision of Legal aid services. People in need of 
legal aid cannot use the service without access to it, even when the services are available. 
Offices and other client contact points must be located so that people who need legal aid 
can have physical access to the services. An accused person is tried in the jurisdiction 
where the offence was committed rather than where he/she lives. Although the Lcgal 
Services Society does not have any jurisdictional requirements, services and the initial 
client contact points have to be available to where the person is arrested and charged. 
Accessibility is also crucial to the need for and the cost of legal aid. To make legal aid 
services accessible, client contact points have to be set up at approachable places. The 
availability of services also needs to be advertised to make the potential clients aware of 
the services. In addition :r, an initial setup cost, the potential cost of providing services to 
meet the need that was previously unmet constitutes the lion's share of the cost. 
Many factors affect the accessibility of legal aid services. First is the physical 
availability of client contact points and the availability of stafT and private bar able to 
provide legal counsel (including both summary advice and representation) after the initial 
contact. In order to make the services available, over 60 client contact points have been 
set up through out the province (as of January 1, 1993, according to the Legal Services 
Society's telephone directory), including 16 LSS branch offices, 10 Community Law 
Offices, 7 Native Community Law Offices, 21 Area Directors, 2 Native Legal Information 
Offices, a Prison Liaison Ofice and several charity organizations such as Salvation Army 
and Elizabeth Fry Society. These client contact points take legal aid applications, provide 
summary advice and provide full representation for clients where staff lawyers are 
available. In addition, the LSS retains over two thousand private bar lawyers to provide 
leg$ counsel either on tariff or on a pro bono basis (CCJS, 1994). In addition, tci make the 
legal aid services physically available, the services also need to be approachable and the 
porentid clients need to be informed of the availability of the service. The Legal Services 
Society, and its predecessors, have made efforts to achieve this end by means of 
advertising and through public legal education programs. It should also be noted that 
police are now required to mention the availability of duty counsel and legal aid as a 
routine part of the arrest process. 
Given all the efforts by the LSS and its predecessors, the current accessibility to 
legal aid services in BC remains to be evaluated. The only research that has been 
conducted on this topic is in the Evaluation of Legal Aid in British CulurrJliu by P;.\tricia 
L. Brantingham and Paul J. Brantingham (1984) about ten years ago. After comprehensive 
research on the accessibility of legal aid services in British Columbia, they concluded that 
in .spite of the fact that the location of offices was partially planned and partially an 
historical accident, "At a regional level, the LSS has been remarkably successf~d in 
matching resources to what appear to be problem areas." However, "their success was 
more limited at the Administrative Service Area level" (Brantingham and B ranting ham, 
1984a:206). At another dimension of accessibility, they found that "legal aid is not  
uniformly available to the people of British Columbia" (Brantingham and Brantingham, 
1984b:g). They argued that the need for legal aid in criminal matters should correlate with 
court actions. "Knowing the prosecution rate and the poverty in an area should make it 
possible to predict demand for legal aid." However, they found that, controlling fbr 
poverty, no correlation between the prosecution rate and the criminal legal aid utilization 
rate across the services areas in BC. Instead they found that "the use of criminal legal aid 
was determined by the availability of staff in offices and the referral network that got 
people to the LSS, not by court prosecution patterns" (Brantingham and Brantingham, 
i984b:9). They also noted that there were major holes in the delivery of criminal lcgal aid 
services and m the non-family legal aid services. "Areas served by Areas Dircct~rs and 
circuits courts had low utilization rates, Areas served by offices had higher utilization 
rates .... Not kaving an Area Director or a circuit court was even worse" (Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 1984b:9). Based on these finding they concluded that "there must be umnet 
nccd for criminal legal aid. Not all people eligible for criminal legal aid are receiving it". 
The problems listed above were found ten years ago. Updated research is 
obviously needed to reevaluate the current status of accessibility to legal aid services in 
BC. However, a comparison between the distribution of the client contact points analyzed 
by Brantingham and Brantingham ten years ago and the client contact points now shows 
that only a few additional client contact points have been set up during the intervening 
eleven years, which indicates that the problem of accessibility that was found ten years ago 
may still exist (see Table If)). 
Table 10 A Comparison of Client Contact Points 
Tvm of Contact Point 1982 1993 
Branch Office IS 16 
CLO 10 10 
NCLO 4 7 
Area Director 20 2 1 
The Legal Services Socieiy Act establishes the right of qualified people in British 
Columbia to have legal aid when they need it. However, the vague wording in the Act 
mAes this right open to interpretation by the administrators of legal aid when there are 
changes in the environment in which legal aid is provided. Various factors have impacted 
on the behavior of the legal aid system in BC. Community involvement, legal profession 
involvement, changes in law (especially court decisions) and government policy have all 
left their rnarks on the manner in which legal aid is provided today. However, nothing has 
impacted on the legal aid system more than the funding has. 
First of all, it is the systemic funding from the government and the legal profession 
that made it possible to initiate a system that provided the people in the province with 
systemic legal services. Before 1970, "legal aid was essentially a voluntary system relying 
on the charitable impulses of individual members of the bar" (Brantingham, 1984:35), 
although the provincial Attorney General had agreed to pay honoraria of $30 per day for 
minor indictable matters and $50 per day for serious indictable matters since 1964. In 
1970 the Legal Aid Society was created with financial support from the Law Foundation 
and the provincial government, which marked the establishment of a formal legal aid 
system in British Columbia. In 1972, the federal and provincial governments entered a 
cost-sharing agreement for criminal legal aid. The province received about 50% of its 
costs for criminal legal aid from the federal Department of Justice. Meanwhile, the 
provincial government changed its policy and increased funding for legal aid. As a result of 
the substantial funding from the federal government and the increased funding from the 
provincial government, the legal aid system in BC experienced a major expansion and 
reorganization in the ten-year period from 1972 to 1982. In these ten years, criminal law 
ceverzge was exteded, a d  the crimbal law and family law tariffs were increased. The 
Legal Services Commission by statute in 1975 started to administer all legal aid funding 
and plan the delivery of legal services. The Commission established legal information 
services to support the placement and use of legal materials in public libraries throughout 
the province. The Legal Resource Centre was created to answer reference questions and 
provide public access to legal information through the Law Line. Later in 1976, the Native 
Programs Branch was established to improve delivery of legal services to native people. In 
1979 the Legal Services Society was created by statute through a merger of the Legal Aid 
Society and the Legal Services Commission. By the end of the f ~ c a l  year of 1981-82, 
there were a total of 18 LSS branch offices, 10 Community Law Offices, 7 Native Legal 
Information Offices and 17 Area Directors through out the province to provide legal 
services. In addition, the LSS funded several agencies such as the Ehabeth Fry Society 
and the BC Civil Liberties Association and ran several special programs such as the Prison 
Services Program, the Burnaby Public Defender Office and the Do Your Own Divorce 
Program (LSS, 1982). 
While substantial funding from the government and the legal profession made it 
possible for the poor in the province to have more and more access to legal services in the 
ten year period from 1972 to 1982, as illustrated above, cuts in funding have had equally 
important impacts on the legal aid system in BC. By late 1982 and early 1983, both the 
federal and provincial governments announced economic restraint policies. While the 
federal government's restraint policies had little direct effect on the funding for legal aid in 
BC, the provincial government made heavy cuts to the funding for legal aid which had 
dramatic impact on the legal aid system. In July 1983, instead of providing tbe modest 
increase expected by the Society, the provincial Attorney General's Ministry reduced 
government funding for legd aid for 1983/84 by $3.7 million from that actually provided 
in 1982183- The Society's financial difficulties were compounded by the Law Foundation 
of British Columbia's reduction in funding by $76G,VN (LSS, 1984:4). Ovcrdl, this 
represented more than a 20% cut in resources. 
As a result of the massive reduction in funding from both the provincid 
government and the legal profession, the Legal Services Society had to take several 
measures to manage the deficit: 
Coverage in family and criminal law cases was narrowed; 
"All coverage was eliminated for anyone facing a summary conviction charge 
(where the maximum sentence is six months' imprisonment), unless that 
individual was likely to go to jail. and did not have a related prior record (LSS, 
1985); 
Strict financial eligibility guidelines were adopted for criminal and I'amily 
matters; 
Services in all information programs were reduced; 
A user fee was introduced for all clients who received representational scrvicc; 
Tariffs of fees paid to lawyers were reduced by 12.5%; 
Five offices in Nanaimo, Vernon, Cranbrook, Smithers and Maple Ridgc wcrc 
closed (LSS, 1985) and staff level was reduced in other offices; 
Funding was discontinued for the paralegal hired by the North Shorc 
Information and Referral Society in North Vanccluver and for the paralegal 
hired by the Richmond Women's Resource Centre Society; and 
Funding of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association was discontinued 
and funding to the Elizabeth Fry Society was substantially reduced. 
As a result of all t k s e  measures, the cost of providing legal aid in the province 
decreased in 1983, 1984 and 1985 (Figure 1) and thp, number of clients that received legal 
aid also decreased. In the fourth quarter of 1982, as illustrated in Figure 2, the volume of 
direct representation was 33% lower than the previous quarter md 23% lower than the 
same period in the previous year. The volume of direct representation in the first quarter 
of 1983 was even lower. The tariff stayed at the reduced rate for several years until 1986 
when the Law Foundation of BC made a special grant to the LSS of BC, which restored 
the tariff to its 1981 level. 
Figure 2 Impact of Restraint Programs on Volume of Services 
!+~irect Representation U Total Contacts I 
Source: Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984:Table 1 - 13. 
LEGISLATION, COURT DECISIONS, THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND LEGAL AID 
Many aspects of the Canadian justice system may influence the number of persons 
served by legd aid and the cost of providing Iegal aid. Chapter VIl will discuss how 
various parts within the justice system influence the need and cost of legal aid. ThLF 
section focuses on Row legislation, court decisions, and the social environment affect the 
need for and cost of legal aid. 
in 1984 the f d e r d  government proclaimed the Young Offeerulers Act, a 
comprehensive overhaul of the procedures relating to young people. In particuular, the Act 
provides that any young person (between the ages of 12 and 17), when charged with a 
criminal offence, has a statutory right to a court order appointing counsel paid for by the 
Crown, even if that person is ineligible for legal aid. If a young person is refused legal aid, 
hdshe can ask the court for "court-directed counsel" under the Young Oflenders Act. 
Since the enactment of the Young Offenders Act, the LSS has extended unlirmted 
coverage to applicants charged as young offenders for federal offences. Table 11 
illustrates the impact of the Young Offenders Act on the need for and cost of legal aid. The 
columns of 'Court Directed Y O A  show the volume and cost of those cases that were 
either financially ineligible or fell out of the range of coverage. Comparing the court 
directed YOA cases with the eligible YOA cases over the 11 years reveals interesting 
patterns. The first pattern is the difference between the volume and cost in the first few 
years and that in the last few years. In the first few years, the impact of the Act was 
relatively minimal. Eleven years later, however, both the volume and cost of cases 
increased dramatically. In 1994, the cost of court directed cases rose to over two million 
dollars a year. One hypothetical explanation of this pattern is that young offenders were 
generally unaware of their rights under the Young Offenders Act in the earlier years of the 
enactment of the Act. When they were charged under the YOA, they (or their parents) 
would pay for legal counsel out of their own pockets. The second pattern is the fairly 
stable percentage of Court Directed Cases out of all YOA cases (around 30 percent) 
between 1987 and 1992 and the sharp increases in 1993 (6 percent from the previous 
year) and 1994 (almost 11 percent from the previous year). Meanwhile, the v o l ~ ~  of 
eligible YOA cases decfeased in the last two years. The second pattern reveals the impact 
of the changes of the eligibility policy and the coverage policy by the Legal Services 
Society in 1993 and 1994 as discussed earlier in t h  chapter. Shce t!le eligibility policy 
and coverage policy became more strict, more people failed to meet the approval standtwd 
and more youths consequently had court directed counsels. Table 11 also indicates that it 
may take many years to see the full impact of new legislation. In the current instance, the 
need for and cost of legal aid for younger offenders have been increasing since the 
proclamation of the Young Offenders Act ten years ago. And it cannot be concluded that 
1994 saw the full impact of the Act, i.e., the percentage of court directed YOA cascs may 
keep increasing. 
Recently, the parliament has been considering redefining the age boundary of 
young offenders. Any change in the age boundary will impact legal aid significantly. If the 
upper h i t  of 17 is changed to 15, for example, fewer people would receive legal aid 
under the court direction, which would translate into less cost of legal aid. However, those 
between the ages of 15 and 17 would go to adult courts, where it takes more time to 
process a case. This would mean higher legal aid cost because part of the age group would 
be from poor families and would qualify for legal aid. 
Table 11 Volume and Cost of Legal Aid for YOA Gases 
Eligible YOA Court Directed YOA % of Court Directed 
YOA 
# of Cases Cost # of Cases Cost % of Cases % of Cost 
1984 1,440 $255,548 80 $1 1,872 5.3% 4.4% 
In addition to new legislation, the interpretation of existing legislation by the court 
at different levels has had significant impact on the need for and cost of legal aid. In 1990, 
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled, in the case of Regina vs. Brydges [1990] 74 C.R. 
(3d) 129, that people who have been arrested or detained in custody have the 
constitutional right to receive immediate information about the availability of legal aid and 
duty counsel. In the majority decision in that case, Chief Justice Lamer considered the 
historical development of legal aid programs in Canada and the development of special 
duty counsel programs which were designed to provide summary advice at the pre-trial 
stage of criminal proceedings. He held that the purpose of these programs coincided with 
the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. On that 
basis, Chief Justice Lamer ruled that the police had a duty at the time of arresting or 
detaining an individual on criminal charges to provide that person with immediate 
information about the availability of duty counsel and legal aid (National Review of Lcgd 
Aid: 26). Following the decision of the Supreme Court, the Legal Services Society of BC 
started a toll-free province-wide telephone service (the Brydges Project) to ensure that 
people detained in custody had prompt access to legal aid advice (LSS, 199 I). 
In order to reduce the expenditure of legal aid during a budget squeeze in 1983, 
the Legal Services Society attempted to reduce coverage for summary conviction matters 
even where imprisonment was a likely result. This action by LSS was declared illegal by 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Mountain vs. Legal Services Society, lIY84/ 2 
W. W.R. 438). It ruled that the plan could not deny criminal and civil services established in 
the Legal Sewices Act, 1979. The LSS, therefore, had to restore its coverage to the carlier 
level. 
Before 1990, refugee claimants and other persons subject to immigration 
proceedings might get services through staff lawyers or pro bono programs. Whether they 
actually could obtain the services was subject to the availability of staff lawyers or of 
private lawyers who were willing to take such cases on pro bono basis. The British 
Columbia Supreme Court ruled that coverage in deportation proceedings is mandatory 
under the terms of the Legal Services Society Act (Gonzulez-Davis vs. Legal Services 
Society [I9911 5 WWR 181). In April of 1991 this r u h g  was upheld by the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal ( [ IN i], 8 1 D.L.R. [4W] 12 [B.C.C.A.]). In response to this 
court decision the legal aid plan created an immigration tariff (CCJS, 1994: 10.9). 
12 illustrates the impact of the court decision in the case of Gonzulez-hvis vs. Legal 
Services Society on the need for legal aid and the cost of providing legal aid. As a result of 
the court decision, each year more than two thousand people are redefined as in need of 
legal aid with an additional cost of four million dollars. 
Table 12 Volume and Cost of Legal Aid for Immigration Cases 
Y ear # of Clients Cost 
Served 
1992 2,638.00 $3,895,765 
Data Source: Legal Services Society's Management Information System 
It should be noted here that although the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet 
ruled on whether there is a constitutional obligation on the state to provide state funded 
defence for the trial of an indigent defendant, several court decisions by the highest 
provincial courts indicated that the courts are prepared to determine not only what legal 
issues must be covered, but also who should be covered. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal made a decision in regard to what legal issues should be covered by state funded 
counsel in the cases of Mountain vs. Legal Services Society [I9841 and Gonzalez-Davis 
vs. Legal: Services Society [I9911 5 WWR 18 1. 
A typical decision by the court in the direction of who should be covered is the one 
made in Ontario by the Court of Appeal in Reginu vs. Rowbotham (1 988) 41 C. C. C. (3rd) 
I ,  that while there is no constitutional right to counsel at state expense, trial judges have 
the power to determine whether representation of an accused who wants counsel is 
essential in order to ensure a fair triaL In this case the legal aid applicant nad originally 
been denied legal aid on the ground that her $24,000 annual income disqualified her. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal found on the facts of the case which involved multiple defendants 
and possibility of a 12 month trial that counsel was necessary to ensure the fairness of' thc 
trial. Thus the court decided to the effect that counsel he provided to the applicant at thc 
expense of the state. 
The demand and the need for legal aid are directly related with the largcr social 
and economic environment. Under ideal situations when the level of criminal charges 
remains the same changes in employment rate and welfare will affect the level of' demand 
and need for legal aid. More people on welfare, for example, means more demand for legal 
aid. Demand for legal aid should also vary with changes in demographic characteristics 
(e.g. percentage of males, percentage of females, percentage of young people, pcrcenlokge 
of single parent families, etc.), and migration level. Meanwhile, changes in the socio- 
economic environment impact on the crime patterns and criminal charge patterns. All of 
these changes are interrelated and impact on legal aid directly and indirectly. 
LAWYERS AND LEGAL A D  
Lawyers, both those in private practice and those on the staff of the Legal Services 
Society, are an indispensable part of the legal aid system. They do almost all the legal 
counsel work, both summary advice and full representation. Without lawyers' 
participation in legal aid activity, the legal aid system wdl cease to exist. Because of thcir 
indispensable participation in the provision of legal aid services and their concern for the 
provision of legal aid, their role has a significant impact on the policy development by the 
LSS, and on the need for and cost of legal aid. 
First of all, it is the legal profession that initiated the first organized legal aid 
services when the Law Society urged local bar associations to establish legal aid societies 
"to render legal aid to indigent persons who appear to be worthy thereof and who are 
unable to obtain legal assistance themselves" (Proceedings, Annual General Meeting of the 
Law Society, 1934 in Cawley, 1991:197). The Victoria and Vancouver Bar Associations 
started legal aid clinics for civil matters shortly after the Law society's Annual General 
Meeting. Although these legal aid activities were put asid2 when World PJar 11 started in 
1939, the legal profession in British Columbia "did play ail active role in the legal aid 
scheme developed for the Armed Forces" (Cawley, 1991:197) and resumed legal aid 
activities after the War. 
The legal profession was also the major advocate arguing that the government 
should involve in legal aid services. Almost as soon as the legal aid program started in 
Vancouver and Victoria, the problems of increasing caseload and high cost of furnishmg 
transcripts, which were essential in all higher court trials and especially so in appeal 
hearings, started to emerge and become more and more pressing. The legal profession 
realized that "funding beyond the capacity of the VBA [Vancouver Bar Association] was 
necessary if the criminal legal aid portion of the Vancouver Bar's program were to 
continue" (Cawley, 1991:199). Moreover, there were too few volunteer lawyers who 
participated in the legal aid services. To solve these problems the legal profession made 
repeated appeals to the provhcial government for funding. 
The establishment of the Legal Aid Society of British Columbia basically marks the 
government's take-over of the responsibility of providing legal aid services from the legal 
profession although the Society was independent from the government. The legal 
profession's role in legal aid services has been largely represented by individual lawyers 
who accept legal aid cases as approved by the Legal Aid Society and later by the Legal 
Services Society. However, it is important to note that the role of the legal profession in 
legal aid is still very important to the legal aid system in BC. 
A major impact from the legal profession on the legal aid system is the repeated 
request to increase tariffs. As is illustrated in Table 9, the legal aid tariffs have been 
adjusted over a dozen times since 1978. Out of all the tariff adjustments, only two were 
downward adjustments; all the rest were upwards adjustments made at the request by the 
private bar. The most dramatic impact of the actions by the private bar on legal aid was 
experienced in the summer of 199 1 when the private bar lawyers struck for several months 
while demanding a tariff increase. As a result of the job action, the tariff was doubled. As a 
result of the tariff adjustment, the cost of providing legal aid in the province was more 
than doubled in the following f ~ c a l  year. Consequently, the LSS had to redefine its 
eligibility p o k y  to meet the budget. 
fn order to "represent the interests of the lawyers of British Columbia who provide 
leg& aid services" (Agg, 1992:46) the lawyers providing legal aid fu-med the Association 
of &gal Aid Lawyers (ALL) in 1991 following their withdrawal of legal aid services in the 
summer. As an organized unit, the ALL voiced their strong opposition to using staff 
lawyers in providing legal aid. In 1994, the ALL started another job action, demanding 
that the LSS cancel its plan to hire staff lawyers to handle 50% of legal aid cases. As a 
result of this job action, the LSS modified its plan and agreed to hire staff lawyers that 
would handle no more than 30% of legal aid cases. 
The legal profession has expanded significantly in the last ten years, according to 
the statistics of registered lawyers (CCJS, 1993). In 1984, there were 4,787 registered 
lawyers in British Columbia. In 1993, the total number of registered lawyers increased by 
60 percent from ten years ago. The number of private bar lawyers providing legal aid 
services also increased from 1,457 in 1984 to 1,674 in 1993. The expansion of the legal 
profession has mixed impact on legal aid. More lawyers mean better availability of lawyers 
md more kg$ aid services. Better services may be provided with more lawyers in that the 
LSS may have better choices in selecting lawyers for legal aid clients. More services, on 
the other hand, means higher cost. An expanded legal profession also means a stronger 
voice in the collective decision making process, which may partly explain the repeated 
increases in legal aid tariff (Table 9). 
White the private bar lawyers who provide legal aid have formed an organization 
to get their voice heard, stafT lawyers belong to the Professional Employees Association 
(PEA). Through the PEA as a bargaining unit, staff lawyers' salrilies have greatly 
increased in the last ten years. Both the increasing salaries of staff lawyers ~ ~ n d  the 
increasing legal aid tariff for private bar lawyers have lead to the increasing cost of legal 
aid, which has, in turn, forced the LSS to redehe the need for legal aid in order to meet 
its budget. Therefore, the legal profession should be considered as a major part of the legal 
aid system. Their opinions and demands have a major impact on the cost of and need for 
legal aid. Thus, they must be taken into account when developing legal aid policies. 
LEGAL AID AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The need for and the cost of legal aid is closely related with criminal justice system 
agencies. The volume of criminal charges by the police is the most important factor to 
determine the level of the need of legal aid. Other factors remaining constant, more 
crimJnal charges lead to greater need for legal aid. The legal procedures the Crown 
Counsel choose to proceed with the accused in court, either by means of going to trial, 
staying charges or withdrawing charges directly impact on the cost of legal aid. The 
interactions between the Crown Counsel and the defence lawyer in regard to guilty plea or 
trial have a significant impact on the cost of legal aid in that a case that goes to trial costs. 
on average, as much as over three times as one that pleads guilty. The number of inmates 
in correctional institutions applying for parole directly constitute the need for legal aid and 
the cost of legal aid, although the volume is small. 
W e  the criminal justice system provides input into the legal aid in the form of thc 
need for legal aid and the cost of legal aid, legal aid provide input into the criminal justice 
system in the form of legal representation, which would be otherwise absent in the courts. 
Meanwhite the Legal Services Society can influence the guilty plea patterns in the courts 
by modifying the legal aid tariff for guilty plea and trial. If the legal aid t a d  is 
unreasonably low, more cases would like go to trial and thus creates excessive workload 
in the court system. 
SUMMARY 
The legal aid system is complex. The complexity of the system can be seen in the 
various aspects and actors in the system; the interdependence and interconnectedness 
between all the parts within the system at different levels of hierarchy; and the multi- 
direction flow of information into the system, within the system, and out of the system. 
The close relationship between legal aid and the criminal justice system renders it 
necessary to render the legal aid system as  a subsystem of the criminal justice system and 
conduct more research into the administration of criminal justice. 
CHAPTER 111. OVERVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
In this chapter, the discussion focuses on the criminal justice system which is 
traditionally regarded to consist of the four official agencies: the police, the prosecution, 
the courts, and corrections. While the interconnectedness between the four agencies is 
discussed, attention will be paid to their relationship with the legal aid system, especially in 
regard to the prediction of the need for and the cost of legal aid in British Columbia. Sincc 
the objective of the research is to develop a simulation model, which is normally a 
representation of the simpued real world system, the discussion of the criminal justice 
system will remain at a certain level of simplification. 
The criminal justice system is defined by many as a system and the four major 
official agencies in the system, police, prosecution, court and corrections as subsystems 
within the system (Connidis, 1982, Ekstedt, 1988, Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994). In 
the present study, legal aid is considered as another subsystem of the criminal justice 
system. In this system, all different parts are interconnected, although they may pursue 
conflicting goals. The legal aid subsystem is inevitably mfluenced by the behavior of' othcr 
subsystems. For example, criminal charges laid by the police are the major input into the 
legal aid subsystem in the form of people in need of legal counsel. The legal procedures in 
the C O U ~  system, such as trials and guilty pleas, stays and charge withdrawals, and failures 
to appear become information input into the legal services subsystem, directly affecting the 
legal aid tanff structure, the cost per case and eventually the total cost and the definition 
of need for legal aid. The local sentencing practices in the court system sends the 
information input into the legal services subsystem by way of interacting with the coverage 
policy of the LSS. The workload in the corrections system sends direct persons input into 
the legal services subsystem by means of creating the need for the services from the Prison 
Legal Aid Program. Indirectly, the effectiveness of the corrections subsystem feeds back 
into the criminal justice system by way of affiecting the patterns of crime. Last, but not the 
least are the changing features of legislation such as the Criminal Code, the Narcotics 
Control Act, the Young Offenders Act that create major mformation input directly into the 
legal aid system by means of affecting the eligibility policy of the LSS and by means of 
dominating the behavior of the whole criminal justice system. 
The behavior of the prime actors in the criminal justice system, while directly 
idluencirlg the need for legal aid and the cost of legal aid, are also interrelated with each 
other and thus indirectly affect the need and cost of legal aid. The police, for example, are 
closely interrelated with the courts. The police send input into the courts in the form of 
criminal charges and receive feedback from the courts in the form of court decisions which 
become part of the guideline for policing. The courts, whose sentencing patterns have a 
direct impact on the number of people eligible for legal aid, are interrelated with the 
corrections by way of dfiecting the population of correctional institutions, which affects 
the need for and cost of the prison legal aid program. The sentencing patterns also affect 
the potential crime patterns, taking into account the deterrence effect and the effectiveness 
of corrections. The crime patterns will in turn affect the need and cost of legal aid. Thus, 
in order to understand the relationship between the ~rirninal justice system rmd the need 
for and cost of iegal aid, it is necessary to review the roles of the m+&r actors within the 
criminal justice system a d  the inter-connectedness between the rn6jor actors. 
The operation of the crimir~al justice system is a complex process. Persons accused 
of criminal offences are processed from one subsystem to the next. The ef'fectiveness of 
the system is dependent on all the major actors within the system to function effectively. 
While the criminal justice system is recognized as a whole and the four major official 
agencies, the police, the prosecutor, the court and the corrections, are all connected with 
each other, the system has to be analyzed by examining each part separately. 
The entry point to the criminal justice system is usually the police when the 
criminal justice system is defined as consisting the four maior official agencies, the police, 
the Crown, the court and the corrections. The police are recognized as the key players in 
the criminal justice system (Sewell, 1985) in that they arguably control, to a largc extent, 
the quantity and quality of the input into the criminal justice system. It is at this point, that 
part of the crimes reported to the police are turned into criminal charges, which are the 
input into the rest of the subsystems (or can be alternatively called throughput in the 
criminal justice system). 
The activity of the police can either increase or decrease the amount of throughput 
handled by the other subsystem. If p o k e  are not effective in preventing crime, 
prosecution, court and prisons may be ilooded. If police fail to solve crime, prosecutions 
cmnot proceed and court c m o i  do justice -- the rest of the system will never have its 
chance (Cole, 1972). While playing the major role in controlling the input into the criminal 
justice system and the Iegal aid subsystem, police have great discretion in exercising the 
control by identifying more or less crime, by laying more or fewer charges, by encouraging 
the public to report more or less crime, and by focusing on some specific types of crime. 
Police and Crime 
Thus the relationship between police and crime is complex. Criminal activity can 
be seen as input for the police when reported to the police and criminal charges laid 
against the suspect as the output by the police. Meanwhile, criminal activity is also the 
output of police activity since one of the major objectives of the police work is crime 
control. Activities of the police may increase crime and may decrease crime. When the 
police do a good job in crime prevention, the volume of criminal r a y  decrease. When the 
police fail to prevent crime, the volume of criminal activity may decrease. In terms of 
crime known to the police, on the other hand, the police doing a good job may also lead to 
m increase in the mount of known crime by means of having a supportive public that 
reports more crime and apprehending more offenders (Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994). 
Canadian kaw does not require citizens to report crimes of which they have 
knowledge to the poke. Thus, the public has considerable discretion in this respect. 
Repeated victimization surveys conducted in the United States and Canada discovered that 
more than 50 % of crimes are never reported to the police (GrifEths and Verdun-Jones. 
'1994:73). htlem~vh3e, it is impossible for the police io detect all the crimes that arc 
committed. Therefore, the amount of crime dsected by the police is highly dependent on 
the willingness of the citizen to report crime to the police. In fact, "the vast majority of 
crime the police learn about are brought to their attention by victims and witnesses" 
(Brannigan, 198495). The police, however, are not totally out of control of the situation. 
Through cornunity relation programs, through crime prevention programs and through 
the mass media, they can intluence the volume ;md types of crime the community reports 
to them. Daily policing activities (patrol, crime investigation, arrests, etc.) dso influence 
crime reporting. The presence of pa t rokg  police officers may encourage people to report 
crime to the police. Active police investigation and arrests of suspects of certain types of 
crime would encourage people to report to the police, although it can also be argued that 
active police investigation and arrests would deter the crime from happening. 
Even if the criminal event is brought to the attention of the police, the policc have 
considerable amount of discretion in processing the report. They can choose to record thc 
crime report and they can choose not to record the crime. Black's study (1970) in Boston, 
Chicago, and Washington, DC discovered that "35% of crimes reported to the police and 
investigated by them went unrecorded" (Brannigan, 1984:96). Several factors are found to 
be &ecting the selective recording of criminal events by the police. These include the 
seriousness of the crime, the preference of the complainant for the arrest of the suspect, 
the degree of familiarity between the victim and suspect, and the amount of deference and 
respect shown to the police by the c o m p ~ t  (Brannigan, 1984). A more important 
factor that affects the amount of crime recorded is related with the measurement of the 
p o k e  work. In evaluation of the police work the clearance rate is normdy used as an 
indicator of the quality of the police work. "In order to improve the clearance rate, police 
might decide not to report certain occurrences that are judged to be unresolvable" 
(Sewcll, 1985:64). 
From the legal perspective, crimes are definitions of the state. In this perspective, 
crime is a sociopolitical artifact, not a natural phenomenon. There is nothing that is 
criminal in any act itself. Crime is merely a consequence of the definition by the authority 
(Packer, 1968, Turk, 1977, Becker, 1963). "While the line between criminality and 
normality is often arbitrary" (Brannigan, 1984:95-5), "the police are at the forefront of this 
definition production. They are given organizational capability to produce particular levels 
of crime, and to produce particular types of crime to the relative exclusion of other7' 
(Ericson, 198 1 :8). Selective law enforcement is best reflected in what is normally called 
proactive policing where the police officer initiates encounters. Enforcement of trac 
laws and prostitution related laws is the area where discretion is frequently used in 
determining where to enforce the law. 
Police and Charges of Crimiml Offences 
The major output from the police that becomes the major input into the legal aid 
subsystem is criminal charges laid by the police. With other variables remaining constant, 
the more charges the police lay the more need for legal aid there will be. 
For each alleged criminal event that police encounter, the police constnblc handling 
the case has several options in regard to the disposition of the case: the constablt: ciu~ 
make further investigations or drop the case. The constable can charge or arrest or release 
the suspect. The constable can mediate, warn or make a referral. Many factors arc found 
to affect the decision the police officer makes. They include the seriousness of the crime, 
the evidence the police have obtained about the case, the attitude of the 
victim/complainant, the personal attributes of the suspect, the personal attributes of the 
police officer handling the case, the resources and the organizational characteristics of the 
police department, and their environment including the behavior of the prosecutor, the 
court and the community. 
First is the nature or' the alleged criminal event. Police oficers are more &cly to 
pursue things further (investigate further and lay charges) with more serious cascs than 
with less serious cases. Normally, the police focus their attention on the more serious and 
more visible types of crime such as murder, assault causing bodily harm, robbery and 
kidnapping, which tend to be more detectable, too. Other sorts of crime such as fraud and 
tax evasion are less visible and draw less attention from the police (Brmnigan, 198494). 
The amount and the nature ol'the evidence the police can gather is essential fbr the 
police to determine whether to pursue with criminal charges. The police estimate the 
strength of the evidence according to their experience in the court. It is up to the constable 
to determine whether he has a case with strong evidence. 
The role of the victim/complainant is important for the police to determine further 
action. When the victim of a crime is unwilling to press charges the police are reluctant to 
do so on their own. Without the cooperation of the victim, it will be dficult to convict the 
offender in court. The police used to be very reluctant to press charges in domestic 
disputes when they did not have the cooperation of the victim/complainant until a recent 
change in policy to "zero tolerance" in domestic assault cases, which has substantially 
increased laying of charges in assault cases. Arrest patterns have been found to highly 
reflect the victim's role as well as those of the police officer and the suspect, "particularly 
when the desire is for leniency and also, though less frequently, when the complainant 
demands arrest" (Klockars, 1983:279). 
It has been argued that police officers identlfy themselves with the middle class and 
reinforce the middle class values in their routine policing (Ericson, 1982:66). Therefore, 
the personal characteristics of the suspect such as age, gender, race, attitude and 
socioeconomic status may become important factors for the police officer to consider 
when making decisions in disposing the case. Klockars (1983) found that the probability of 
arrest increases when a suspect is disrespectful toward the police. "Pihavin and Briar 
(1964) suggested that the police decision to arrest juvende offenders was not based simply 
on the offence having been committed. The juvenile's demeanor or show of respect for the 
police, as well as any exhibition of contrition or show of remorse or sorrow, determined 
whether the case was brought to court" (Brannign, 198459). According to Grifiths and 
Verdun-Jones (1994), many police observers in Canada have expressed the concern that 
ethnic minorities and Aboriginal peoples in Canada, as well as citizens of lower 
socioeconomic status, are often subject to police discrimination. 
Police officers are different in their background, attitudes, perceptions, pcrsoni&ty 
and work-style preferences. These individual differences are likely to inllusncc thc in 
which police officers dispose the cases they handle. Research in this area discovered that 
police officers with less experience tend to make more arrests. Morcovcr, "callegc- 
educated officers have been found to be more active in detecting offences, to n~ake marc 
arrests than their less-educated colleagues" (Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1993: 170). 
Related with the first factor is the volume of crime reported and thc availability of 
police resources. No police department is able to fully investigate dl crimes reported 
because of the limitatim of resources. Decisions have to be made as to what to pursuc 
further. In addition, "there is considerable variability across police departments in tcrins o f  
the resources available to prevent and respond to crime. Some departments may have thc 
resources to engage in more proactive policing, which may result in high rates of' arrest lix 
ce~zain categories of crime7' ( G f i ~ t h s  and Verdun-Jones, 1994:178). Ericson (1982) 
analyzed the relationship between the volume of crime known to the police, the number o f  
persons charged and the number of police officers in Canada over 16 years from 1962 to 
1977. He found that while the number of reported crimes per police officer per annurn 
increased from 30 in 1962 to 45 in 1977, the number of persons charged per of'ficcr per 
m u m  remained stable at approximately 14 throughout the period. This finding strongly 
supports the argument the "crime is, above all, a function of the resources available to 
know it" (Manning 197 1 :234). 
The o rganizationaf differences between different police departments also impacts 
on the patterns of criminal charges. James Q. Wilson (1968) compared the arrest rate cf 
juvenile delinquents in two police departments. He found that in the professional 
department, that is, the department marked by an emphasis on centralization of operation, 
recruitment on basis of achieved characteristics, and a stress on education and training, 
juveniles were arrested at the rate of 47%. In the more traditional department, emphasis 
was given to attributes such as height and weight, familiarity with the local culture and 
having relatives in the department. For this type of department, the arrest rate was only 
30%. The size of police departments is also found to be a factor affecting the charging 
patterns. In a US study, Smith and Klein (1984) found that police officers in bigger police 
departments tend to make more arrests while officers in smaller departments were found 
to be more lenient in their enforcement practices. 
The police are supposed to be independent of politicians in the process of law 
enforcement, especially in the day-to-day operations in western democratic countries such 
,- 
as Canada or the United States of America. "No government can properly direct any 
policeman to prosecute or not to prosecute any particular person or class of 
~;ei.sons"(SeweIl, 1985:159). However, politicians can to a large extent govern policing 
policies by making iegisiative changes. In addition, the government can influence policing 
policy by means of increasing or decreasing the level of funding. 
The last and the most important factor from the systems perspective that afyccts 
the charging practice is the information feedback from the Crown Counsel and the court. 
The Crown Counsel does not prosecute every single case the police have liled for 
prosecution. In British Columbia, the Crown Counsel "reviews (or screens) the charges 
and pre-approve them before the information is iaid by the police" (Brockmm, 1996: 1 0  1). 
In addition, when proceeding with prosecution, the Crown Counsel can modify till: chargc, 
return the case to the police for more information, issue a caution letter or divert the cnsc 
(Porteous, 1994). The police can be encouraged or discouraged thc messagcs implicit in 
Crown counsel's actions. 
The court is responsible for determining the guilt or innocence of the accused and 
the penalty for the convicted (Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994). According to 
Brantingham (1977), the court subsystem is different from other components of the 
criminal justice system from a systems point of view. She argues that the court is the only 
subsystem that can, to some extent, control both its input and its output. While the Crown 
counsel takes thz fundamental control of input by screening cases out of the systcln or by 
directing the cases along different routes into the court system, the judge controls thc 
output by determining the guilt or innocence of the accused and by making scntencing 
decisions. The decisions madc by both the Crown and the court have great impact on the 
administtations of the court subsystem and the legal aid. 
The Crown Counsel: Input Controller 
After the p o k e  have laid criminal charges, 5ies go the prosecutor to proceed in 
the court. Of the many agencies within the criminal justicc system, the Crown Counscl is  
distinctive since it is concerned with all aspects of the crimind justice systcm. At this 
stage, the prosecutor "enjoys a formidable degree of discretion in carrying out his or hur 
duties in the court process" (Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, l994:XM). The prosecu tor has 
the power to determine which cases will be prosecuted and the charges to be made. He 
can determine whether the case will proceed to prosecution; he can dctcrminc how to 
prosecute; he can stop the procedur~, even when the case is in trial. He can determine thc 
bargain to be agreed upon with the defendant. All of the options open to the prosecutor 
have significant impact on the need for and cost of legal aid. They ako have direct impact 
on the operations of the police, and the courts (Cole, 1972: 141). 
The prosecutor can determine whether the case will or will not bc prosccutcd in 
court at all. Although earlier studies suggest that the prosecutor docs not do much 
screening of cases because "the overcrowded lower court docket leaves littlc timc for 
reflection by prosecutors on the sufficiency of the charge in each case which comes bcforc 
the court" (Grcsman, 1978:27), recent statistics in British Columbia indicatc that thc 
Crown Counsel does conduct active screening". In February, 1994, for example, the 
Crmm Counsel withheld or returned to the police for more information about nine percent 
11 The Crown Counsel in in British Columbia, Quebec and Now Bntnswick exercise 
substantially more control over case scrutiny than is the cutomary in other Canadian 
jurisdictions becuase these three provinces have adopted a screening procedure for the 
prosecutor @rockman, 1996: 101). 
of all RCC files (police requests for criminal charges) (Porteous, 1994). In addition, he can 
drop the charge when he believes that there is insufficient evidence and that it is impossible 
to gather more information; he can issue a caution letter when he belimes that the charge 
is not serious and a caution letter is good enough to warn the accused not to commit 
crime again; he can divert the case out of the system or he can proceed ta prosecute the 
case. 
The Crown Counsel's ability to proceed with a prosecution is very often limited by 
the willingness of the victim and witnesses to cooperate; the preferences of the police; the 
strategies of' the accused and his counsel; the cooperation of the judge in granting 
adjournments; and court schedules (Osborne, 1983). However, when the prosecutor 
decides to go ahead with prosecution, 5e has further discretionary powers such as: 
selecting how to proceed on a dual or hybrid offence; restricting an 
accused person's right to elect the method of trial in relation to an 
indictable offence by laying a direct indictment or by insisting on a trial by 
judge and jury where an offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than 
five years' imprisonment is concerned; deciding whether or not to oppose 
bail; deciding whether to grant discovery of the proseationys case against 
the accused and to what extent; deciding whether to appeal against the 
acquittal (Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994:304). 
Although the Crown's ability to proceed with a prosecution is limited, terminating 
a case by withdrawal of the charges is largely the result of a discretionary decision of the 
prosecutor rather than an initiative of the judge (Crosman, 1969; Osborne, 1983). 
Grossman pointed out that 
prosecutors feel free to reduce or withdraw charges on their own initiativc. 
In this way they exercise belated control over the decision-making 
processes of the police. The majority of withdrawals are n~ade on the 
indeptendent initiative of the prosecutor handling the case (1969: ). 
Although the Criminal Code does not expressly give prosecutors the right to 
withdraw chages, the judge has been found to "rarely question or refim the application'' 
to withdraw charges (Osborne, 198357). In fact, termination of a case by withdrawid or 
dismissal is found to be the most common method of disposition next to conviction as the 
result of a guilty plea (Osborne, 1983). 
While the Crown has an absolute right to withdraw a case before a plea is taken, 
~ I S  decision to withdraw a case is often affected by external fwtors that are bcyond his 
control. The victim or witness's failure to appear in court is a frequent reason for a chargc 
withdrawal. When the victim does not wish the prosecutor to proceed with a prosccution, 
the Crown is likely to withdraw the charge "even though the formal law rarely rcquircs thc 
consent of the victim as a condition to prosecution (Miller, 1970: 17 I).  Thc Crown may 
also have to withdraw a case when the police have laid charges before thcy have gathered 
sufficient evidence to support the charge (Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994). 
In addition to charge withdrawals, the Crown also has the discretion to stay 
criminal proceedings. Staying a charge is different from withdrawing a charge in that 
when a charge has been withdrawn, there is no charge remaining on the record, and to 
contide the prosecution a new charge must be laid. Corsequently, the withdrawal 01 the 
charge terminates the proceedings. When a stay is entered, however, the prosecutor may 
continue the proceedings without laying any new charge w i t h  the appropriate k t a t i o n  
of time period, although the Crown seldom re-prosecutes a stayed charge. Simdar to the 
situation of charge withdrawals, although it seems to have the power to review the 
Crown's decision to enter a stay of proceedings, the court is found to be reluctant to 
exercise its control (Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994). 
Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining is one of the most controversial issues in the criminal justice 
system and has unique impact on the administration of criminal justice and of legal aid. 
Plea bargaining is an informal conviction process and a negotiating process. In this process 
the accused offers to plead guilty to some offence, in return for some benefit either in the 
form of having the charges against him reduced or in exchange for a more lenient sentence 
in type or in length. The Crown, in return for the accused pleading guilty can promise 
some benefits to the accused. The Crown can promise to reduce the charge to a lesser 
degree, withdraw or stay other charges or promise to recommend a more lenient sentence 
(Verdun-Jones and Hatch, 1985:3). Although the agreement between the Crown and the 
accused reached in the plea bargaining process does not have any binding effect to the 
judge, the court normally "relies on the prosecutor's judgment when accepting a plea of 
guilty; if the plea is acceptable to the prosecution it is axeptable to the court" (Grosman, 
l978:D). 
Although plea bargaining is believed to be a widespread phenrtnlcncm (Ericson and 
Baranek, 1982) and much research has been conducted in this m a .  the extent of plea 
bargaining is actuall. unknown (Grosman, 1969; Bowen-Coulthurst, 1970). It is believed 
that in the United Jtates plea bargaining is more tolerated than ir, most other common law ' 
systems. Cole (1972) estimated that up to 90 percent of all defendants charged with 
crimes plead guilty rather than exercise their right to go the trial. Sigler (1979) cstimatcd 
that between 80% and 90% of all felony convictions in the US are produced by guilty 
pleas. The empirical research conducted in Canada suggests that plea bargaining occurs in 
Canada, too (Cousineau and Verdcn -Jones, 1979A). The figures, howevcr, appear to bc 
lower. Canadian studies found that over 70% of accused persons in Canada plead guilty 
before trial (Greenspan, 1980:263; Ericson and Baranek, 1982; Canadian Committee on 
Corrections, 1966:134). Although it is generally believed that the extent of negotiating 
pleading is uncertain (Grossman, 1969; Hartnagel and Wynne, 1975; Canadian Committee 
on Corrections, 1966), the evaluation research on the public defender project in Burnaby, 
British Columbia, Canada by Brantingham et al. (1981) discovered that public defenders 
and the private bar legal aid lawyers had different patterns in regard to the plca 
negotiation. "In Burnaby public defenders engaged in discussions with Crown in 47%) of 
the cases" (p. 51). The private bar legal aid lawyers in Burnaby and Vancouver entcred 
into discussions with the Crown Counsel in about 25% of their cases. A comparison 
between the overall guilty plea rate of 70% as documented by many criminologists 
(Grossman, 1969; Hartnagel and Wynne, 1975; Canadian Committee on Corrections, 
1966) and the patterns as discovered by the Brantingham's study in British Golumbii 
(1 98 1) suggests that a large number of guilty pleas entered in Canada are not the product 
of some kind of plea bargain. 
Reasons for plea bargaining 
One of the most common justifications for plea bargaining is the need to dispose of 
cases as rapidly as possible; otherwise, the court system would grind to a halt. Just how 
caseload pressures come to influence plea bargaining decisions, however, remains unclear. 
Akchuler (1968) and Modes (1979) believe these pressures are background factors which 
do not determine either which cases shall be plea bargained or on what teams. Rather, 
these pressures act at a distance and simply require that some portion of the caseload be 
plea bargained. Mills (1971) describes caseload pressures as having a direct and distressing 
impact on plea bargaining (In McDonald, 1979:155). 
The study conducted by McDondd el al. (l979:193-5) shows that contrary to 
popular belief, prosecutors and defense counsel are not concerned with the question of the 
court's backlog or caseload when they are attempting to evaluate what to do with 
individual cases. 
Since many parties are involved in the plea bargaining process the reasons to 
initiate plea bargaining are many, too. The accused, as a major player in the process, hopes 
to get a "deal" for pleading guilty, although research has discovered that on most 
occasions they do not (Ericson and Baranek, 1982; Solomon, 1983). The police would be 
more than willing to have the accused plead guilty because that will make their work look 
good for making successful charges. 
Of all the major factors involved in the bargaining, the very broad discretiotlary 
powers eejoyed by the prosecution and the benefit the prosecutors get from the plca 
bargaining process are probably the most ~ i g ~ c a n t .  Through plca bargaining the 
prosecutor can be assured of a politically beneficial hgh rate of conviction, yet does not 
have to spend the time and effort to prepare a trial case. He avoids thc ever-prcscnt 
risk of losing even a clear-cut case should the accused have gone before a jury. "It 
provided a way to obtain convictions in cases that might have been lost at trial because of 
inhere~tly weak evidence, sloppy police work, incompetent prosecution, or biased 01 
unpredictable juries" (McDonald, 1979). 
It should be noted that although it is generally believed that the plea bargaining is 
normally a negotiating process between the Crown and the accused and/or the defense 
lawyer, police officers are often involved in plea discussions as well. Crown attorneys 
often are not well informed about a case because they often do not receive the case until 
the morning of the court appearance. If the case goes through several court appearances, 
the same crown attorney frequently does not stay with the case but passes it on to 
whomever is handling the eases for the courtroom that case comes up in the next time 
around. As a result, crown attorneys often rely on the police assessments of' the case 
(Eikson, 1982). Memwhile, the p o k e  haw ;in iaterest in the plea bargaining. Guilty pleas 
are an easy means for conviction that will free the police from repeated court appearanccs, 
which at times can be very demanding. As well guilty pleas make the police work look 
better for guilty pleas basically confm police actions and police justice (Skolnick, 1976). 
Police involvement in plea bargaining arguably starts when the police officer lays charges. 
He tends to wer  charge the accused with the highest number and degree of charges that 
possibly be supported the available evidence (McDonald, 1979). The charge then becomes 
the asking price in plea bargaining (Ericson and Baranek, 1982). 
The defense lawyer is also ultimately concerned with strategies leading to a bargain 
plea. It is the impersonal elements involving the economics of time, labor, and expense, 
together with his commitment to the court organization, that win the allegiance of most 
defense attorneys, not the needs of the accused (Blumberg, 1971:66-7). 
It is clear that the court, too, benefits from the plea bargaining. Similar to other 
agencies in the criminal justice system, the court system is limited with resources. Court 
calendars are always crowded with new cases and case backlog is always there. Plea 
bargaining makes it possible to dispose of cases as rapidly as possible. If all cases go to 
trial the court system would grind to a halt. The recent Supreme Court of Canada's Askov 
decision (Regina vs. Askav, 1990, 59 C.C.C. [3d]) on case backlog and the defendant's 
right to speedy trial makes it imperative for the court to process criminal cases in a speedy 
manner. However, it is not clear whether the Crown is driven by the court caseload to 
initiate plea bargaining and research into plea bargaining has conflicting findings. 
Legal aid tariff may be a major factor in the guilty plea process, too. As discussed 
earlier in the Chapter, block fees are paid for criminal legai aid according to different 
procedures cases go through the court. In 1992, for example, $400 was bc paid for 
defending a legal aid client charged with robbery who pleaded guilty. $720 would he paid 
for each half day of hearing if the case went to trial. A busy lawyer would be financially 
better off if he chooses to practice "dump truckingvi2 in which two or more guilty pleas 
are arranged on the same morning than going to a trial hearing. On the other hand, a 
lawyer might be fmancially better off to bring the case to trial if he does not have sufficient 
caseload to arrange "dump trucking7'. 
Impact of the Crown's Discretion 
As illustrated above, the Crown has substantial discretionary power in many 
options in disposing criminal cases at different stages. He can drop the charges, return the 
cases to police or withhold the case for more mformation. He can proceed with the 
prosecution following different routes (summarily or indictable in case of hybrid 
offences)or he can initiate plea bargaining. He can withdraw charges or stay proceedings 
almost at any stage before a plea is taken. All of these options open to the Crown has 
tremendous impact on the administration of the legal aid system. Whcn charges arc 
dropped, the caseload for the court system is lessened and there will be no further need for 
legal aid and no cost or much less cost of legal aid will be generated. 
12 
"Dump trucking" is a used in Ontario to describe the phenomenon of pleading guilty on 
behalf of several clients at the same time by the defence lawyer, according to Dr. 
Prefontaine at the defence of this dissertation. 
The Output from the Court 
Decisions made by the judges on convictions, acquittals and sentencing constitute 
the m+r ourput from the court system. While these decisions affect the crime patterns in 
the form of the potential deterrence effect they all have significant impact on the 
administration of the criminal justice system and the legal aid system. First of all, appeals 
can be made fdlowing these decisions which affects the need for and the cost of legal aid 
for appeals. While the Legal Services Society provides conditional legal aid to the appeals 
made by the accused on merits, it has to continue the provision of legal aid to those 
accused where the Crown make appeals. 
A major output from the court system is the sentencing decision by the judge. 
While the sentencing decisions by the judge have a direct impact on the population in the 
corrections system, which affects the need for and the cost of prison legal aid, they aiso 
affect the crime patterns indirectly, considerir,,g the deterrence effect, the rehabilitation 
effect by corrections and the incarceration effect. Crime patterns, in turn, wdl affect the 
need for legal aid. 
A wide range of options are available to the sentencing court. They include: "(1) 
fme; (2) suspended sentence and probation; (3) imprisonment; (4) declaration that the 
accused is a dangerous offender; (5)  discharge (either absolute or conditional); (6) order 
for compensation; and (7) prohibitions and forfeiture" (Gd3ths and Verdun-Jones, 
1994:352). Within these types of options there are also a wide range of quantum such its 
thc fine amount and length of imprisonment. 
Of all the sentencing options, imprisonment has the most significant impact on the 
legal aid system. Thus it ir necessary to have a brief review of the sentencing patterns in 
the use of imprisonment and the related policy changes. It is found that "custody is the 
most frequent form of sentence for indictable offences (from 4 3 4  to 55% of all cases), 
while fine is most frequently resorted to when both indictable and summary offences ;u-e 
combined (from 40% to 55% of all cases) (Gmths and Verdun-Jones, 1994:384). 
Mitchell-Banks (1983) analyzed the sentencing patterns in British Columbia from 1976 to 
1982. Similar to other findings she discovered that the Fie was the most serious penalty 
imposed by the BC courts in the majority of cases (68.6% in 1976). In addition, she 
discovered that the use of fine declined from 68.6% in 1976 to 56.1% in 1982 and the use 
of imprisonment increased from 22% in 1976 to 16% in 1982. 
Comparing the sentencing patterns in Canada with that in other jurisdictions, 
Canadian criminologists are of the opinion that imprisonment is over-used in Canada 
(Jobson, 1980:73), which "appears to have one 3f the highest rates of imprisonment in the 
world" (Hogarth, 1971:358). The pclicy makers in Canada appear to agree with the over- 
reliance on imprisonment (Canadian Sentencing Commission, 1987 in Griffiths and 
Verdun-Jones, 1994).) and that Canada probably has one of the highest rates of 
imprisonment among all Western countries with an imprisonment rate of 108 per 100,IK)O 
inhabitants (Correctional Service of Canada, 1986 in Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994). 
Thanks to these and other studies, administrators and policy makers in the criminal 
justice system have begun calling for the reduced use of imprkomment. "The courts have 
repeatedly emphasized tfrat imprisonment i. a sanction that is to be employed as a 'last 
resort'" (Nadin-Davis, in Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994:363). In a similar fashion, the 
"Law Reform Commission of Canada advocated that the adoption of sentencing guidelines 
that wiluld further reduce the courts' use of imprisonment" (Griffths and Verdun-Jones, 
1994). 
Canada has a single criminal code, the Criminal Code of Canada. However, the 
Criminal Code gives the sentencing judges a wide range of sentencing options. Meanwhile, 
Canada is a large country with its people from different cultures, with different religions. 
The ten provinces and two territories as well as the regions within the provinces and 
territories have tremendous differences in social values, cultural values, religious believes 
and many other areas. On top of all the differences, there is an apparent lack of agreement 
as to the social objectives that sentencing should serve. These are just some of the many 
factors that lead to the most significant issue in the criminal justice--sentencing disparity. 
Various studies have concluded that there are sigmficant variations in the manner in which 
different offence categories are assigned sentences in the various provinces (Hann et al., 
1983; Hann and Kopelman, 1986, in Gr=ths and Verdun-Jones, 1994:423) and within the 
provinces themselves (Gmths and Verdun-Jones, 1994). Murray and Erickson 
(1983)compared the sentencing patterns for the possession of cannabis in five regions in 
Ontario and found significant differences in the sentences given. Brantingham (1985) 
analyzed a Iarge number of criminal cases in two courts in British Columbia. While the 
study concludes that the overall sentencing pattern was on of "morc consistency t h i i  
in~onsistency" the study die find that there was some degree of disparity in st.ntcncir:p in 
that some 35% of sentencing outcomes were unpredictable. The Legal Scrviccs Society of 
British Columbia rightly recognized the existence of sentencing disparity within thc 
province when it recently adopted the new legal aid coverage policy that requircs lugid aid 
intake workers in each community to seek the Crown's opinion about thc lrkelihoud of 
imprisonment for a particular offence in that community before making approval decisions. 
It should be noted that "the sentencing process in Cmada is currently p;wsing 
through an era of fundamental change7' (Grifliths and Verdun- Jones, l!B4:448). With the 
new legal aid coverage policy, which uses the probability of imprisonment for all offcnccs 
in any specrfic region as one of the major criteria for legal aid approval, the changes in 
sentencing practice will impact the legal aid system significantly. 
Defence counsel undoubtedly pIays an extremely important role in the Canadian 
criminal justice system. While both the Charter of Rights and the Canadian Criminal Code 
have provisions on the right to counsel for those who have been arrested or detained, thc 
nature of the adversary system, the complex court process, the complicated procedural 
rules and evidential rules make the presence of legal counsel an essential part in the justice 
process for justice to be done. Ii: British Columbia defence counsel is required most of thc 
time in the interest of justice and for all practical purposes. 
The presence of defence counsel undoubtedly has significant impact on the 
ciimitat justice system. First of &, the accused persons who haw defence counsels are 
less likely to be found guilty than those who do not have defence counsels. A comparison 
of' the conviction rates in British Columbia in 1970 and 1978 shows that because of the 
introduction of legal aid system more accused persons were represented by lawyers and 
consequently the conviction rate dropped by about 17 percent (Statistics Canada, 1970, 
1978). Other research on the impact of defence counsel agrees that legal representation 
affects the outcome of criminal cases. Renner and Warner's (198 1) research found that 
although the presence of defence counsel made no significant differences in the conviction 
rates among those who pleaded not guilty, accused persons without defence counsel were 
significantly more Uely to plead guilty than those with defence counsel; and those with 
defence counsel were more likely to have lenient sentences than those without defence 
counsel. 
The differences in the outcome of criminal cases brought about by the presence of 
legal representation suggests its impact on the administration of the criminal justice 
system. Since the presence of legal counsel results in fewer guilty pleas, these cases 
defktely take more time to be disposed of in the court system. On the other hand, the 
fewer guilty outcomes and more lenient sentences brought about by legal representation 
mean less workload to the corrections system. Some would argue that introduction of 
kg& aid has got some bad guys off, or out of jail much more quickly and eventudy 
increases crime. 
When discussing corrections there is the tendency to relate it with the agency thtit 
carries out the sentences by the court only. From the systems point of view this would 
mean that corrections receiving input from the court produces output into society. I11 
reality, Corrections is an integral part of the criminal justice system. Corrections receives 
input from many components both from within and without the criminal justice systcn~, 
Corrections sends output not only out of the criminal justice system, it ako sends input 
into the criminal justice system. In terms of persons flow in the system, "the correctional 
enterprise is the gathering place for those persons who have been screened through one or. 
more of the system's other components" (Ekstedt and Griff'iths, 1988: 10). In addition to 
receiving persons from the court as a result of sentencing, corrections receives persons 
input from the police when a person is arrested and put in custody before a bail hearing, or 
in custody waiting for trial or for sentencing. In regard to output, corrections sends 
information output to the court in the form of what correctional services are available, 
"'brings forward information to the court concerning offenders awaiting sentence (prc- 
sentence reports) and for the containment or supervision of persons who arc not rcleascd 
by the courts on their own recognizance while awaiting trial" (Ekstedt and Griffjths, 
1988:7) in addition to releasing persons into society. 
The corrections subsystem is different from other subsystems in the criminal justice 
system in that it does not have any direct control over the input and its output is also 
limited to a large extent by decisions in other subsystems. It has to accept, for example, 
any number of pcrsons sentencec' by the court and any number of criminal suspects the 
police have decided to keep in custody. Although the correctional system has some degree 
of policy autonomy in regard to releasing its inmates out of the corrections, its operations 
are to a large extent controlled by the legislation, the case law and court sentences, in 
regard to jd terms and minimum jail time before parole. 
The operations of corrections have direct impact on the need for and cost of legal 
aid. The LSS provides legal aid to those in prison in need of legal aid. The corrections 
subsystem also affects the need of legal aid indirectly, because it affects the patterns of 
crime. Corrections may arguably affect the patterns of crime in several ways. First, the 
corrections system may be able to reduce the volume of crime by keeping the offenders 
from committing crime again by simply incarcerating them inside the various institutions. 
Sincc the offenders are isolated from the community they cannot commit crime in the 
community. Their chances of committing crime inside the institutions are much less 
because of all the security measures taken by corrections administrators. Second, 
ccrrections can reduce the volume of crime if its programs are effective since the offenders 
will be rehabhtated by going through the various rehabilitation programs and will not 
commit crime again. Third, corrections may be able to reduce crime by punishing the 
inmates. The inmates are deterred by the punishment they receive in the corrections 
system and will not commit crime when they are released back into the society. Fourth, 
corrections, along with other criminal justice agencies, exercises control on crime by 
means of general deterrence. 
All of the four ways in which corrections may affect the volurnr: of crime iUL\ 
problematic and are under much debate. The claim that merely incwcertiting the offcnt.1crs 
can reduce crime assumes that the convicted offenders wdl simply commit more crimc if 
they are not incarcerated. While this assumption may be true with some offenders it should 
be pointed out that there are just a few hardened offenders who commit repeated crime. A 
large proportion of offenders will not commit crime again after they commit one or two 
crimes whether they are incarcerated or free. In addition, the "replacement" cl'Sccl may 
also reduce the effectiveness of incarceration on crime. "There are certain cr~mes that arc 
the 'work of a criminal labor market' (Blumstein, 19821315) and are likely to be replaced. 
For example, the crimes of those convicted offenders involved in the sale o f  illicit drugs 
will most likely be replaced since their sales will be picked up either by an increase in the 
activity of those still out or by recruitment of an additional seller to take his place" 
(Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994:411). 
The effectiveness of rehabilitation has been under much debate in recent years. On 
the one hand there is the claim of "nothing works" as represented by the much quoted 
research by Martinson and his associates (Ekstedt and Grd5ths, 1988). With a survey of 
23 1 evaluations of correctional programs conducted between 1945 and 1 967 Martinson 
and his associates concluded that "with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative 
efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism" 
(Martinson, 1974:25, in Ekstedt and Grrffiths, 1988:211). On the other hand there has 
been extensive research that argues that a large number of correctional programs haw 
produced positive results (Palmer, 1975; Ross, 1979, in Ekstedt and Griffiths, l988:2 14). 
An extensive research by Andrews et al. (1990:356) suggests that "the delivery of 
appropriate correctional service" works in redwing recidivism when the service "reflects 
three psychological principles: (1)  delivery of service to higher risk cases, (2) targeting of 
criminogenic needs, and (3) use of styles and modes of treatment that are matched with 
client need and learning styles". 
The deterrence effect of imprisonment upon those offenders who are convicted 
and sentenczd to terms of imprisonment has also been a topic of much debate. Some 
research suggests that there is little evidence to show that imprisonment has any 
deterrence effect on the convicted offenders (Canadian Sentencing Commission, 1987 in 
Gnffiths and Verdun-Jones, 1994). Some research suggests that imprisonment can actually 
increase the likelihood of subsequent re-offending since offenders will be placed in an 
environment to learn more of crime, both the techmques to commit crime and the attitude 
about crime (Griflitlls and Verdun-Jones, !994:410). The counterpoint to this, research on 
criminal cases in both Canada and the United States, suggests that imprisonment have a 
very strong deterrent effect on offenders at around age 30. This has been shown to be 
especially so for robbers (Gabor, et al., 1987; Feeney, 1986). 
SUMMARY 
All the malor actors in the criminal justice system, the police, the Crown counsel, 
the court, and the corrections have their unique functions that have their share of impact 
on the administration of the criminal justice system and on the administration of legal aid, 
particularly the need for and the cost of legal aid. More importantly, these actors in the 
criminal justice system are interrelated. The actions of one actor will bring about ch;mgcs 
in the actions of the other actors. 
Overall, the organization structure within the criminal justice system is enabling for 
the police. The ordering of the criminal process is very much under the influence of the 
police because their versions of the truth are routinely accepted by other crime control 
agents, who usually have neither the time nor the resources to consider competing the 
police's version of truths. 
While the court system may be dependent upon the police for cases to acljudicatc, 
the police are also dependent on the courts for the acceptance of persons who the policc 
feel should be charged and for the validation of the l a d s  of information (cvidencc) that 
will constitute a successful charge (conviction). The dependence on the court by the police 
in fact guides the police in their daily activity. Every time the police lay a charge, they have 
to consider how likely it is the prosecutor will proceed with prosecution and how likely it 
is the court will convict. When they gather evidence they have to consider whether the 
court will accept the evidence and whether the methods in collecting the evidencc will bc 
challenged in court. 
While the court relics on the police to bring forward cases, the decisions by thc 
court feed back into policing all the time in regard to gathering evidence and laying 
charges. While the court sentences the convicted into the corrections system, the court 
also has to take into consideration the availability of corrections programs and the cost of 
varicus programs. 
AU the major actors in the criminal justice system produce direct input into the 
legal aid subsystem. The police, by laying charges, basically control the caseload of legal 
aid. The court, by processing the accused through various routes, affects the cost of 
providing legal aid for each case. The corrections influences the need for prison legal aid. 
In addition to the direct impact they have on tbe administratior! of legal aid, interaction 
between the major actors have greater impact on legal aid and mikes it difficult to forecast 
the need for and the cost of legal aid. 
CHAPTER IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The reviews of the British Columbia legal aid and criminal justice systems 
presented in the previous chapters have established that the behavior of legal aid is closely 
related to the behavior of the major actors in the criminal justice system, Legal aid is 
dependent on these actors in the criminal justice system ior its input, both in the form of 
material and of information. It sends its output into and also gets feedback from the 
criminal justice system. While the legal aid system is regarded as a subsystem of the 
criminal justice system, the behavior of legal aid can only be best understood by studying 
the whole criminal justice system. In this chapter, research questions are raised for the 
purpose of examination. This chapter also deals with the methodological issues in this 
study. The major methodological approach, systems analysis and computer simulation 
modeling, is discussed and followed by a discussion of data collection. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
B ~ s e d  on the discussion in the earlier chapters, some basic research questions are 
raised concerning forecasting the need for legal aid and the cost of legal aid. Since no 
previous studies of a similar nature have ever been undertaken in this area, this research is 
exploratory in nature. 
As has been discussed in the previous chapters, the cost of legal aid in British 
Columbia has sky-rocketed in the last two decades. However, there has been little study 
about the reasons for the sharp increase in the cost. In this context, the first major purpose 
of this study is to develop a plmling too! that can be used to forecast the need for legal 
aid and the cost of legal aid. 
Second, the need for legal aid and the cost of legal have been found to be closely 
related with the behavior of the criminal justice system. When one part of the system 
changes its behavior, other parts of the system will be affected. ft is an objective of this 
study to examine the connectedness among the various agencies with the criminal justice 
system, including the legal aid system. 
Third, computer simulation modeling, as will be discussed hl detail in this chapter, 
has been used in many fields. However, it has never been used to study legal aid. 
Methodologically, the study is intended to test the feasibility of using computer simulation 
modeling to forecast the need for legal aid and the cost of legal aid. 
Since the legal aid system is interconnec+ed with the criminal justice system, it is 
necessary to regard the legal aid system as part of the criminal justice system, which is 
apparently a very complicated system. One way to approach such a complex system is by 
means of systems analysis and simulation modeling. In this study, system analysis and 
simulation modeling are utilized to explore the system dynamics of legal aid and forecast 
the need for legal aid. 
Systems analysis 
Systems analysis is adopted as the methodological basis for ths  study. It should he 
emphasized that systems analysis is not really a theory but rather an approach or a 
perspective adopted when conducting the research. 
"The systems approach ... is not a sophisticated, mathematical tool such as 
mathematical systems theory or control theory, or such as one of the many 
operations research methodologies (e.g., optimization theories or queuing 
theories). Rather, it is a method of approaching a particular problem c x  
phenomena in order to define the problem and its structure and to proceed 
from this point to make some preliminary analysis" (Cwsidy and 
Hopkinson, 1976:4). 
This distinction here is crucial. When we use this approach, we are testing thc 
applicability of the systems perspective, and its ability to lead to explanation and point to  
variables of importance, rather than testing a theory's ability to expkain. If hypothescs 
generated by the systems analysis are borne out, "we can conclude that systems analysis 
aids in our understanding of ths phenomenon under study. If the hypothescs are not borne 
out, however, we do not conclude that systems analysis is wrong or invalid, but rather that 
either its applicability to the system under study is somewhat ljmited or that we have 
applied it incorrectly" (Connidis, 1982:7-8). 
From the systems perspective, a system is defied as "a set of subsystems, 
interrelated so as to f o m  a unit" (Delaney and Vaccari, 1 1). The s ystcms approach k 
concerned with connectedness and wholeness, so it emphasizes the interconnections 
among the various parts that constitute a whole system (Roberts et al., 1983). While any 
description of a real system attempts to bring together various aspects of knowledge from 
systemic disciphes, a systems approach may avoid "disciphary myopia" (Wilson, 
1 98 1 : t 9). This systems approach can incorporate analysis at many different levels. 
According to Connidis (1982:3), systems analysis first became popular in the 
military during the 1940's. Since then it has been employed most successfidly in areas such 
as industry where concerns have focused on marketing procedures to increase demand for 
products and hence profits. In the past three decades the basic concepts in the systems 
approaches have been transferred to the study of social systems. From the systems 
perspective the criminal justice system has been defined and studied as a system. Within 
the criminal justice system, the police, the courts, and corrections are defined and studied 
as subsystems because what is done in one part of the process affects persons or events in 
other parts of the network of procedures (Connidis, 1982; Brantingham, 1977; Coffey, 
1974; Duffee and Fitch, 1976; Ekstedt and Griffiths, 1988). 
Systems analysis is chosen as the methodological basis for this study because of its 
several characteristics. Fkst is the most fundamental concept in systems analysis, i.e, that 
of holism (Rapoport, 1968; Connidis, 1982). The concept of holism stems from the 
recognition that even if each element or subsystem is optimized from a design or 
operational viewpoint, the whole system's performance may be less optimal owing to 
interactions between the parts. Because of the increasing complexity of man-organized 
systems and the need to cope with this complexity, the necessity for systems thinking has 
thus become more and more important. 
A piece-meal approach to the study of the crinlinal justice system by studying 
criminal justice agencies separately does not lead to deep understanding of the criminal 
justice system. Attempts to improve the performance of the criminal justice agencies 
individually would not necessarily add up to the improvements of the entire system's 
performance (Hann, 1973:17). As Connidis points out, "while one need not always deal 
with the whole of a system, research focusing upon a part or subsystem cannot ignore its 
relationship to the whole" (1982:12), the performance of legal aid can hardly he 
understood or improved without a detailed andysis of its interactions with the criminal 
justice system. 
Second is the focus of systems analysis on the relationships between the various 
parts (subsystems) rather than the parts themselves. As has been discussed, the 
interactions of legal aid as a subsystem with other subsystems of the criminal justicc 
d OWS system are no less important than the legal aid subsystem itself. A systems analysis 11 
detailed analysis of the interactions. 
Third is the stress of systems analysis on the interdependency among system parts. 
"The concept of interdependency denies the validity of dealing with system parts as if' they 
act (operate) independently. Thus researchers adopting a systems perspective must come 
to terms with the interdependent relationships existing between that isolated aspect of 
society selected for study and other societal parts" (Connidis, 1982: 12). As has hccn 
discussed in the previous chapters the operation of legal aid depends on the other parts in 
the criminal justice system for its input and output. A systems analysis will reveal the 
interdependency. 
Rational Goal Model Vs. Functional-systems Model 
There are two broad ways to approach the analysis of a complex system, i.e. the 
rational-goal model and the functional-systems model (Feeley, 1976). The rational-goal 
model focuses on formal means and goals and the purpose of such systems analysis is 
optimization, The rational-goal model basically assumes that, to conduct systems analysis, 
one must be able to identify the system's goals in order to determine whether or not the 
system can be classified as a system (Landsberger, 1961; Brantingham, 1977; Connidis, 
1982). The functional-systems model assumes that complex systems perform many 
functions. It is the roles and relationships which drive and control the system that are 
studied. The fact that complex systems exist is considered worthy of investigation 
(Connidis, 1982; Brantingham, 1977; Feeley, 1976). 
The systems approach used in this study conforms more closely to the functional- 
systems model. It is apparent that using the rational-goal model in this study will be 
problematic for two major reasons. First, the assumption that the object being studied 
must have a system goal befme it can be studied as a system cannot be applied to the 
criminal justice system becwse various parts (subsystems) in the criminal justice systems 
have their own goals/objectives to achieve: the police tend to aid at crime control; the 
court system tends to have, as reflected in sentencing, several and arguably contradictory 
objectiveJ such as punishment, deterrence and rehabfitation; the correctional subsystem 
also has a contradictory set of objectives such as punishment. penitence, rchabilitntion. 
reiategration and reparation (Ekstedt and Griffiths, 1988; Gr=ths and Verclun-Jones, 
19943. For the legal aid subsystem in this study, its objectives are to pro~%c Iegd services 
and legal education. Second, the choice of either model is dependent on the objectives of 
the research. Since the purpose of using the rational-goal model is optimizing the system, 
this model is more fit for evaluation research, which typically studies the performance of 
the system and compare the performance with the system's goal. Thc purpose of this study 
is that of exploring the system dynamics of the system by means of simulation modcling, 
which basically determines that the emphasis of the study is on the functional roles ol' thc 
subsystems and the interactions between the subsystems, rather than the systems goal. In 
addition, simulation modcling attempts to approximate to the real wxld as much as 
possible and thus is more descriptive rather than prescriptive which renders the functional 
systems model more appropriate for this research. 
Systems analysis is used to measure the effect on an organization of alternative 
programs. It may involve the creation of simulations as a process for testing the effect 
alternative programs might have upon the system as a whole. In this context, a simulation 
is any representation by a model of a system or process (Ekstedt and Griffiths, 1988: 15 1). 
A dynamic model is a simplification of the real world system which changes through time 
and space. Such a model is used to describe, explain or predict the behavior or operating 
characteristics of a system of interest (Bohigian, 1971). The model is built by identifying 
important elements, their interrelationships and interdependency within s system, and by 
developing simplified structures which represent what is happening in all important 
respects (Brantingham, 1977:150; Connidis, 1982:lO-12). Therefore, in any systems 
approach? it is necessary to omit some apparently less important aspects of the real system 
under investigation so that the model of the system is a sirnphfied and intelhgible version 
of the complex real phenomenon. The model should be kept as simple as possible to reveal 
the basic structure of the causal processes underlying the behavior of the system. 
Defining the Problem: Systems Boundary Determination 
There are two types of systems from the systems perspective: closed systems and 
open systems. The systems analysis techniques are transferred from studies in natural 
sciences such as physics, physical chemistry and biology. The systems studied from the 
systems perqective in these fields are normally closed systems. "The key characteristic of 
closed systems is that they can be isolated from their environment" (Connidis, 1982:19). 
In a closed system all interactions among the system parts (subsystems) take place within 
the system and contain no relationship with elements outside the system (Brantingham, 
1977:18). However, all social systems including the criminal justice system are open 
systems because they interact with their environment with continuous inflow and outflow 
(Brmtingham, 1977; Connidis, 1982). 
The criminal justice system's characteristic of openness brings about one 
conceptual issue of determining the system's boundary, i.e., which elements should be 
regarded as the subsystems within the system that will be the focus of the research and 
which elements should be regarded as the e~vironment of the system. The conceptual 
criterion used for setting up the system's boundary for this research is that of a srructural- 
functional approach, i.e., the system's boundaries will be initially delineated on thc basis of 
its structure, and then will be further refined by relating system functions to system 
structure. Here, the structure of a system is defined as "the ordering of its activities or 
organizational pattern" (Connidis, 1982:30). 
It should be noted that using the structure as the starting point for systcnls 
boundary determination is not based on the assumption that "the structure of' social 
systems determines how their functions are carried out" (Cortes, et al., in Connidis, 
1982:31). In fact, this structuralism assumption can be refilted on the ground that thc 
structure of social systems has to change in order to serve certain functions and, in this 
sense, it is the functions that determine the structure. Thus the dialectic relationship 
between structure and function basically denies the logic for using whichever as thc initial 
basis in determining systems' boundaries. 
There are two major reasons that structure is used as a more desirable basis for 
boundary determination. As discussed earlier in this chapter, one of the most important 
characteristics of systems analysis is its hobtic assumption. From the lunctiona! 
perspective, the "whole is greater than the sum of its parts"(Connidis, 1982:30), which 
determines that a system c m o t  be divided into subsystems while maintaining the systcm's 
original function. Structurally, however, a system can be divided into subsystems and 
divisions of the larger system by structure become the boundaries of smaller, included 
systems (Connidis, 1982). Secondly, social systems tend to have unique structures that can 
be used to identlfy one system from the others. "While one may be able to delineate the 
functions performed by a particular social system, cliftlculty arises when one attempts to 
defme a system's boundaries exclusively on this basis because s ~ d a r  functions may be 
carried out by several social systems" (Connidis, l982:3 1). 
Another useful criterion that can be used in determining system boundaries is 
pragmatic rather than conceptual. 'The purpose of the investigation" as argued by 
Brantingharn (1977:19) should be used as the basis for determining system boundaries. 
Since the purpose of her investigation was "exploring the courts from a functional, 
performance and potential change perspective" (p.19) she decided to "begin temporally 
with the commission of crime and end with the discharge of individuals from criminal 
justice agency control". "If the primary questions being asked were based on uncovering 
the mechanisms which 'cause7 crime or trying to uncover intervention points in the larger 
social organizations which could be used to prevent criminal acts or reduce crime, then the 
bounhs of the system would quite rightly be different." 
It has been stated that the purpose of this research is to explore the possibility of 
forecasting changes in the need for and the cost of legal aid in British Columbia. It has 
also been established in the previous chapters that changes in the need for legal aid and the 
cost of legal aid are heavily dependent on the performance of and interactions among the 
criminal justice agencies, namely the police, the courts (including the prosecutor and the 
defence attorney), and corrections. The study, therefore, focuses on the interactions and 
interdependencies among the criminal justice agencies. Thus ths research objective 
basically determines the system's boundaries. 
The decision to include the police, the courts, and corrections is also supportcd by 
the conceptual basis for determining a system's boundaries, i.e., using structure as rhc 
basis for initial boundary determination, and then refining the system's boundary by 
relating function to structure. From the structural point of view, as argued by Connidis 
(1982:32), 
A key structural feature of al l  social systems is the difference in character 
of the relationships among system parts as compared to the relationship 
between the system and its environment. This difference is based primarily 
upan the frequency and directness of interaction such that parts of a system 
relate to one another with greater frequency and directness than does the 
system to its environment. 
It is obvious that the system that has been defined has this structural characteristic. 
The police, the courts and corrections relate to one another much more frequently and 
dircctly than any of them or all of them together relate to other social services agencies 
(Ewing, 1976: 126). This is also true for the legal aid subsystem. It can be established that 
the functions ordered by structure, which are decisions by these agencies are closely tied 
to structure since each of these agencies has jurisdiction over specitic types of decisions in 
regard to both substantive and procedural criminal law. 
In addition to using the formal crimlnai justice agencies as the object for the 
systems analysis, this research will attempt to take advantage of one of the characteristics 
of social systems, i.e., that social systems tend to be open rather than closed. As discussed 
earlier, social systems, including the criminal justice sys tem, interact with the environment 
all the time. The interactions are different in frequency and in directness. Since criminal 
events reported to the police serve as the major input into the system being studied and the 
amount of this input is also affected by the output of the system in the form of deterrence 
effect, incapacitation effect, recidivism, etc. it has been decided to include some crime 
generators as part of the research object although they are major environmental elements 
rather than system elements. 
Simulation Modeling 
Decision makers are often interested in talung action that will change future 
events. Therefore, to provide estimates of the future effects of policy actions, policy 
analysts may need to construct models allowing decision makers to anticipate the results 
of actions they want to take. It is believed that simulation modeling is useful in studying 
the criminal justice system because of the system's complexity (Brantingharn, 1979). 
Simulation modeling allows the researcher and the planner to discover how changes in one 
part of the system affects the rest of the entire system. Simulation modeling is geared more 
towards understanding how different components of the system interact with each other to 
produce the net activity of the system as a whole than to understanding in depth the 
activity of a particular component in isolation from the others. 
The legal aid system is a complex system consisting of many sub-systems which 
consist of many parts at different hierarchical levels. The basic characteristic of such a 
complicated system is that all of the various parts at various hierarchical levels are 
interconnected. Changes brought about by decisions or exogenous factors in one part of 
the system influence flows and decisions in other parts of the system. Simulation modeling 
is one of the most commonly used techniques to study such a complex social systems from 
the systems perspective. 
What is simulation modeling 
According to Shannon (1975:4), "simulation is the process of designing a modcl of 
a real system and conducting experiments with this model for thc purpose either of 
understanding the behavior of the system or of evaluating various strategies (within the 
limits imposed by a criterion or set of criteria) for the purpose of the system." He argues 
that the purpose of building a model, which is a representation of an object, or a system, is 
to help explain, understand, or improve a system. Such a model provides, through 
prediction and comparison, a logiccd way to forecast the outcomes that follow alternative 
actions; and to indcate a preference among them (Shannon, 1975:4). 
According to Putt and Springer (1989:lOO-101), a model is nothing more than 
informed speculation about ... behavior of some system whether human or nonhun~an." 
Emshoff (1971:28) suggests that "a model is simply a representation of a system and, as 
such, its function is to integrate data about the system's behavior in a way that provides 
information about characteristics of that behavior." Similarly, Patton and Sawicki 
(1986:206) argue that. models are simplifications of reality that make relatively specific 
statements about the interrelationships between a limited set of elements of the real world. 
The term simulation model is usually reserved for those types of models where 
many units or groups of units are moved through a process or sequence of steps over 
time. Ham (1973) suggests that a simulation model is essentially an abstraction or 
sbmpbfied representation of the actual phenomenon that is being investigated. According 
to him (1973:24), "models are used for two basic purposes: as an aid for understanding 
past behavior and/or for predicting future behavior. The particular model built depends on 
the way the model builder hypothesizes the way the actual system works." Brantinghm 
argues that simulations are used when the system being studied is so complex that a 
discrete mathematical representation is difficult or intractable, and they are used in 
situations where some type of experimentation in the real system is desired but impractical 
(1 979: 159- 160). According to her, using simulations helps increase our understanding of 
the behavior of a system over time, and it can reduce the need for experimentation by 
pointing out probable consequences of implementing ideas (Brantingham, 1977: 159-160). 
Employing different criteria, models can be classified in various ways. Using time 
dependency as the distinguishing criterion, s model can be defined as a dynamic model or 
a static model (Brantingham, 1979; Delaney and Vaccari, 1989). According to 
Brarrtingharn (I977:154), "static models ignore time. They give a temporal snapshot of a 
system. Dynamic models, on the other hand, are time-related. The representation of the 
system provided by the model changes over time. The models are often used to explore 
the state of a system at some future date." In essence, a14 red world system models, 
including social system models, are dynamic (Forrester, 1971; Dclaney and Vaccnri, 1989; 
Pidd, 1992). 
Dynamic models constructed using the computer allow forecasts of the rcsults of 
changes in any one or a number of interrelated variables. It is argued thdt cornputcr 
simulation methodology has two major advantages over other methodologies (Pugh, 
1977). It can deal with systems of greater complexity and it is also a highly integrative 
form of model bujldhg which can be used to bring together and relate segments of' 
knowledge from several levels. In principle, computer simulation models can assist in 
dealing with the complexities of policy analysis by simulating the impacts of alternative 
policies on the real-world system (Pugh, 1977:1, 21). It is important to note, however, 
that the usefulness of models of this sort always depends upon the assumptions, especially 
the causal assumptions, that go into them. 
Models have been used with increasing frequency to cope with poiicy analysis and 
planning in a society that is growing in complexity. Designed as analogs to that portion of 
the real word which are relevant to the policy problem under study, the models are 
intended to simulate a real-world situation in such a way that inferences useful for policy 
making may be drawn from them (hgh,  1977: 1). 
Simcchtion Models ofthe Criminal Justice System 
As Pidd (l992:2) points out, computer shutation methods, developed since the 
early 1960s, may well be the most commonly used of all the analytical tools of 
management science. In the past three decades a diversity of models have been developed 
to simulate the police, the court, the corrections and the overall criminal justice system. 
Since no simulation model has ever been developed for the legal aid system and the legal 
aid system described in this research is very closely related to the whole criminal justice 
system, simulation models of the criminal justice system will be reviewed in this section. 
In essence, simulation models of the overall criminal justice system are of three 
major types: the deterministic aggregate-flow model as represented by the JUSSIM model, 
the stochastic case-by-case (entity) flow model as represented by the DOTSIM model, and 
the dynamic aggregate-flow model as represented by the Florida model. The Best-known 
overall criminal justice system simulation models are JUSSIM and CANSUS. As the 
CANJUS model is essentially an implementation of the JUSSIM model in the Canadian 
context, the two models are almost identical, with the only difference being that the 
CAWUS model has some modifications made in accordance with differences in system 
structure and data accessibility in Canada as compared to the United States (Brantingham, 
1977; Coraidis, 1982; Chaiken et al., 1976). Thus, reviewing one of the models is 
sufficient fur this study. 
JUSSIM was designed by Belkin, Blumstein, and Glass in the Urban Systems 
Institute at the School of Urban.and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University (Belkin, eb 
al., 1974). Written in FORTRAW IV, the criminal justice system is modeled as a line~r 
steady-state13 production process "where crime and associated off'enden are the basic unit 
of flow, and the processing stations are the different stages through which the urcstcd 
offender passes" (Chaiken, et al., 1974:22). As crimes and arrestees flow through the 
system from one stage to the next, the units of flow consume resourccs at each stage, such 
as the time of p o k e  oEcers, prosecutors, and judges. The model cdculates thc rate of 
consumption of the resources at each stage. Fixed "branching ratios" are used when the 
units of flow go to alternative stages such as charged or not charged, convicted or 
acquitted, etc. 
The JUSSIM model can be used to estimate the effects of a proposed changc at 
one stage of the criminal justice system on the workload and costs of the following stages 
and hence estimate changes in resource requirements (Connidis, 1982:42-48). This allows 
the user to address policy issues that propose changes in h e  flow and processing of 
crimes, offenders, and prisoners in the overall criminal justice system with the model. It is 
possible to estimate the impact on the whole system from the changes in the subsystem. 
One major limitation of the JUSSIM model is its rigidity. The branching ratios are 
f ~ e d  or have a known probability distribution. A change in the flow in one part of the 
system is assumed not to alter the branchmg ratios in another part of the system. The fixed 
13 
"A steady-state model is one in which the parameters of the system do not change with 
time, and the long-run characteristics are all that are judged relevant. A linear model is one 
where parameters are independent of one another and independent of flow rates through 
the system" (Chaiken, et al., 1974:22). 
branchmg ratio in the model in essence assumes that elements in the system are 
independent of each other. This assumption is contrary to the basic concepts in the 
systems approach to the criminal justice system. As discussed earlier, the elements in the 
criminal justice system are a31 interconnected and dependent on each other. This is a 
significant feature of any system and should not be ignored in a simulation model. 
Another major limitation is that the flow model is basically timeless. If there is any 
short or long term change in the branching ratios or delay times, the model has no capacity 
to handle it (Brantingham, 1977; Connidis, 1982). Another limitation of the model is its 
steady-state production process in which the parameters of the system do not change with 
time, whereas time is an important variable in the real system of criminal justice. Case 
delays in the court system, for example, may substantially change the behavior of the court 
system. 
Based on its success and limitations, the JUSSIM model was modified in the 
second edition, JUSSIM II. In the second edition, a feedback of recidivism and a time 
variable are added to simulate the criminal justice system in a dynamic year-by-yeax 
manner while the units of flow advance through the system in the same way as in the 
original JUSSIM model. In JUSSIM 11, 
all processing is assumed completed within a year's time, and the resource 
capacity at each stage is assumed sufficient to handle the load. The output 
from each of the stages, including the corrections facilities, is divided into 
the fraction who eventually become recidivists and those who return to the 
general society and behave as norma! citizens (Chaiken, et G I . ,  197633). 
The addition of the feedback in the form of recidivists and the year-to-year timc 
variable in the JUSSIM I1 model is a significant advancement as it makes available timc- 
dependent (yearly) outputs of workload, costs and flows and allows the user to addrcss 
policies that change recidivism and that investigate changes in the times beewecn 
successive criminal acts. Because of its dynamic structure, the new model provides somc 
forecasting capacity since it can generate "snapshots" of the system perfornunce for 
several years into the future. On the other hand, the major hitation of the original 
version, i.e., that of fixed "branching ratios", still exists with the new model. 
A somewhat different approach to simulating the criminal justice system was ttakcn 
in DOTSIM (Dynamic Offender Tracking Simulation) by Public Safety Systems of' Sunla 
Barbara, California (Jago, 1973). WMe JUSSIM and its close descendants such as 
CANJUS, JUSSIM I1 and PHILnM are all aggregate-flow models, in which the 
aggregated volumes of crimes andlor offenders flow through the system, the DOTSIM is a 
case-by-case flow model (Chaiken et al., 1976). Written in FORTRAN for the CDC 6400, 
the model simulates the movement of offenders through the criminal justice system, Each 
case or entity within the model is created with characteristics chosen from random number 
generators based on statistics on the frequency and type found in the rcal world. The 
model accumulates measures of both costs and times attributable to each case as jt passes 
through the processing stages. Costs and average transit times for the offenders through 
each of the stages are avaiiable by crime type. 
The major advantage of the DOTSIM model, according to Chaken et al. (1970), is 
its case-by-case flow which reflects the actual procedural step-by-step processing of 
individual offenders through the criminal justice system. Court case delays, for example, 
are a result of the interaction between the availabihty of resources to process cases anci ;he 
accumulative effect of the case-by-case flow. However, the case-by-case flow approach 
has several limitations in its attempt to simulate the overall criminal justice system. First, 
the case-by-case flow is in serious conflict with the practice by any criminal justice system 
in the real world in which many cases are being processed at the same time instead of one 
by one. In this respect, it is more feasible to use the model to simulate a single agency's 
activity rather than a whole system. Moreover, the concerns of the senior management of 
the criminal justice agencies generally do nct involve individual cases, but rather aggregate 
cost and process rates. Thus the problems should be studied by aggregating the individual 
"events" into a continuous flow and examining this flow in the context of the continuous 
variables that affect it and are affected by it. 
The second rn+jor limitation of the DOTSIM model, which is characteristic of all 
the models reviewed, is that "parameters describing interaction between system 
components (branching ratios) must be prescribed by the user" (Chaiken et al., 1976:40). 
Thus, the erroneous assumption of independent elements in a system is implanted in this 
model. The third limitation of the DOTSIM model is again related to its case-by-case 
stochastic approach. This kind of approach normally requires more irdi~rmatian crn the 
precise rules for tke movement of each case through the system. It is difficult i ~ ~ d  
expensive to obtain data to calculate the precise parameters as required by the model 
(Chaiken, et al., 1976). 
The third representative model is the Florida model developed by Patricia L. 
Brantingham (1977). Although the model is named "Dynamic Modeling of the Felony 
Court System" in Florida, it actually simulates all the procedures that criminal cases Ilow 
through in the criminal justice system, starting with the criminal events reported to the 
police and ended with corrections. The major decision points such as arresting, charging, 
bargaining and sentencing, are all included in the model. Therefore, it is considered more 
appropriate to regard it as a simulation model of the overall criminal justice system. 
Written in DYNAMO, a simulation language designed specifically to simulate [he 
real world dynamic systems, the Florida model was designed to model the complcx 
interrelationships within the system, to identify flow linkages, and to respond to dynamic 
changes in crime patterns. The equations used in the simulation were designed to model 
the flow breaks at these important decision points and the information feedback from 
other agencies and processes within the system. 
The major advancement in the Florida model lies in its capacity to simulatc the 
dynamic nature of the criminal justice system. Instead of using find branching ratios as 
used in the other models reviewed, the Florida model allows the branching ratios to 
change in response to continuous feedback from various decision points in the systzm such 
as; workload, resources available and case delays. The inclusion of a monthly time variable 
moves the model closer to the reai system than the year-to-year var:ables in the other 
models and makes it possible for the researcher and the potential planner to explore the 
impact of time re1 lted policies. 
Review of the three typical simulation models of the overall criminal justice system 
illustrates that, technically, there are three approaches to developing a simulation model of 
a complex system in the real world. First, it can be developed by using an all-purpose 
computing language. The JUSSIM model and the DOTSIM model took this approach. 
Both of them used FORTRAN, which is an all-purpose computing language. The second 
approach is to implement a well-devzloped simulation model into the current situation. 
CANJUS is an example in this approach. It implemented the JUSSIM model into the 
Canadian situation by modifying the parameters with data from the Canadian criminal 
Justice system. The third approach is illustrated in the Florida model, i.e., by using a 
computing language written specifically for simulation purposes. 
Each of these three approaches has its advantages and disadvantages when 
compared with other approaches. Of the three approaches, using an all-purpose computing 
language offers the most flexibility and power in that the model developer can basically 
structure the model at hislher will, be it stochastic or deterministic, dynamic or static, 
aggregate flow or case-by-case flow, with or without feedback, etc. However, review of 
the three typical simulation models of the overall cn'uninal justice system indicates that for 
all purpose computing language approach is the most difficult and most resource- 
demanding. It requires a team with at least a professional programmer iu the computing 
language of choice to spend several years to develop a simulation model as is the case 
with the JUSSIM model. 
The second approach, implementing a well-developed model, as in the case of 
CANJUS which implemented JUSSIM in the Canadian context, requires the least cffi~rt 
and resources in developing a simulation model. The developer does not need to do any 
programming to m o d e  the structure of the simulation model. All hefshe needs to do is to 
collect and analyze data for his subject system and to change the input and the parameters 
in the model with the analytical results. Using a well-developed model, however, gives ihc 
developer the least flexibility. Two conditions must be met before a well-developcd rnodcl 
can be implemented in a new context: the structure of the system to be simulated has to be 
very similar to the simulation model to be implemented; and the purpose of' the current 
research has to be similar to the purpose of the original model. 
The third approach, using a computer simulation language to develop a new 
smulation model, demonstrated in the Florida model, stands somewhere between the 13rst 
two approaches in terms of efforts required and capacity and flexibility offered. Computer 
simulation languages are written essentially to make it easier to build simulation models. 
They normally have various built-in functions and macros that are required for simulations. 
Using a built-in function or a macro is equivalent to using hundreds of ljncs of native code 
in a general computing language. In addition to the ease in developing simulation models, 
simulation languages also offer great flexibihty and capacity for modeling complex 
systems. The only major hitation of using a simulation language may be the availability 
of a language that is suitable for the type of system to be modeled. Generally spealung, 
simulation languages are written for modehg specific types of systems. DYNAMO, for 
example, is written for dynamic aggregate-flow models. Therefore, it cannot be used to 
develop stochastic case-by-case flow models. MAW,  GALS, and MAST are written for 
modeling manufacturing systems and cannot be used for dynamic models (Pritsker, 1986). 
This limitation has become a much smaller problem than it was in the earlier days when 
simulation was fust introduced and there were very few simulation languages avadable. In 
the past three decades, a great number of simulation languages have been developed and 
the researcher normally has a range of choice as long as he has the knowledge and 
resources (Pidd, 1992; Pritsker, 1986). 
The advantages and disadvantages of the three approaches as discussed above 
demonstrate the general principles that the model builder should follow in choosing the 
appropriate approach the problem has been defined (or, the system has been identified) for 
simulation. The model builder should start by reviewing existing well-developed 
simulation models and compare their compatibility with the system to be simulated. If 
there is no compatible simulation model existing simulation languages should be examined 
and their capacities compared with the purpose of the research. Using an all-purpose 
computing language should be regarded as the last resort. 
Since no simdation model has ever been developed to forecast the nced for le@ 
aid, there is no possibility of implementing a simulation model. Thus, the fcuibility of' thc 
second alternative has to be explored, i.e., using simulation programming languages. Of 
the various simulation programming languages that have been developed during thc past 
three decades, some are general purpose oriented and some are for specific types ot' 
models. DYNAMO is selected for this study as the simulation programming language 
because it is specifically developed to provide a language for analyzing dynamic systems 
(such as the criminal justice system) characterized by the interconnectedness bctwcen 
various parts within the system and time-dependent continuous feedback. The other 
reason for choosing DYNAMO is because it is the most cost-effective as comparcd with 
some general purpose simulation languages, such as SLAM I1 and thc CSSL languages I4 
which, in addition to other functions,. have the capacity for simulating dynamic modcls as 
well as DYNAMO does. The version used in this research, Professional DYNAMO Plus 
v.3.1 (for DOS) costs US$100, while SLAM I1 costs around US$50,000, (learncd by thc 
researcher when attending a conference in August, 199415). The DOS version o f  
DYNAMO is selected for this research over the Windows version out of the consideration 
of cost-effectiveness as well. The Windows version cost US$3,000 at the timc of inquiry 
(1994). 
14 The CSSL languages refer to the family of simulation languages which have bccn 
reasonably standardised by the Society for Computer Simulation's Continuous System 
Simulation Language Committee. "Exampies of CSSL languages are CSMP III, CSSL IiI, 
CSSL IV, ASCL and DARE-P" (Pritsker 1986579). 
15 At the conference, the Court Services Branch of the Ministry of Attorney General 
reported its feasibility study of using SLAM to simulate the provincial court system in 
British Columbia. 
Dyttamo 
Before discussing the procedures to follow in developing a skulation model. in 
DYNAMO, it is necessary to provide a brief description of the DYNAMO simulation 
language. As an effective tool for building and simulating cmtinuous feedback models, 
DYNAMO has been widely used to study business, social, economic, biological, 
psychological and engirieering systems, among others. 
Using what happened in the past to predict what will happen in the future, 
DYNAMO is a time dependent simulation language based on h e a r  and non-linear 
ddference equations. It is a language which facilitates the exploration of flows and rates of 
change and is well suited to modeling interactions and feedbacks. The execution of a 
simulation model in thrs language provides a time ordered picture of how a system 
operates and changes (Brantingham, 1977: 175-6). 
DYNAMO compiles and executes continuous simulation models. According to 
Pugh (1983:1), "continuous models are useful when the system in question depends on 
aggregate (average, continuous) flows rather than on the occurrence of single, discrete 
events. The problems of senior management, for example, generally do not involve 
individual sales transactions or particular machines, but rather aggregate revenue and 
production rates." 
DYNAMO can be used to study the structural aspects of models of systems. 
"State variables, called levels (in DYNAMO), are defmed in difference equation form and 
may be nonlinear. Nonlinearities are also included in the model through the use of table 
functions, delay, and clipping operations" (Pugh, 1983:l) DYNAMO used a fixed step 
size, Euler-type integration algorithm to evaluate the level variables over time. 
A DYNAMO model is a set of equations which is constructed to represent flows 
of people and mformation. The solutions to the equations represent the simulated behavior 
or operating characteristics of the system over time. The model consists of a set of 
equations representing flows, rates of change and information links, and initial time 
dependent values for variables. The sxecution of a simulation model in this language 
provides a t h e  ordered picture of how a system operates and changes. The simulation is 
designed to identlfy and model flow hnkages, and to respond to dynamic changes in thc 
flow patterns. 
The basic concept in DYNAMO is the process of integration which relates a 
variable to the rate of change over time in that variable. Pritsker (1986581) providcs a 
brief description of some of the symbols used in DYNAMO: "...variables that arc a 
function of time are indicated by a period following the variable name and subscripts 
denoting time following the period. Single letters denote points in time and double letters 
denote that the value holds for an interval. Three points in time are used, which are 
represented by the letters J, K, and L. The intervals between these points are represcnted 
by JK and KL. The length of the interval is fixed and defmed by the variable DT." To take 
as an example the number of cases represented by legal aid lawyers, at any given time, the 
number is determined by the difference between the rate at which cases flow into the legal 
aid system (in the form of legal aid approvals) and the rate at which cases flow out of the 
legal aid system (cases are completed and bilhngs are paid). If the system had 10,000 
persons on legal aid a year ago and the net rate of change is 100 persons per month, the 
system now has 10,000 persons plus 100 persons per month times 12 months, or 1 1,200 
persons. In equation form ths  is : 
volume (now) = volume (earlier) + elapsed time * rate of change 
In DYNAMO, the present time is indicated by the subscript K, the earlier time by 
the subscript J, and the elapsed time is called DT (Delta (change in) Time). Thus the above 
equation in DYNAMO will look like: 
L V0LUME.K = VOLUME.J+DT*RATE OF CHANGE 
A DYNAMO model consists a set of equations which is constructed to represent 
the flows of goods (in this case people and dollars) and mformation. The equations are 
compiled and executed in DYNAMO program. Ths execution of the CYNAMO model is 
basically a process of solving the equations on a computer. The equations are solved in an 
itemthe fashion. Each successive iterative solution gives values for the flow levels and 
rates of change in successive time periods. The solutions to the equations represent the 
sindated behavior or operating characteristics of the system over time. 
DYNAMO makes use of thirteen equation types to generate thirteen types of 
essentid variables. Of the thirteen equation types, three are essential to an understanding 
of the DYNAMO language and w d  be discussed in this chaPterl6 to illustrate the structure 
of the DYNAMO simulation language. The three basic equation types are level equiitions, 
rate equations and auxiliary equations, indicated by L, R7 A respectively in the model. 
Level equations are integral equations to generate variables such as the numbcr of 
persons on legal aid, whose values are calculated by integration. Level equations relate a 
quantity at the current time to its value at the previous time that calculations were made 
and to its rate of change during the interval between calculations. They accumulate the 
effects of changes in the "rate7' variables that flow into and out of them. The equation used 
earlier to illustrate the time function in DYNAMO: 
L VOLU1ME.K = VOLUME. J+DT*(LAAP.JK-LACMPL. JK) 
where VOLUME = the number persons on legal aid 
LAAP = number of persons approved for legal aid 
LACMPL = volume of legal aid completion 
is a typical level equation to generate the "VOLUME" variable, which stands for the 
number of people on legal aid at the current time. 
A "rate" variable is the sum of inflows minus the sum of the outflows. The 
equations determining rates in a DYNAMO model are not restricted to a specific format. 
16 Detailed discussions of the equation types in the DYNAMO language can be found in 
the Professional DYNAMO Plus Reference Manual published by Pugh-Roberts 
Associates, 1991. 
Rates can potentially be determined by a wide variety of factors in a wide variety of ways. 
Examples of rate equations in the legal aid model are: 
R LAAP.KL=PSNCHRG*APPRATE 
R LACMPL.KL=CURTCASE*DISPRATE 
where PSNCHRG = persons charged with criminal offences 
APPRATE = legal aid approval rate 
CURTCASE = criminal cases in the court system 
DISPRATE = court disposition rate 
Auxiliary equations are simple algebraic functions of levels, rates and other 
auxiliary variable at the current time. They are frequently used as building blocks to make 
the definition of rate variables clearer and easier w,We level variables and rate variables 
form the fundamental building blocks for a DYNAMO model. In terms of the continuous 
feedback structure of a system, auxiliary variables bridge the gap between levels and the 
rates changing other levels. In the practice of modeling, as can be seen in the current legal 
aid model, auxiliary variables tend to be most numerous and to represent important 
concepts in the system under consideration. "Auxiliary variables tend to be based on 
information within a system and act to control the physical components of the system" 
(Pugh-Roberts, 1991 : 18). A s i m p l ~ e d  example from the legal aid model is shown as: 
A PSNCHRG.K=CNP.K*.30 
where CNP = crime known to ?he police. 
--Stages in the Simulation Modeling of a System 
The process of building a DYNAMO simtllation model can be summl~ized into 
five stages. First it is essential to define the problem as clearly as possible. Basically it is a 
matter of defining the system to be simulated. The problem definition in this rescurch is 
mostly achieved by reviewing the legal aid system and the c r i e d  justice system in British 
Columbia in Chapter I and Chapter 11. It should be noted, however, that problem 
definition is not a one time shot. As indicated by Figure 3, problem definition needs to be 
updated every time there is feedback from later stages in building the model. 
Figure 3 Five phases in Simuiatian Model Building 
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Once the problem has been initially defined it is necessary to attempt some form of 
conceptualization of the problem viewed as a system. This second phase of system 
conceptualization requires the researcher's knowledge of the way in which the system 
funcfons. This phase can be achieved by constructing a causal diagram or digraph of the 
system in the case of a dynamic model with continuous feedback. A flow chart is a partial 
representation of the sequence of operations which are necessary to solve a problem. 
DYNAMO uses a set of conventional symbols as a diagrammatic representation of a 
DYNAMO program. Chapter IV of this paper is devoted to the second phase of rnociel 
conceptualization which essentially consists of the development of a digraph of the 1cga.I 
aid system using the conventional symbols of DYNAMO. 
In the third phase of model building the behavior of the system being studied 
should be quantitatively analyzed to provide the parameters for all the equations in thc 
DYNAMO model. In the case of modeling social systems (including the criminal justicc 
system), however, it is not uncommon that, because of data collection limitations, some 
parameters are not available through analysis of empirical data. Therefore, hypothetical 
parameters have to be used as shown in the Florida model by Brantingham (1977). The 
validity and reliability of the model become dependent on the proportion of hypothetical 
parameters as well as the researcher's conceptual understanding of the system. In Chapter 
V, the empirical analysis of the behavior of the legal aid system in British Columbia will he 
discussed and the results of the analysis will be used in the DYNAMO simulation model. 
The fourth phase of model building is programming in DYNAMO. This is the 
process in which the model concepts captured on paper in a flow diagram are translated 
into an operating model on the computer, More specrfically, the decision points in the 
legal aid system are translated into DYNAMO equations. It should be stressed that thc 
programming part has to be refined repeatedly in response to the feedback from thc fast 
testkg phase of the process. 
The fifth phase of model building in DYNAMO is testing the model. First the 
behavior of the simulation model, i.e., the output of the base flow pattern is compred 
qualitatively and quantitatively with the behavior of the system being studied. The model 
may be verified if the simulation model can replicate the actual pat;tern of the system being 
strtdied. This basically means that the output at the important focal points in the model 
c~rrespond closely with the behavior of the real system. 
The main purpose of data collection in this research is to provide accurate 
estimates of the parameters needed to make the simulation model a true representation of 
the actual criminal justice system (legal aid system) based on which +future projections can 
be made. This means that at every significant decision point in the model data are needed 
to estimate the behavioral model parameters (Hann, 197373). 
Because of the popular use of computers, many agencies in the criminal justice 
system, in addition to Statistics Canada, have operational information systems that provide 
the rn3ior information sources for this study. Three sets of data were collected for this 
study: crime predictors, criminal justice system data, and legal aid data. Crime predictors 
include such key indicators as the volume of liquor sales, retail volume, population 
compositions, age and sex structure, unemployment rates and numbers of people on social 
assistance. Monthly data from 1985 till 1993 were used in the simulation model and the 
requisite analyses. 
The criminal justice system data include data from the police, crown, court and 
corrections. Data from the police include crimes known to the police and number of 
charges laid by the police, including both charges against adults and against youths. Data 
from the Crown prosecutors include the number of cases returned to the policc for more 
information; the number of charges dropped; the number of caution letters: the numbcr ol' 
cases that proceed to the court; and, the number of diversions. Court data include thc 
number of cases that go to court and information on dispositions, especially whether by 
guilty plea or trial. Data from corrections include the number of cases and lcngth of 
imprisonment. 
Legal aid data include number of applicants, applicant age and sex proliles, nuinber 
of people who have received legal aid over the years, number of private bar lawyers 
accepting legal aid cases, and number of legal aid intake points. Legal aid data can also 
provide such information as the time delay between occurrence of crime and charges bcing 
laid and patterns in guilty plea and t d ,  cost of different types of cases and different court 
procedures, etc- 
Forecasts provide information about future needs that are a prcjcction of existing 
trends--an extension of the past into the future. A common way of predicting the future 
from the past in social science is through the use of tbnc series analysis. Such an analysis 
iavolves obtaining and processing data on one or more variables for many points in time. 
It is generally contrasted with cross-sectional analysis where data are obtained and 
processed over one or more variables for many places at a single point-in-time (Nagel, 
1982). 
One advantage of using simulation modeling in forecasting the future to the 
commonly used time series analysis is that time series analysls assumes that nothing 
changes - that cyclical patterns simply replicates whereas simulation modeling allows the 
consideration of policy changes and the system dynamics. 
There are limitations in using computer simulation models to study a complex 
social system such as the criminal justice system. A maior limitation is that simulation 
models are built upon many assumptions, which are derived from the researcher's 
understanding of the system. In essence the validity of a simdation model is as good as the 
assumptions are. Since our understanding of the criminal justice system is far from 
thorough, the simulation model will be similarly limited. 
Another major limitation is that simulatioc modeling requires a lot of data to 
provide the parameters in the model. Although the situation now is a lot better than it was 
twenty years ago when simulation modehg was f ~ s t  introduced into the study of social 
systems, data collection proves to be the most time consuming, costly and it is always the 
case that more data are wanted than are available. Hypothetical parameters have to be 
used at various decision points in the model for lack of sufficient data. W e  these 
hypthesis a e  arguably educated guesses, they are nonetheless hypothetical :mi ultimately 
affect the reliability of the model when used as a planning tool. 
CHAPTER V. DEVELOPXNG THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
It has been argued in Chapter I1 and Chapter III that many factors in the criminal 
justice system and its environment affect the need for and cost of legal aid in British 
Columbia. Thus, the preceding discussions have basically defined the problem and 
significant variables for the study. Before a simulation model is programmed, it is 
necessary to conceptuahze the model by further deheating the way in which these 
variables are interconnected and exploring others that may also be related and affect legal 
aid. The conceptualization of the model will be achieved through the search for causal 
relationships, feed back structures and the development of flow charting diagrams, causal 
l o ~ p  diagrams and the DYNAMO flow diagram. The diagrams will provide a useful link 
between a verbal description of a system and its representation as difference equations. 
Causal loop diagrams are a representation of a model that maps out the interacting 
elements of feedback systems and clearly illustrates the causal relationships. As shown in 
Figure 4, the individual lmks in such diagrams can be labeled to show whether the nature 
of the causal-link is "positive" or "negative". Generally speaking, a plus sign indicates that 
the variables at the opposite ends of the arrow tend to move in the same direction while a 
minus sign indicates an inverse relationship. In Figure 4, for example, there is a direct 
reidtionship between the need for legd aid and the availability of legal aid, i.e. as the need 
for legal aid incrdases, more legal aid offices will be set up and more lawyers will be made 
avdable to the people in need of legal aid. There is also a direct relationship between the 
availability of legal aid and the total cost of legal aid. On the other hand. there exists an 
inverse relationship between the total cost of leg2 aid and the need for kgd aid. When the 
cost goes up, the Legal Services Society normally has to make its eligibility policy more 
strict to bring down the level of the need for legal aid so as to keep a balanced budget. 
Figure 4 Causal Loop for A Legal Aid System 
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DYNAP\?O users make use of a set of specific flowcharting symbols. The symbols, 
as illustrated in Figure 5, include level, flow rate, delay, auxiliary computation, noise, 
switch, table, sourcelsmk,, people flow and information flow. A few words of explanation 
of these symbols may assist in understanding how they are used. 
Of all the symbols level is the most essential concept in DYNAhfO simulation. 
With constant changes in input and output, the level is changing all the time. In the legal 
aid system, levels can be that of the number of cases that are provided with legal aid; 
levels can also be the amount of cost. In the court module, level is the number of cascs 
flowing through the court. is an equation which calculates the differences between 
input and output. Delay is a function used in DYNAMO to control the time when changes 
in rates are supposed to occur. An a u ~  is an equation to assist in the calculation of 
rates, delays and lev&. A noise is a random fluctuation or interference pattern in data or 
information. DYNAMO generates noise by selecting a random number between 0.5 and - 
0.5. Switch is used by DYNAMO to run in what-if situations. When certain condition is 
met, the program goes to a different route. A table can be used to provide input into the 
model at different stages. A source is an external input of cases, people, mformation or 
resources into the system. A slnk is an embodiment of cases or information removed from 
the system. Peo~ le  flow refers to the through-put of cases going through the system. 
Information flow refers to the throughput of information in the form of, in the present 
model, policy changes etc. 
Developing a flowchart with DYNAMO speclfic symbols helps the model builder 
better understand the causal relations between the various variables and identlfy the 
different types of variables that are essential in the programming process. It assists the end 
user of the simulation model, whether for research purpose or for planning purpose, to 
understand the logic behind the program. 
Figure 5 DYNAMO Flowcharting Symbols 
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FACTORS INPLUENCiNG THE NEED FOR LEGAL AID 
Many factors influence the need for legal aid, including socio-economic conditions, 
demographic characteristics, crime rate, law enforcement, court procedure, policies for 
legal aid services, the availability and accessibility of legal aid, etc. TEus is illustrated in the 
causal loop diagrams shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 Factors Influencing the Need for Legal Aid 
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The legal aid system itself influences costs and expenditures of legal aid services, 
which, in turn, influence the criteria for determining legal aid need (cost for tanff and staff 
lawyers, administrative practices, financial eligibility criteria, cost per applicant, types of 
service, service coverage policies, and the distribution of services). For example, if legal 
aid services are not highly evident, a person may be unaware that he /she is actually 
eligible for representational services and fails to apply. Or, if the services are not readily 
accessible, prospective clients may choose not to apply. Some variables that may be used 
in the simulation model include: number of private lawyers providing services, number of 
staff lawyers providing services, number of contact points, number of non legal staff, etc. 
The socio-economic-demographic pattern may influence the need for legal aid. 
Given financial eligibility criteria, legal aid expenditures should vary, under ideal 
circumstances, with changes in employment and unemployment levels, in demographic 
characteristics (e.g. percentage of males, percentage of females, perceritage of young 
people, percentage of single parent families, etc.), and in migration rate. All of these 
factors are interrelated. When the percentage of people on welfare increases, the number 
and percentage of people financially eligible for legal aid will also increase. 
For example, in the aggregate profde, criminal legal aid applicants and recipients of 
representational services are predominately single young males with low levels of 
education. This general demographic pattern helps estimate ihe demand and med for legal 
aid. Census data that can be used for predicting legal aid need include: t o w  population, 
total number of famihes, percentage of males, percentage of males aged 15-24, percentage 
of single males (never married, separated, divorced), t nmkr  of fern& single piwents, and 
number of population aged over 15 with no income. Social and economic predictor data 
include unemployment rate, number of persons on welfare, average income, rate of  
women participating work, etc. 
Changes in the socio-economic situations impact on the crime pattern which may 
have an impact on the need for legal aid. The number of people who would seek and 
receive services, i.e. the demand for service, depends on crime patterns. When more crime 
is committed, for example, there will be more criminal charges and more will demand for 
legal aid. A larger volume of serious crime will also increase the demand for lcgal aid. 
The need for legal aid also depends on the operation of the criminal justicc SYSICIII. 
Many aspects of the procedures of the criminal justice system may influence thc need lilr 
legal aid. These may include charging practices, trial rates as compared with guilty plea 
rates, stay and withdrawal rates, the changing and fixed features of the Criminal Code, thc 
Narcotics Control Act and other legislation including the Young Oflenders Act, as well as 
sentencing practices. 
For example, persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Young Offenders Court 
comprised 25 percent of all persons charged with offences in Canada in 199 1 ,  but made up 
only about 15 percent of the total population. The Young Offenders Act provides thc 
judge with powers to appoint legal counsel for youth in court, while adults must apply f;w 
legal aid. Even when charged with minor offences under background conditions 
suggesting little or no &elhood of incarceration, youths are stdl generally covered in 
practice by legal aid. Thus, the base of those who might receive legal aid representation 
increased greatly with the proclamation of the Young Oflenders Act. Some variables 
include: offences cleared by charge, persons charged, etc. 
Underlymg need and availabdity, accessibdity and wllPingness to use produce the 
demand for legal aid. The demand can be increased or decreased by changes in need levels 
or in levels of avadability, accessibility or w~gness-to-use.  High accessibility makes it 
natural for an increase in need to be reflected in an increase in demand, that is, requests for 
services. When there is low accessibility of services, demand would be low even when the 
underlying need for services increases. Avadability and accessibility of legal aid are tied to 
the site of the criminal event and the home location of the accused. The utilization of legal 
aid services is largely dependent on the avadability and accessibility of the services-- 
mostly, the number and location of intake pcints. 
For the conceptual simulation modeling of legal aid need, many more factors could 
be chosen depending on the purpose of the analysis. All the factors should be considered 
jointly. For the first step, feedback loops or flow charts are constructed to show the 
interrelationship of' the factors within each sub-system. Tnen, they will be connected 
together further showing the interrelationship among the different sub-systems. 
Many variables influence the need for and the cost of Iegd aid in BC. Thcse 
variables can be groups into four sections called modules to make it possible to struoturc 
the model: the crime module, the police module, the prosecution module, the judicid 
module, the corrections module, and the administration of legal aid module. Thus the 
model can be regarded as made up of six modules, with information and people il-lowing 
between them (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 modules of the Legal Aid Model 
The modules are not hdependent: but are Interconnected. Information and pcopk 
can flow between different modules. From the Crime Module, people flow as alleged 
offenders to the Police Module in the form of being arrestedkharged. Information flows 
from the Police  module to the Crime Module in the form of deterrence effect. From the 
P o k e  Module, people flow to the Crown Counsel Module in the form of request for 
prosecution of the criminal suspect. Information flows back from the Crown in the form of 
information feedback about what evidence b required to lay charges for criminal offences. 
From the P o k e  Module people flow to the LSS Module, too, to seek legal advice. 
Information flows back from LSS to the Police when legal advice is given under the 
Brydges duty counsel program (24-hour hot line of legal advice for arrestees). From the 
Crown Counsel Module, people flow into the Judicial Module in the form of being 
prosecuted and into the LSS Module for legal aid. Information flows from the Judicial 
Module back into the Crown Module normally in the form of information feedback such 
as the court's acceptance or rejection of evidence, ruhgs on motions, etc. Information 
flows from the LSS Model to the Crown when legal aid is given and some charges are 
dropped at this stage as a result of legal representation. From the Judicial Module, people 
flow into the Corrections Module as those who are found guilty serve their sentences. 
Information flows from the Corrections Module to the Judicial Module in the information 
feedback about what correctional programs are available and, arguably, jail crowdedness. 
lnforniation flows from the Judicial Module into the LSS Module in the form of different 
court procedures thdt legal aid cases go through, which constitute the tariff cost, and 
information flows from the LSS into the Judicial Module in the form of legal services 
pmvided. From the Corrections Module, people flew back into the system by way of the 
Crime Module in the form of recidivism. Information flows from the Corrections Module 
into the Crime Module, arguably, in the form of general deterrence. People flow from the 
Corrections Module into the LSS Module for leg& aid under the Prison Program pt - ided  
by the LSS, and information flows from the LSS Module into the Corrcctians Module 
when legal aid is provided. 
MICRO STRUCTURE OF THE CRIME MODULE 
Criminal events are the major input into the criminal justice system as well ils thc 
legal aid system. The first part of the simulation model consists of inonthly crime pattcrns 
by offence and various socio-economic and demographic variables that are used as crimc 
predictors. The crime predictors used in the model are found to vary over time both in 
terms of long term trend and seasonal fluctuations. In addition, each predictor has a 
different long term trend and a different seasonal fluctuation pattern. Thus, the generation 
of each of the base crime predictors (called CP in Figure 8) consists of steps in thc 
DYNAMO model (Figure 8). First, the long term crime predictor pattern is generated by 
calculating and integrating the yearly average values and the long term trends. Second, the 
seasonal crime predictor pattern is generated by calculating and integrating the values of' 
the monthly fluctuation and the monthly cycle counter. Third, the base pattern of crimc 
predictors is generated by integrating the long term pattern and the seasonal fluctuation 
pattern. 
With the crime prediciors as the input, the amomt of crime reported to the pollce 
is calculated by seven offence types. Since im crime predictor can predict the amount of 
crime with one hundred percent accuracy, some variation is added to the calculation of 
the volume of crime reported to the police as random variation by using a DYNAMO 
built-in function called "noise" which produces a random number between -0.5 and t-0.5. 
Figure 8 Causal Loop of the Crime Module 
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In the DYNAMO model, the amount of crime known to the police (CKP) by 
offence type is used to calculate the charges by the police (Figure 9). To makc the 
simulation possible, it has to be assurned that the proportion of multiple offenders 
committing single offences and single offender committing multiple offcnccs to be fixed 
over time at the provincial aggregate level. 
Using CKP as the input, people flow through the police agency at a certain charge 
rate and some time delay. The relationship between the amount of CKP and charges is not 
hear ,  ie., the charge rate and the time delay are not fixed. They are affected by the 
volume of CKP, the workload of the police, the proportion of serious crime versus less 
serious crime and some unexplainable factors (represented by "noise" in DYNAMO). The 
level of crime is found to fluctuate over time. Staffig level of the police, howevcr, 
remains relatively stable. When there are crime peaks, the workload for the policc 
increases. Although police are found to be able to lay more charges at crime pcaks, charge 
rate decreases with more time delay as a result of workload constmints. Facing crirnc 
peaks a d  workload constraints, the police are likely to pay more attention to more 
serious crimes, resulting in a greater decrease in charge rate and morc delay fix less 
serious offence types. 
Figure 9 DYNAMO Flowchart of the Police Module 
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Crown counsel has several alternatives in disposing requests for criminal charges 
(called RCC in Figure 10). In addition to proceeding with the criminal charges as 
requested by the police, Crown counsel can drop the charge when helshe believes that the 
evidence is weak or when it is believed that carrying on with the case would be 
inappropriate; the case can be returned to the police for more information; a caution letter 
can be issued:, or the case diverted out of the system. Cases may have weaknesses in the 
evidence which cause the Crown to drop the charges or they may have characteristics that 
compel the Crown to proceed with the charges. However, there are a large number of 
cases which do not have clear-cut characteristics for disposal alternatives. The disposal of 
these cases is at the discretion of the Crown. 
Several factors affect the Crown in hislher exercise of the discretion to dispose 
cases. The volume of requests for crixinal charges from the police Buctuates ovcr the 
time. The staff level of the Crown remains relatively stable. These two factors constitute 
the changing workload for the Crown, which is hkely to affect the Crown's decision about 
disposal alternatives and time delay. The case load in the judicial system such us thc 
volume of case backlog is hkely to influence the Crown's decision about case disposal, 
Unlike the police, who cannot control the input level of crime reported. the Crown can 
control their own workload and the case load in the system by rejecting RCC or 
proceeding with RCC without much scrutiny. In the process of screening RCC's from thc 
police, the Crown is likely to treat different types of charges differently. The Crown is lcss 
likely to drop a murder charge than a break and enter charge. In a high vol~trne season, 
especially when there are more serious charges, the Crown is Idcely to drop more charges 
of less serious nature. 
Figure 10 DYNAMO FIowchart of the Prosecution Module 
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AAer the Crown files charges and proceeds in the court, the major decision point 
in the judicial module is that of whether there is a guilty plea. Although this decision 
appears to be up to the defendant and a large number of guilty pleas are made by 
defendants, no matter what the Crown does or thinks, it is generally believed that the 
Crown counsel play a major role in the plea bargaining process. 
As is shown in Figure 11, the decision by the Crown to take a case through one of 
the alternative routes has a major impact on the system. Meanwhile, many Factors dfcct 
the choice of the alternatives called the "Adjusted rate of plea or trial or stay or 
withdrawal". A certain number of defendants plead guilty uninfluenced by the system, 
constituting the base bargaining rate. A certain number of defendants fail to appear, 
uninfluenced by the system constituting the base rate of fad to appear. The Crown's 
propensity to initiate plea bargaining affects the guilty plea rite on one hand. On the other 
hand, it is affccted by the level of new case load and the volume of court case backlog, 
which, to a large extent, is affected by the Crown's earlier dec;s' I lons. 
Figure 11 DYNAMO Flowchart of the Judicial Module 
The level of the inmates in the correctional institutions is determined by the 
incoming rate of people who have received institutional sentences, the time the inmates 
spend in the institdons (time delay) and release rate. The input rate is dependent on the 
number of people given jail or prison sentences. The release rate is dependent on the 
length of time the inmates actually spend in the institutions, which is dependent on the 
length of sentence. While the sentencing pattern gives information input into the input rate 
into the corrections system, determines the length of the stay of the inmates in the 
corrections system and the release rate, it receives feedback from the corrections system. 
When the level of inmates in the correctional system changes, because jails have become 
too crowded for example, judges might opt for short term jad sentence or make use of 
available diversion programs. The release rate is also determined by the use of parolc. 
Although there is insufficient data to analyze its practice in British Columbia, parole is 
somehow included in the simulation model. 
After serving their sentences, the inmates are relea,ed into society. A ccrtain 
proportion of them will commit crime again sooner or later, which constitutes the 
feedback into the criminal justice system. 
Figure 12 DYNAMO Flowchart of the Corrections Module 
PentencingJ 
? Pattern 
The major input of people into the module of legal aid administration is from the 
police module and the corrections moduie where people who are charged with criminal 
offences or prisoners who face post-suspension/revocation hearings before the National 
Parole Board or the British Columbia Board of Parole apply for legal aid. Between 
charges being laid and applying for legal aid, there is a time delay. Some people izpply for 
legal aid as soon as they are charged with criminal offences. Others wait until they contact 
their lawyers or appear in court before they apply for legal aid. The rate of legal aid 
application is rwt fixed. While the application rate is affected by the general economic 
sit~~atiorn, it is aIso affected by the approval rate of legal aid applications. When the Legal 
Services Society adopts a stricter eligibility policy, some people would think that they are 
not eeligibie for legd aid and, therefore, may not apply at all. 
Of those who apply far legal aid, some are approved for fuil bgd representation, 
some are rejected md some izre given sumnary advice. While the number af people 
approved for legal aid has the biggest impact on the cost of legd aid, the cost of legal aid 
affects the approval rate, too, through a policy switch. Normdy, the Legal Services 
Society attempts to expand legal aid services, both in terms of the Xegd problem areas 
covered and in tsrms of the number of people covered within the available resources. 
However, when cost increases raster than resourceq so thai the LSS 'becomes unable to 
cover the increasing cost, the gap between cost and resources nor~laally triggers a policy 
swkh ,  i.e., a restraint policy will be introduced to reduce the number of legal slid 
approvals. 
The number of people approved for legal aid incurs costs through the legal aid 
tariff, based on the seriousness of offences and the court procedures legal aid recipients go 
through. The volume of cases going though different court procedures are mostly 
affected by the system dynamics in the judicial module as discussed earlier. The tariff for 
different procedures, while having positive impact on the cost of legal aid, is inversely 
afTected by the gap between the cost of legal aid and the budget. 
Figure 13 DYNAMO Flowchart of the Module of Legal Aid Administration 
The simuiation of the system dynamics of iegai aid aims to study the 
interconnectedness in the system. Through the discussion and illustration of the various 
modules it can be seen that the interactions between legal aid administration and the 
criminal justice system are dynamic rather than static. At many major decision points the 
person flow and information flow from the earlier decision points affect the decision 
alternatives, but feedback from later decision points affect earlier decision points as well. 
From the legal aid planner's point of view, the interconnectedness in the system is 
extremely important. Charges at any point would affect the performance of the whole 
system. 
It should be noted as well that the DYNAMO flowcharts are simplified 
representations of the program per se, basically because it is not feasible to represent a 
multi-dimentional model with a two-dimentional format. The persons flow in the system 
is divided into seven offence types and separately traces young offenders and adult 
offenders. Additionally, some of these peopIe are represented by legal aid lawyers and 
others are not. A11 of these people of different characteristics are treated differently at 
various decision points and go through different sets of court procedures. 
CHAPTER VI: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL AID 
SYSTEM 
The development of a simulation model requires an understanding the whole 
system both conceptually and empirically. The numerous equations used in the DYNAMO 
simulation model also requires various parameters which can only be obtained through an 
empirical analysis of the legal aid system. This chapter analyzes the behavior of the various 
major actors and their interreletionslups in the legal aid system using the empirical data as 
described in the previous chapter. The analytical results will provide the parameters 
needed to develop the simulation model in DYNAMO. It will also achieve an 
understanding of the interconnectedness of the legal aid system. 
At the hghest level of the system, the need for legal aid is a function of various 
factors which can be presented in the following form (Table 13): 
Table 13 The Equation of the Need for Legal Aid 
where 
N = Need for legal aid 
C = Crime known to the police 
P = Persons Charged 
S = Prosecution behavior 
U = Court behavior 
R = Co~ections khavioi 
T = Legal Aid Tariff 
B = Budget dkgd Services Society of BC 
The equation representing the need for legal aid and the independent variables can 
be, in theory, indefinitely long. Operationally for the present research, the boundary of the 
system is determined at h ted  above. Each of the factors stated in the function above is a 
subsystem and a function of many factors at a higher level of resolution. This chapter will 
analyze these factors at a higher level of resolution in the same order as listed above. 
CRIME KNOWN TO THE POLICE 
The volume of crime feeds police activity. Police activity feeds court activity. 
Court activity should feed legal aid tariff activity. As a rough rule of thumb, the volumc of 
crime and types of crime should have a direct relationship with the need for legal aid, This 
section attempts to analyze the factors that can be used to predict the volum of various 
types of crime reported to the police. 
Crime known to the police is, hypothetically, a function of a number of variablcs as 
presented in the following form (Table 14): 
Table 14 The Function of Crime Known to the Police 
C=f(P,S,E,D,B,W ,...) 
where 
C = Crime known to the police 
P = Population change 
S = Social environment 
E = Economic environment 
D = Demography 
B = Beer consmptio~ 
Pi = Women participating in work outside home 
Various aggregated data elements for the province of British Columbia have been 
c ~ ~ t e d  artd analyzd to find the best predictors of crime. Socio-economic data include 
the monthly number of people receiving income assistance between 1985 and 1993; 
monthly number of claimants for unemployment insurance compensation between 1985 
and 1993; monthly percentage of women participating in the work force obtained from the 
CANSIM University Base (1946-present); monthly volume of retail sales and monthly 
voIume of liquor consumption. Demographic information includes the estimated total 
population for each quarter from 1983 to 1993 and the number of people between ages 15 
to 24. Crime data include monthly volume of crime reported to the police in the whole 
province by detailed offence types and number of charges laid against adults and youths. 
The relationship between the crime pattern and various socio-economic and 
demographic patterns is rtnalyzed in order to develop the simulation model. The number of 
people receiving unemployment insurance is found to correlate negatively and weakly with 
crime known to the police, the correlation coescient between the two being -0.17 
(P=U.857). The number of people receiving income assistance is found to have little 
relationship with crime known to the police, the correlation coefficient being 0.2203 
(P=O.O18). The relationships between these variables are visually illustrated in Figure 14. 
This findding gives support ti, pattern theory and routhe activity theory in that in a 
welfare society people living on unemployment insurance do not need to commit crime out 
of absolute necessity to survive. People, when becoming unemployed, instead of 
committing crime, tend to spend time at home more than when they arc crnploycd. 
&awe of the lack of money to go out as well as because there is no nccd to go out to 
work. The tendency to stay at home impacts on the reduction of crime in three ways. First, 
they stay at home to serve as guardians for their property and thus fewer property crimes 
are committed. Second, by staying at home, people are less lkely to become victims of 
crimes against person, as most person crimes are committed out of people's homes. Third, 
by staying at home, potential offenders do not find opportunities to commit crime. 
Figure 14 Crime, Unemployment and Welfare 
A multiple regression analysis between four socio-demographic variables and the 
v o h n e  of crime was conducted using SPSS. (See Appendix A for SPSS output of 
mmdtipk regression malysis.) Beer consumption, percentage of women participating the 
work force, retail volume and population were found to be highly correlated with grand 
total of crime known to the police (R Square = 0.88); property offences" (R Square = 
0.70); offences against the (R Square = 0.91); Auto theft (!X Square = 0.90); 
Robbery (R Square = 0.80) and other criminal code offences19 (R Square = 0.89). Details 
of the results of these regression analyses can be seen in the SPSS output section in the 
appendix. 
The high correlation between these socio-demographic variables and crime is in 
line with the pattern theory (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993a). People who have 
consumed a certain amount of beer are normally prone to crime victimization. Meanwhile 
they are likely to commit crime (Chard, 1995:13-14). Women going to work are more 
likely to be victims of persons crime than those staying at home. Their homes are also 
likely to be victims of property crime because their homes have lost their guardians when 
the women go to work. The correlation between the size of population and crime does not 
require much explanation: more people basically means more potential offenders and more 
potential victims. 
17 Property offences include break and enter, auto theft, theft from auto, theft, fraud etc. 
18 Offences against the person include homicide, attempted murder, sexual assault, 
common assault, robbery and abduction. 
19 Otfier Criminal Code offences include 14 UCR offence categories: arson, bail violations, 
counterfeit currency, disturb the peace, escape custody, indecent acts, kidnapping, public 
morals, obstruct police officer, prisoner at large, trespass at night, mischieflproperty 
damage over and under $1000 and others which are not covered by specific UCR offence 
category, i.e. breach of probation, obscenefthreatening phone calls, extortion, 
computerfdata mischief, loitering at school yards, playgrounds or swimming pools, etc. 
Figure 15 Crime and Beer Consumption 
Figure 16 Crime Known to the Pdice and Rate of Working Women 
1-crime Known to Police --. Rate of Working Women I 
As a result of the analysis, four variables are chosen to be used in the simulation 
model: volume of beer consumption, percentage of worlung women, r e t d  volume and the 
total of population in BC. 
The relationship between the number of youths and the volume of crime should be 
noted. A negative correlation is found between the two variables. Crime is known to be a 
youth problem, ie., a disproportionately high volume of crime is committed by youths. 
Thus, it is difficult to explain this negative correlation between youths and crime. 
The number of persons charged is a major variable in the equation of the need for 
legal aid (Table 13). Everything else being equal, the need for legal aid should increase or 
decrease in the same rate as that of the number of persons charged. The number of 
persons charged is a function of a number of variables, too (Table 15). 
Table 15 The Equation of the Number of Persons Charged 
P = f(C,R,O ...) 
where 
P = Number of persons charged 
C = Volume of crime 
R = Resources available to the police 
O = Other variables such as changes in law. 
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mst ,  the relationship between the number of persons charged anG the volume of 
crime reported to the police is analyzed. The data used in this analysis are the monthly 
volume of crime known to the police and the number of persons charged by the policc by 
offence types. It is fwmd that the number of persons charged for criminal offences wries 
positively with the amount of crime reported to the police. When more crimc is rcportcd 
to the police more criminal charges are laid. 
It is clearly shown by Figure 17 that both the mount of crime reported to thc 
police and the number of persons charged have peaks in summer time and the valleys in 
winter time for almost all the ten years, except for 1984 and 1985 where the nirnibcr thc 
persons charged did not show clear peaks in summer times. Annual changes in the amount 
of crime reported to the police and the number of persons charged with criminal offences 
have a similar positive correlation. In 1993, for example, 634,556 cr~minal incidents wcrc 
reported to the police, an increase of 41 percent from the amount of crime rcportcd in 
1984. The number of persons charged in 1993 increased 40 percent from that in 1984. 
Figure 1'7. Amount of Crime Reported and Number of Persons Charged 
However, when charge rate is compared with the amount of crime reported to the 
police, it is found that charge rate correlates negatively with the amount of crime. This 
pattern is illustrated by Figure 18. Generally speaking when more crime is reported to the 
police in the summer time, the charge rate drops and when less crime is reported to the 
police in the winter time, the charge rate increases. This pattern is more clear in the first 
years included in the analysis and tends to diminish in more recent years. 
Figure f 8 Amount of Crime and Charge Rate 
Figure 17 and Figure 18 also indicate the learning curve of the police forccs in the 
province of British Columbia in dealing with the seasonal patterns of crimc peaks. In the 
first few years as covered by the analysis, especially in 1984 and 198.5, the numbcr of' 
persons charged remained at a lower level than later years. Even when a crime wave 
peaked in the summer time, police did not lay more charges, probably because of the lack 
of staff, which resulted in the low charge rate for the summers in the iirst three years. 
Later on, starting in 1986 till 1993, the valleys of charge rates for the surnmcr times 
became shallower and shallower, indicating the police forces became more capable in 
dealing with the peaks of the crime wave in summer time; probably by allocating more 
staff for summer time. 
The relationships between amount of crime, the number of persons charged and 
the staff level of the police forces will be ktter  understood if detailed of the 
police staff level for the four seasons for these years is analyzed with the amount of crime 
and the number of persons charged. Unfortunately, such information is not available. In 
the absence of the police staffiig information, it can only be chimed that the patterns 
identified tend to support the hypothesis that the number of persons charged and charge 
rate is a function of the amount of crime and the staffing level of police. With relatively 
fixed staffiig police can investigate and solve only certain number of cases. If the volume 
of crime goes above certain level but police staffig remains unchanged, they can still only 
solve a certain number of cases. Consequently the charge rate drops although the number 
of charges remains the same. 
Charge Rate and Offence Types 
Charge rates vary with different types of offences. Using twelve months7 data in 
1993, charge rates by different types of offences are calculated (Table 16). Generally 
spealung, more serious offences have a higher charge rate than less serious offences. 
Persons offences are generally regarded as more serious than property offences. The 
charge rate for persons offences is over 3 times as high as that for property offences. T h  
pattern may also be related to the fact that v i c h ~  in the persons offences can often assist 
the police in laying charges by identdjmg the offenders while a big proportion of the 
ofiendeis C m O i  be iden&& iri property offences. W i t h  persons offences, attempted 
murder has the highest charge rate, 94.6% and abduction has the lowest charge rate, 
22.2%. Among property offences, the offence of possessing stolen goods has ths: highest 
charge rate, 66.3% while theft over $1,000 has tse lowest charge rite, 5.4%. 
Table 16 Charge Rate and Offence Types 
Types d Offence Crime Number of Charge Rate 
Known to Perscrns 
Police Charged 
Persons Offences 
Homicide 
Attempted Murder 
Robbery 
Sexual Assaults 
Assaults - non sex 
Abduction 
Property Offences 
Break and Enter 
Possessing Stolen Goods 
Theft < $1,000 
Theft > $1,000 
Motor Vehicle Theft 
Fraud 
Other Offences 
Federal Drugs 
Gaming and Betting 
Offensiw Weapons 
Prostitution 
Other CC 
Other Federal Statutes 
Provincial Statutes 
Municipal Bylaws 
Grand Total 624,556 96,163 15% 
As the cost of representing young offenders in court is different from representing 
adult offenders (much less costly), it is necessary to analyze the number of youths charged 
as well as rhe number of adults charged. Table 17 shows that more adults were charged 
with crimind offences t h  youths in almost all offences. Comparing the charging patterns 
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between persons offences and property offences it is clear that the more serious the 
offences are, the more adults are charged. The ody offence category in which more 
youths are charged is motor vehicle theft where 55.3% of charges are against youths and 
44.7% are against adults. 
Another pattern is revealed when the proportion of youths charged for criminal 
offences with the proportion of youths in the whole population. According to 1991 census 
in British Columbia, youths between the ages of 10 and 19 account for about 13 percent 
of the whole population and account for 15 percent of all the people over 10 years of age. 
Table 17 shows that over 23 percent of all the persons are youths, much higher than the 
proportim of youths in the province. 
Tabie 17 Charges against Youths and Adults 
Number of Persons Proportion of All 
Charged Persons Charged 
Types of Offence Crime Adults Youths Adults Youths 
Known to 
Police 
Persons Offences 54,037 17,964 
Homicide 
Attempted Murder 
Robbery 
Sexual Assaults 
Assaults - non sex 
Abduction 
Property Offences 
Break and Enter 
Possessing Stolen Goods 
Theft < $1,000 
Theft > $1,000 
Motor Vehicle Theft 
Fraud 
Other Offences 
Federal Drugs 
Gaming and Betting 
Offensive Weapons 
Prostitution 
Other CC 
Other Federal Statutes 
Provincial Statutes 
Municipal Bylaws 
Grand Total 624,556 73,891 22,272 76.8% 23.2% 
The number of persons prosecuted by the Crown counsel is a major variablc in thc 
equation of the need for legal aid (Table 13). The number of persons prosecuted is a 
function of a number of variables, too (Table 18). 
Tabie 18 The Equation of the Number of Persons Prosecuted 
S = f(P,C,R,O, ...) 
where 
S = Number of persons prosecuted 
P = Number of persons charged 
C = Court caseload and case backlog 
R = Resources available to the police 
0 = Other variables such as changes in law. 
The Crown counsel does not proceed with prosecution with every case forwarded 
from the police. The Crown has the discretion to choose from several options to dispose 
the case in addition to prosecution. Hdshe can hold the case or return the case to the 
police for more information, helshe can drop the charge, helshe can choose to send a 
caution letter to the accused or divert the accused out of the criminal justice system. Table 
19 has a one-month sample to illustrate tine disposition of the cases received from the 
police. On average the Crown counsel held or returned to the p o k e  f ~ r  more information 
about 10% of all the "requests for criminal charges". There is a regional variation in this 
practice, with Region 3 (Fraser Valley area) having the hghest at 16.9% and Region 4 
(the Northern part of BC) having the lowest at 3.9%. 
Tabie 19 Return or Withhold for More Information by the Crown 
Received from Rtd/Held for % of R/H 
Police More Info for More Info 
Region 1 (Van Isle) 1,374 11 1 8.1% 
Region 2Wancvr) 1,500 137 9.1% 
Region3Fraser) 1,910 323 16.9% 
Region 4(Interior) 1,274 50 3.9% 
Region S(N0rtht-n) 946 70 7.4% 
BC Total 7,004 691 9.9 % 
Data source: Criminal Justice Branch Management Information Report, Ministry of Attcancy Gcacral, 
British Columbia, February, 1994. 
The Crown proceeded with prosecution for about 85% of those cases that arc no[ 
returned or held for more information, diverted about 7%, sent caution letters to ahout 2% 
of the cases and dropped charges in about 6% of the cases. Again there is significant 
regional variation in the case disposition at this stage (Table 20). 
TabIe 20 Disposition of the Accused by the Crown 
Approved Diversion Caution No Charge 
to Court Letters 
Region 1 (Van Isle) 80% 10% 1% 9% 
Region 2(Vancvr) 89% 7% 0% 4% 
Region 3(Fraser) 80% 14% 0% 6% 
Region 4(Interior) 87% 6% 3% 5% 
Region 5(Nortbrr1) 89% 4% 1% 6% 
BC AveragdOffice 85 % 7% 2 %J 6 % 
Data source: Criminal Justice Branch Management Information Report, Ministry of Allorney Gcncral, 
British CoPibia, February, 1994. 
The way in which the Crown counsel disposes cases is likely to be influcnccd by 
the court caseload and court case backlog and the st&' Iew! of the C r t w ~  coimsc!. 
Unf~rtunately~ there are no time series data for the activities of the Crown counsel"' l'or 
such an analysis. 
The demand for legal aid, as represented by the volume legal aid applications and 
the need for legal aid as represented by the volume of iegal aid approvals should ccirrclatc 
highly with the number of persons charged with criminal offences. Easton et al. ( 1992) 
conducted an elasticity analysis of approved applications with respect to persons charged. 
They found that the elasticity in the percentage increase in approvcd applications with 
respect to the percentage increase in persons charged by thc police over the liscal ycars 
1981-82 through 1990-91 in British Columbia to be statistically differcnt from zcro ;it thc 
5 percent confidence level and the vdue  of elasticity to be 1.06, meaning that thcrc 1s a 
proportional increase (1.06:l) in the number of approved criminal lcgal aid applications 
associated with increased level of charges. 
The number of cases and percentage of cases that arc reprcscntcd by lcgal aid 
lawyers vary over the years. Before 1992, mostly due to the expansion of legal aid in the 
form of setting up more branch ofices throughout the provincc, more and moic pcoplc 
who were charged with criminal offences came to Legal Services Offices to apply fbr legal 
20 The Crown counsel in BC did not start to systematically computerize the data until 
January, 2994. 
aid (Figure 19j. This i(; reflected not only by the volume of legal aid applications but also 
by the proportion of legal aid applications in compwion to the number of persons 
charged. In 1984, for example, about 47 percent of the accused applied for legal aid. In 
1992, the application rate rose to about 57 percent (Table 21). 
Figure 19 Legal Aid Applications and Approvals 
-Persons Charged -Legal Aid Application - Legal Aid Approval 1 
In comparison to the fluctuations of the application rate which range from 47 
percent in 1984 to 58 percent in 1992, the approval rate to provide legal presentation has 
been more constant over the years. It should be noted that in Septzmber, 1993 Legal 
Services Society changed its eligibility policy by removing the flexible test and introducing 
a more stringent requirement of proof of income. The decrease in application rate and 
approval rate in 1993 is likely the result of this policy change. On the other hand, the 
private bar lawyers retained for legal aid services withdrew services for sevcrill months in 
1993. The decrease in application rate may also due to the private bar lawyers* job 
action.(Trhis was certainly the effect of various budget problems and staff strikes in thc 
early 1980s.) 
Table 21 Legal Aid Applications and Approvals 
Year # of Persons Legal Aid Legal Aid Application Approval 
Charged Applications Approvals Rate Rate 
1985 68,192 32,133 25,482 47% 79% 
1986 72,330 35,300 27,804 49% 79% 
1987 80,936 36,786 29,224 45% 79% 
1988 79,697 38,569 30,824 48% 80% 
1989 84,640 39,589 32.292 47% 82% 
1990 86,063 42,901 35,150 50% 82% 
1991 96,113 52,234 42,880 54% 82% 
1992 97,056 55,886 44,872 58% 80% 
1993 96,163 54,455 42,492 57% 78% 
Legal Aid Application and Types of Churges 
In order to simulate the cost of legal aid, it is important to identify lcgal aid 
coverage over different types of offences for two reasons. First, the cost of legal aid pcr 
case is different over different types of offences, because some types of cascs tend to he 
more difficult, take more time for preparation and more time in court. Thc tariff rate is 
designed to reflect these differences. Second, legal aid coverages arc likely to vary rrvcr 
different types of criminal charges. Legal aid coverage policy, for example, dctermincs that 
legal aid will be provided to those who are charged with criminal offenzcs, the conviction 
for which will result in the loss of freedom or the livelihood of the accused. Legal aid 
eligibility policy also determines that those people who are facing serious criminal charges, 
such as murder, will be provided with legal aid even if their income is marginally higher 
than the poverty guideline. These policies basically determine that more people charged 
with more serious offences are covered by legal aid than those charged with less serious 
offences. The profile of the offenders, i.e., the poor ones, who are eligible for legal aid, are 
more &ely to face certain types of charges than the richer ones, is also a variant that 
should be considered. 
Although it is important to identlfy the variation of legal aid coverage over offence 
types, it is difficult to conduct this analysis. The management information system of the 
LSS has offence type information for approved legal aid cases. This information has to be 
compared with information from the other subsystems in the criminal justice system such 
as the charge volume from the police or the case information from the court. Using 
information from different subsystems becomes very complicated due to the way in which 
cases are defined by different parts in the system. Police count cases by the number of 
persons charged. The court system counts cases by the number of charges and a 
substantial proportion of the accused have multiple charges against them. Legal Services 
Society basically defines an application as a case. In addition to the basic rule, LSS has a 
six-month rule: when a person is charged again within six months after that person made 
an application, the new charge(s) will be referred to the same lawyer who handled the 
person's earlier charges, and the applicant with the additional new charge will not be 
counted as a new case, which is, however, counted as a new case by the police. 
Additionally, different parts in the criminal justice system dm group cases in 
different categories, although it, is the same crinr?imd code that is k ing  used in various 
parts of the system. Because of this inconsistency, it is dif'ficult to comptlre legal aid 
coverage by offence types by simply comparing raw data from the different parts of the 
system. 
The amount of legal aid provided varies across different types of charges. This 
analysis is conducted by linking two databases: the database maintained by Legd Services 
Society the database maintained by the Court Services of BC. The case identifiers the 
two databases have in common are the dormation numbers issued by the police laying the 
charges and the names of the accused. Each information number is unique only in the 
police jurisdiction and thus may have duplicates in the province. As well, the names o f  thc 
accused are not unique either. However, the chances of two cases having the sainc 
information number and the same name are very slim. After linking the two data bases by 
using both of the two identifiers, 100 cases were randomly selected to check the accuracy 
of the linking. The charges and court locations from the two databases of the cases in the 
sample were compared. They all have the same court locations and share sirnilas charges. 
The only difference in charges are the charges that are not recorded in the LSS database, 
which, as a rule, does not record more than six charges whereas the court database has all 
the charges. From the result of this comparison it can be concluded that those cases that 
have been matched by the same information numbers and name are truly represented by 
legal aid lawyers. Those that are not matched either by name or by information numbers 
are definitely not legal aid cases. Meanwhile there are about 15% of cases that match 
either by infixmation numbers or by names, which may be or may not be legal aid cases. 
This gray area is not likely to seriously affect the study as the major purpose of t b  
exercise LS to compare legal aid coverage over different types of offences by looking at 
percentages rather than the actual counts of cases. 
After the database is developed all the cases are tabulated by offence type and legal 
aid coverage versus non-legal aid coverage. Table 22 has the results of this tabulation. The 
table shows that generally speaking, legal aid does cover more of the serious cases and 
Sewer of the less serious cases. For robbery, for example, legal aid covers about 85% of 
the cases in the court. In comparison, legal aid covered only 32.6% of impaired driving 
cases. 
Table 22 Legal Aid Coverage by Offence Types 
Represented by Legal Not Represented by 
Aid Lawyers Legal Aid Lawyers 
Offence Type # of Cases Percent # of Cases Percent 
Robbery 398 84.9% 7 1 15.1% 
Break and Enter 95 6 84.8 % 172 15.2% 
Possessing Stolen Goods 716 75.1% 238 24.9% 
Abduction 21 72.4% 8 27.6% 
Honlicide 68 71.6% 27 28.4% 
Other Criminal Code 6,505 69.5% 2856 30.5% 
Fraud 15 1 68.6% 69 3 1.4% 
Theft 2,850 62.0% 1746 38.0% 
Federal Drug 1,890 60.5 % 1235 39.5% 
Sexual Assault 191 57.5% 141 42.5% 
Common Assault 2,487 56.8% 1,888 43.2% 
Prostitution 400 54.08 34 1 46.Q% 
Impaired Driving 1,105 32.6% 2,280 67.4% 
Grand Total 17,738 61.6% 11,072 38.4% 
Time Elapsed between Charges and Application for Legal Aid 
There we t h e  delays a: various stages between the time when s crime is 
committed and the time the accused applies for legal aid, which is when the workload 
starts at LSS, and the time when the case is processed in the court system, which is when 
the major cost occurs to LSS. First of all, there is a time delay between the occurrencc of 
a crime and when the crime is reported to the police. This varies a lot over offence types. 
After a crime is reported, it takes some time for the police to do investigation before a 
charge is laid. When a charge is laid, the accused rnay have first physical appcruancc in 
court the next day if the accused is in custody. Or it may take several wceks for thc 
accused to appear in court. When a charge is laid by the police, the accused can apply fix 
legal aid. However, by linking the Legal Services Society's database with thc court 
services7 database, it is found out that over 70% of legal aid applications are made alicr 
the accused have appeared in court. 
Table 23 Time Between Alleged Offence and Application for Legal Aid 
Tf ME INTERVAL NUMBER OF PERCENT CUMULATIVE 
CASES PERCENT 
Within 10 Days 7,426 28.0% 28.0% 
10 to 30 Days 3,237 12.2% 40.1 % 
1 to 2 Months 4,408 15.6% 56.7% 
2 to 3 Months 2,743 10.3% 67.1 % 
3 to 4 Months 1,699 6.4% 73.5% 
4 to 5 Months 1,214 4.6% 78.0% 
5 to 6 Months 93 1 3.5% 81.5% 
5 to 7 Months 746 2.8% 84.4% 
7 to 8 Months 610 2.3% 86.7% 
8 to 9 Months 492 1.9% 88.5% 
9 to 10 Months 43 2 1.6% 90.1 % 
10 to 1 1 Months 3 12 1.2% 91.3% 
1 1 to 12 Months 25 7 1.0% 92.3 % 
1 to 2 years 1,336 5.0% 97.3% 
Over two years 716 2.7% 100.0% 
TOTAL 26,559 100.0 % 
Data source: The management information system of the LSS 
Table 23 illustrates the distribution of time intervals between the time of alleged 
offence and the date of application for legal aid. It is noticeable that although police lay 
most of the charges within a few days after the offence is committed, which is indicated in 
Figure 17, where the peaks and valleys of charges follow that of crime waves closely, only 
a relatively small number of legal aid applications (28%) were made within 10 days after 
the offence was allegedly committed. Almost 60 percent of the applications were made 
within two months of the committal of the alleged offence. This means that when there is a 
crime wave, the workload of processing legal aid applications, which is the workload of 
LSS field offices, will increase slightly within a few days and more impact will corne after 
two months. Further analysis and an interview with a police officer in the Vancouver 
Police Department (VPD) revealed two reasons for t h  delay. The analysis timud that 
most of leg4 aid applicants come to TLSS to apply for legal aid dter they have made their 
first appearance in court instead of immediately after they have been charged with criminal 
offences even though they are advised by the police officer laying the charges that they can 
apply for legal aid if they cannot afford a lawyer. The interview with the police oflicer 
revealed that although police lay most of the charges within a few days after the crime is 
reported, police officers in Vancouver usually n o t e  the accused to appear in court aficr 
five weeks. Different police jurisdictions have different practices in this regard. 
Table 24 Time Interval (in Days) Between Alleged Offence and Application for Legal Aid by 
Charge Type 
Charge Mean Median # of Cases 
ABDUCTION 190.28 12 196 
MURDER 344.99 16.5 282 
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS 74.41 18 1,583 
POSSESS STOLEN PROP. OVER ($1000) 83.18 32 2,499 
ASSAULT CAUSING BODILY HARM 102.1 1 35 1,726 
COPAPviON ASSAULT 70.85 3 6 4,380 
BREAK & ENTER 97.12 42 4,338 
IMPAIRED DRIVING 95.15 48.5 3,819 
SEXUAL ASSAULT, SUMMARY 374.23 50 193 
THEFT UNDER ($1 000) 93.15 50 9,03 1 
SEX, OTHER SUMMARY INDECENT ACTS, 232.7 54 355 
ETC. 
THEFT OVER ($1000) 136.5 1 59 1,618 
FRAUD, UNDER ($1000) 190.63 107 1,017 
SEXUAL ASSAULT, OTHER INDICTABLE 77 1.57 133 1,271 
FRAUD, OVER ($1000) 35 1.59 182.5 619 
The time interval between crime occurrence and the application for legal aid varies 
over different types of offences (see Table 18). Common assault, for example, is likely to 
be reported to the police immediately after it occurs. Sexual assault, on  the other hand, 
may not be reported until after a few decades. The big difference between the mean value 
and the median for sexual assau!t suggests that although over 50 percent of sexual assault 
caes  are reported fairly quickly, there were a small number of cases that must be reported 
very late or the investigation time was extremely long. 
The cases go through different legal procedures in the court. Some cases ?lead 
guilty, some go to trial, some are stayed and some have charges withdrawn. The different 
procedures they go through have different impacts on the criminal justice system and 
different impacts on the cost of legal aid because the tariff of the LSS is structured to pay 
differently for different legal procedures in the court. It is therefore important to identltjr 
the patterns of the legal procedures that cases go through in the court system. 
Data from the management information system of the LSS are retrieved for this 
analysis. It is discovered that of all the cases handled by legal aid lawyers in the past 
twelve years, 62.8% pleaded guilty, 25.7% went to trial and 11.5% were either stayed or 
charges were withdrawn2' (Table 25). 
'' The LSS puts charge withdrawal and stay in one category. 
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Figure 21) Guilty Plea, Trial and WitkdrawaVStay 
1 l ~ u i l t ~  Plea CJTriai R WahdrawaVStay ] 
The overall time series patterns are illustrated in Figure 20 and Table 25. Thcy 
suggest that more and more cases were completed by guilty pleas and withdrawals/stays 
and fewer and fewer cases were completed by trials. There were some exceptions from 
this general pattern in 1986 and 1987 when the percentage of trials went up a little with 
the percentage of guilty pleas and charge withdrawal/stays decreased. 
In order to find out the driving force b e h d  the pattern of court proccdurcs that 
the criminal cases went through, the caseload in the provincial court was retricvcd from 
the Ministry of Attorney General Key Indicator Reports from 1985 to 199322. The 
numbers of guilty pleas and withdrawallstays are put together to be compared with the 
caseload in the provixia! cotlrt,. The reason for pitting guilty pleas and chargc 
withdra~~staqrs  together is that aii of the three procedures tend to fall within the 
22 It would be Setter t:, have caseload data from 1983 to 1984. However, the caseload 
data were not availabe before 1985 or past 1993. 
discretion of the Crown counsel, who arguably exercise this discretion according to the 
cueload conditions in the court (Brantingham, 1977). In addition, the guilty pleas and 
charge withdrawalsfstays are lagged by one year when compared with the caseload in the 
court. The one year lag is based on several assumptions. First, increases or decreases of 
the new cases registered in the court system do not show up immediately. It takes quite a 
few months of inrxeasing or decreasing case volumes before the Crown begins to feel 
caseload changes. When the Crown feels the changes in caseload and starts to react 
accordingly, it will take many months for the cumulative effect of the reaction to be seen. 
The comparison between the caseload of the court and the rate of guilty plea and 
charge withdrawal/stays is illustrated in Figure 21. It tends to support the argument 
(Brantingham, 1977) the Crown has a greater propensity to initiate plea bargains and 
withdraw or stay charges when the caseload in the court system increases. 
Figure 21 Rate of Guilty Plea and WithdrawaVsby Vs. Court Caseload 
-4- New Cases in Court + Rate of Guilty Rea and Withdraw aVStay 
The guilty plea pattern might be affected by the LSS' tariff structure as well. 
Effective on December 1, 1992, the LSS adopted a new tariff for criminal law. One of the 
changes from the earlier tariff was a redwtion of the fees for guilty pleas by 25%. The 
reduction of the guilty plea tariff might discourage the legal aid lawyers from advising 
their clients to plead g d t y  and account for the one percent decrease in guilty plea ratcs 
from 65.8% in 1992 to 64.8% in 1991 (Table 25). 
Table 25 Patterns of Court Procedures 
- -- 
Date Nurn her of Cases Percentage 
Guilty Trial Withdrawal Subtotal Guilty Trial Withdrawal 
Plea or Stay Plea or Stay 
1983 3,794 2,045 472 6,311 60.1% 32.4% 7.5 % 
1984 11,378 6,197 1,514 19,089 59.6% 32.5% 7.9% 
1985 11,530 5,513 1,657 18,700 61.7% 29.5% 8.9% 
1986 12,123 6,176 1,787 20,086 60.4% 30.7% 8.9% 
1987 12,105 6,526 1,765 20,396 59.3% 32.0% 8.7% 
1988 13,705 6,793 2,377 22,875 59.9% 29.7% 10.4% 
1989 14,613 6,201 2,5 IS 23,332 62.6% 26.6% 10.8% 
1990 14,927 6,002 2,775 23,704 63.0% 25.3% 11.7% 
1991 18,309 6,310 3,570 28,189 65.0% 22.4% 12.7% 
1992 19,667 6,068 4,172 29,907 65.8% 20.3% 14.0% 
1993 20,556 6,503 4,661 31,730 64.8% 20.5% 14.7% 
t%4* 14,423 4,061 3,211 21,695 66.5% 18.7% 14.8% 
Total 167,140 68,395 30,480 266,015 62.8% 25.7% 11.5% 
* Cases for 1994 are not complete at the time of data analysis. 
* In cases that have multiple charges that go through djfferent procedures, the procedure for the most 
serious charge is counted. 
Different types of cases have different patterns for the different court procedures 
they go through (Table 26). Homicide has a very low guilty plea rate while Break and 
Enter has a much higher guilty plea rate. Assault and Abduction have the highest rates of 
charge withdrawd and stay while Break and Enter has about the lowest withdrawallstay 
rate. 
Table 26 Court Procedure by Offence Type 
--- 
Guilty Plea Trial Withdrawlstay Failure to Tot a1 
Appear 
Types of Offence #of % #of % #of % # o f %  
Cases Cases Cases Cases 
Abduction 51 46.6% 30 28.6% 23 21.98 1 1.0% 105 
Assaults - non sex 6,313 49.2% 3,214 25.0% 2,892 22.5% 420 3.3% 12,839 
Homicide 104 33.5% 167 53.9% 37 11.9% 2 0.6% 310 
Robbery 1,187 63.4% 442 23.6% 188 10.0% 54 2.9% 1,871 
Sexual Assaults 890 42.6% 887 42.5% 270 12.9% 41 2.0% 2,088 
Break and Enter 4,788 73.7% 905 13.910 611 9.4% 190 2.9% 6,494 
Fraud 1,510 68.7% 315 14.3% 240 10.9% 133 6.1% 2,198 
Motor Vehicle 131 66.2% 25 12.6% 33 16.7% 9 4.5% 198 
Theft 
Pos. Stolen Goods 2,449 64.4% 620 16.3% 572 15.0% 162 4.3% 3,803 
Thefi < $1,000 6,712 67.4% 1,385 13.9% 1,234 12.4% 624 6.3% 9,955 
Theft > $1,000 1,520 70.0% 310 14.3% 262 12.1% 80 3.7% 2,172 
Federal Drugs 4,187 61.8% 11,262 18.6% 927 13.7% 398 5.9% 6,774 
Gaming and Betting - 0.0% 1 50.0% 1 50.0% - 0.0% 2 
Municipal Bylaws 8 66.7% 2 16.7% 1 8.3% 1 8.3% 12 
Offensiveweapons 766 55.0% 343 25.1% 216 15.8% 43 3,176 1,368 
Other CC 7,905 63.9% 2,155 17.4% 1,840 14.9% 474 3.8% 12,374 
Other Federal St. 176 54.0% 97 29.8% 47 14.4% 6 1.8% 326 
Prostitution 409 49.6% 233 28.2% 76 9.2% 107 13.0% 825 
Provincial Statutes 1,795 60.4% 687 23.1% 385 12.9% 106 3.6% 2,973 
Within a period of ten years, the cost of hiring the private bar to provide legal aid 
for criminal cases increased almost six times, from $6.1 million in 1 984 to $36.1 million in 
1993. This big increase in cost makes it very necessary to explore the reasons behind it. 
Part of the reason for this increase came from the number of people served. In 
1984,22,067 new cases were served with full legal representation by the private bar and in 
1993,38,075 persons were served, an increase of slightly over 1.7 times. The major cause 
of the increase in legal aid expenditure is the cost per case. This makes it necessary to 
analyze the cost per case over the years. 
There are different ways to calculate the average cost per legal aid case over time. 
Different ways calculating the cost per case yield different results. One way to analyze it is 
to look at the cost per case according to the date on which cases are completed. The other 
way to analyze the cost per case is using the case starting date. The results of the former 
method are useful for budgeting in that the major part of the cost occurs when the case is 
completed and the cost per case and the number of cases completed in a fiscal year 
directly affects the budget for that fiscal year. The results of the latter, on the other hand, 
conform with the way that the tariff is paid in that every time there is some tariff change, 
the change always becomes effective at the starting date of the next case, which is when 
the case is approved for legal representation and referred to a lawyer. Thus, the cost per 
case according to the case starting date is useful when one wants to examine the effect of 
tariff changes. 
Table 27 shows the cost per case by using the date of case completion. It is 
apparent that the cost per case has increased very steeply over time while the number of 
cases completed has increased less steeply. In 1983, each criminal case cost $278 on 
average. In 1993, the estimated average cost per case was $949. 
TabEe 27 Cost Per Case by Measuring Cases Completed Each Year 
Date of Cost Per Total Tariff Number of 
Case Case Cost Cases 
Completion 
1983 $21 8 $1,800,402 8,258 
Tariff Changes Over the Years 
The Legal Services Society of BC has changed the tarrff for criminal law cases 
many times during the last twenty years. While the Society is under constant pressure from 
the private bar to increase its tariff, which can be seen in column one in Table 21, it also 
attempts to improve service and control its expenditure by modifying the tariff structure. 
As can be seen in Table 21, however, there is always a substantial difference between what 
is planned and what actually happens. Effective on October 1, 1988, for example, LSS 
modified its tariff structure by increasing payment over certain procedures and moved 
some charges from the minor offence category into the major offence category. It was 
anticipated that the restructured tariff would increase the average cost per case by 10%. 
The actual cost per case, however, increased 21.9% from $379 per case in the last tariff 
period to $435 in the following. It would be interesting to find out the costing conducted 
before that change was made. - 
Table 28 Cost Per Case and Tariff Changes for Different Tariff Periods 
Date of Tariff Anticipated Actual Cost Per Number of Total Cost 
Change TarE Change Case Cases 
Change Assigned 
Jan. I ,  1979 (1) 8.0% 
Jun. 1, 1980 8.0% 
Sept. 1, 1981 38.0% 
Qct. 1, 1982 -12.5% $275 64,713 $17,767,742 
Jan. 1, 1986 (2) 14.3% 9.34% $300 41,910 $12,581,326 
Aug. 1,1987 25.0% 21.76% $366 32,820 $1 1,996,740 
Oct. 1, 1988 10.0% 22.63% $448 29,787 $13,351,614 
Oct. 1, 1989 5.0% 6.83% $479 39,281 $18,809,737 
Jan. 1, 1991 6.0% 0.72% $482 13,085 $6,310,833 
Jun. 1, 1991 100.0% 125.50% $1,088 26,152 $28,441,679 
Jan.  1, 1992 (3) 0.0% -8.00% $1,001 38,311 $38,333,503 
Dec. 1, 1992 -15.0% -31.14% $689 3 1,634 $21,794,885 
Oct. 1, 1993 (4) -5.3% -30.78% $477 16,634 $7,933,289 
Notes: 
(1) This was the first tariff change since 1973 when tariff was first introduced. 
(2) This removed the 12.5% restraint reduction implemented on October 1, 1982. 
(3) Tariff was restructured to group charges into four categories from earlier two 
categories of minor and major charges. Costing was expected to be neutral. 
(4) The decease was implemented by reducing all fees by 4.3% on criminal cases and a 
further reduction of 1 % of drinking and driving offences. 
Another significant discrepancy between anticipated costing through tariff change 
and actual change in cost is that over January 1, 1991 when the tariff was increased by 6% 
and the actual cost per case decreased by 1.5% from the last tariff period. An analysis of 
the cases paid for the periods before and after the tariff change reveals that it was the 
bigger number of guilty pleas that resulted in the actual decrease in the overall cost per 
case since the cost of cases through trials is a lot higher than cases that ended in guilty 
pleas. 
Guilty Plea Vs. Trial 
Criminal law legal aid tariff pays block fees for different court procedures in 
addition to general preparation time and actual time spent in the court. A major proccdurc 
dependent tariff differentiation is that between guilty pleas, trials, s tay/withdrawal and 
sentencing. For a robbery case, for example, the 1993 tariff23 pays $400/$600 for guilty 
plea, $720 for each half day trial/prehinary hearings, $400/$600 for first half day 
sentencing hearing, etc. The fees for the drff'erent procedures have been adjusted many 
times to make the pay more reasonable and proportional to the time actually spent. Table 
29 has the actual payments for guilty plea cases and trial cases sincc October 1, 1982, 
Generally speaking, the average cost for a case that goes through trial is almost thrcc 
times (2.7) as much as that of a case that ends with a guilty plea ($1,118 Vs. $409 per 
case). 
- pp - 
23 Referring to the tariff that became effective on December 1, 1992 and was used ti11 
October 1, 1993. 
Table 29 Cost of Trial and Guilty Piea over Different Tariff Structures 
- 
Trial Guilty Plea Other* Total 
Effective Cost Per # of Cases Cost Per #of Cases Cost Per # of Cases Cost Per # of Cases 
Tariff Date Case Case Case Case 
Oct. 1,1982 $548 16,411 $187 30,858 $170 17,444 $274 64,713 
Jan. 1,1986 
Aug. 1,1987 
Oct, 1, 1988 
Oct. I ,  1989 
Jan. 1, 1991 
Jun. 1, 1991 
Jan. 1,1992 
Dec. 1,1992 
Oct. 1 ,  1993 
Total $1,118 68,287 $409 167,355 $331 98,685 $531 334,327 
"Other column includes stay, withdrawal, change of lawyer, failure to appear. 
Offence Category for Targf 
The Legal Services Society of BC pays the private bar for the services they 
provide according to the seriousness of the charges and the procedures the cases follow 
through the court. For the purpose of paymg according to the seriousness of charges, all 
charges are categorized into a few groups. Before 1992, all charges were put in two 
categories, a minor offence category and a major offence category. Since January 1, 1992, 
charges have been put into four categories. Less serious charges such as Municipal bylaw 
offences, are grouped into Category I and the most serious offences, such as murder 
charges are grouped into Category IV. Table 30 shows how much legal aid cases cost in 
each category from 1982 to 19411. in order to improve service quality with more a 
reasonable tariff structure, LSS regroups charge categories fairly frequently. In 1989, for 
example, a number of charges were moved from the Minor Charge Category to the Major 
Charge Category. While it was anticipated that the restructured tariff would cost 10% 
more than before, the actual cost went up by 22.6%. The rtcategorization accounts for the 
major part of this discrepancy between what was planned and what actually happened, 
Table 30 Cost of Legal Aid Cases by Tariff Categories (1982-1991) 
Minor Charge Category Major Charge Category 
Effective CostPer #ofcases CostPer #ofcases 
Tariff Date Case Case 
Oct. 1, 1982 $228 62,45 1 $1,708 2,017 
Jan. 1,1986 $265 40,783 $1,974 924 
Aug. 1,1987 $333 32,018 $2,135 623 
Oct. 1, 1988 $360 27,990 $1,884 1,733 
Oct. 1, 1989 $381 36,996 $1,999 2,276 
Jan. 1, 1991 $386 12,247 $1,745 836 
Jun. 1,1991 $858 24,s 14 $455 1 1,632 
Table 31 shows how much each category actually cost for each of the four Tariff 
Categories from January 1, 1992 to June 30, 1 9 9 4 ~ ~  . It shows that Category 111 had the 
biggest number of cases and incurred most cost. More noticeable is the cost per case in 
Category IV, which was over four times as costly as Category I11 cases. Consequently, the 
total cost of category IV cases was fairly close to that of Category 111 although the case 
volumes of the two categories were far apart. 
24 Data used in Table 19 may not be complete for all the three tariff periods because some 
cases take more time and have not enterred the Management Information System of LSS. 
Table 31 Cost of k g &  Aid Cases According to Categories (1992-1993) 
Cate~ory I Category I1 Category I11 Category IV 
Effective Cost Per #of Cost Per #of Cost Per #of Cost Per #of 
TarifiDate Case Cases Case Cases Case Cases Case Cases 
Oct. 1,1993 $723 1261 $334 7452 $522 5798 $1,270 1179 
YOA Cases Vs. Adult Cases 
Although the criminal law legal aid tarB does not have a separate schedule for 
youths charged under the Young Offenders Act (YOA), YOA legal aid cases normally go 
through simpler court procedures, take less court time and cost less for legal counsel. 
Because of the provision of the YOA that requires compulsory provision of legal aid 
counsel whether or not the YOA applicant meet the LSS financial eligibility or problem 
coverage, the LSS keeps track of the expenditure on YOA cases. Table 32 illustrates the 
different legal aid cost per case for YOA cases and for adult cases. As hypothesized, YOA 
cases do cost a lot less than adult cases. On average, a YOA case costs $421 compared 
with $560 per adult case. The impact of the Young Oflenders Act on the cost of legal aid 
is also illustrated in Table 32. In 1983 the provision of legal aid to young offenders cost a 
little over 100,000 dollars and accounted for about three percent of all criminal law legal 
riid cost. The cost of provision of legal aid to young offenders grew till 1992, when it 
almost reached six million dollars. By early 1994, young offenders were absorbing almost 
one-fourth of all criminal legal aid expenditures. 
Date of 
Case 
Adult Offenders I Young Offenders 
Cost Per # of Cases Total Cost 1 Cost Per #of Cases Totai Cost YOA (2! 
Assignment Criminal 
Legill Aid 
Expcnditurc 
$136,221 2.90% 
$323,581 5.20% 
$645,548 10.30'% 
$l,Ol9,49O 13.30% 
$1,181,981 13.30% 
$1,652,999 14.90% 
$1,881,015 13.50% 
$2,368,876 15.40% 
$5,196,592 14.40% 
$5,963,138 14.50% 
$4,130,977 17.70% 
$914,826 23.10% 
Case 
Total ( $560 273,513 153,235,1951 $421 58,133 24,500,418 17.5% 
Offence Type and Cost 
Different types of offences incur different levels of legal aid cost for various 
reasons. First, different types of offences have different volumes. &sault (non-scxual), for 
example, is a high volume offence type that has a higher level of need for legal aid because 
of the likelihood of imprisonment upon conviction. Second, different types o f  ofTences 
require different amounts of resources in terms of legal counsel preparation time and 
different likelihoods of court time. The LSS structures the legal aid tariff according to the 
serio'isness and complexity of offence types. A sample of legal aid cases approved 
between January 1, f 992 md November 30, 1992 is selected to analyze the cost per cilsc 
by offence type2'. Table 33 presents the results of this analysis. As expected, more serious 
cases such as homicide cost a lot more per case than less serious cases. Assault, because 
of its volume, incurred the biggest amount of subtotal cost, although the cost per case is 
pretty close to the average cost per case. It is also worth noting that there are two h d s  of 
cases, homicide and abduction, that are exceedingly expensive per case while relatively 
rare. It should be pointed out, too, that serious cases often proceed over long periods of 
time and may be paid out over several years. T h  probably explains why the number of 
homicide cases that have legal aid representation exceeds the number of people charged 
for homicide in British Coiumbia. 
'' The time period from January 1,1992 to November 30,1992 is chosen for the data 
selection mainly because there was no tariff change in this period and cases approved for 
legal aid in this period are more likely to be completed at the time of the analysis. 
Table 33 Cost per case by offence type 
Types of Offence Cost per # of Cases Subtotal 
Case Cost 
Persons Offences 
Abduction 
Assaults - non sex 
Homicide 
Robbery 
Sexual Assaults 
Property Offences 
Break and Enter 
Fraud 
Motor Vehicle Theft 
Possessing Stolen Goods 
Theft < $1,000 
Theft > $1,000 
Other Offences 
Federal Drugs 
Gaming and Betting 
Municipal Bylaws 
Offensive Weapons 
Other CC 
Other Federal Statutes 
Restitution 
Provincial Statutes 
Driving Offences 
Others 
Grand Total $1.016 37.994 $38.597.167 
Table 34 Cost of Legal Aid for YOA Cases and Adult Cases by Offence Type 
Offence Type Adult Cases YOA Cases 
Cost Per # of Cases Total Cost Cost Per # of Total Cost 
Case Case Cases 
Persons Offences 
Abduction 
Assaults-non sex 
Homicide 
Robbery 
Sexual Assaults 
Property Offences 
Break and Enter 
Fraud 
Auto Theft 
Have St, Goods 
Theft < $1,000 
Thefl> $1,000 
Other Offences 
Fcderal Drugs 
Garn. & Betting 
Munic. Bylaws 
Offenc. Weapons 
Other CC 
Other Fed Stat. 
Prostitution 
Provincial Stat. 
Driving Offences 
Others 
AverJGrand Total $1 .07? 30.8 I8 $33.069.694 $770 7.177 $5.527.473 
Time lag for the Need for and Cost of Legal Aid. 
When an application is approved and a lawyer is provided for the applicant the 
cost does not all occur immediately. The accused normally has to wait for several months 
for the court to precess -hisher case. then it may tdce several more months for the 
court to complete the process. As a rule of thumb, LSS only allows the lawyer to bill LSS 
only after a case is completed. Consequently, there is a time difference of several nwnths 
between when application for legal aid is approved by LSS and when the cost to LSS is 
actually incurred. This time difference varies by type of charge, by the types of persons 
charged, i-e., whether the accused is a young offender or an adult, and it also varies by 
court procedure, i.e., whether the case is completed by guilty plea or by trial. 
Discovering patterns in the time lag is important to the process of forecasting the 
cost of legal aid, to the planning of legal aid and to the development of thc simulation 
model. When budgeting for LSS, frequently asked questions are, for example, how much 
the tariff cost will be if the tariff is decreased or increased by a ccrtain percentage or how 
much decrease has to be made to the tariff if the budget is decreased by a ccrtain 
percentage. Answering questions of this type is difficult without knowing the patterns of  
time lag in case completion because changes of legal aid tariff can become effcctive only 
with newly assigned cases, not with those that have been assigned. 
Fn 1991, for example, 39,485 cases were approved for legal aid. Those cases cost a 
total of $36,037,365~~. However, only 33% of all the billings were sent to LSS in the same 
year in which the cases were approved. The major part, about 51% of the total, camc to 
LSS in the second year. 
26 Total billings is slightly higher than this because there are always some lengthy cascs 
that could last quite a few years before completion. However, the incompleted amount 
normally accounts for no more than one percent of the total billing. 
Table 35 Biffing Pattern of Cases Approved in 1991 
- - 
Date of # of Cases Billing Amount % of 
Billing Billing 
1 991 21,968 $12,021,255 33% 
1992 15,447 $18,508,185 51% 
1993 1,977 $4,547,7 15 1 3 % 
I W4* 103 $960,211 3% 
Total 39,495 $36,037,365 1 0 %  
Note: Billings for the cases approved in 1991 were not complete at the time of this 
analysis (September 1, 1994). However, the incomplete amount is not likely to be over 
one percent and thus does not affect the reliability of the results shown in Table 35. 
A sample of eleven months' data between January 1, 1992 and November 30, 1992 
is used to analyze the time lag. There are several reasons for using data of this period. 
First of all, this is the most recent period within which there is no tariff change, whch 
sometimes may affect the time of billing. Secondly, cases approved in 1992 are likely to be 
completed by the time of this analysis. 
Table 36 shows that on average, it takes about 5.3 months for a young offender 
case to be completed and LSS to received a lawyer's bill. On the other hand, adult cases 
take more time. More serious cases tend to take more time than less serious cases. 
Homicide, for example, takes almost a whole year to be completed and Break and Enter, 
Theft Over and Theft Under take about half a year. 
Table 36 The Time Difference Between Legal Aid Application and Lawyer's Billing 
A ~ U I ~  C~ h u n g  otreider Cases 
Types of Offence AVG Time # of Cases AVG Time # of Cases 
(month) (month) 
Abduction 10.02 6 3 6.97 13 
Assaults - non sex 6.82 5,064 6.36 921 
Homicide 11.88 196 9.07 19 
Robbery 6.99 65 1 6.89 236 
Sexual Assaults 9.81 935 7.3 146 
Break and Enter 6.38 2249 5.5 11 85 
Fraud 7.44 1099 5.83 80 
Motor Vehicle Theft 6.04 6 3 3.84 69 
Possess Stolen Goods 6.43 1351 5.37 5 69 
Theft < $1,000 6.06 3855 4.7 1410 
Theft > $1,000 6.72 767 5.15 40 1 
Federal Drugs 7.71 3377 5.45 230 
Gaming and Betting 0.72 1 
Municipal Bylaws 7.05 2 6.46 I 
Offensive Weapons 6.99 543 5.5 1 123 
Other CC 5.86 4362 4.71 1458 
Other Federal Stahtes 7.55 163 12.5 1 2 
Prostitution 7.25 54 1 4.04 55 
Provincial Statutes 6.31 1403 4.79 111 
Driving Offences 7.16 4122 6.16 146 
Others 6.08 10 4.17 2 
TotaI Average 6.82 30817 5.34 7177 
Different court procedures make big differences in when the cost accrues to LSS 
after the application for legal aid is approved. On average, it takes about 5.8 months when 
a case is completed through guilty plea md takes almost three months more to complete a 
case by trial More dramatic is the different length of time that abduction charges take. 
Guilty plea takes about 6.4 months and trials take w e r  twice as much. 
Table 37 Time Ebpsed kiwcjen Legal Aid Appraval ari& Billing by Court Proctxkares and 
Charge Types 
Guilty Plea Trial 
Types of Offence AVG Cases AVG Cases 
Time Time 
(month) (month) 
Abduction 6.40 22 13.77 25 
Assaults - non sex 6.17 2,415 8.14 1,320 
Homicide 10.83 54 13.60 77 
Robbery 6.33 488 9.06 17 1 
Sexual Assaults 8.27 339 11.37 342 
Break and Enter 5.43 2,099 8.65 437 
Fraud 6.94 624 10.95 116 
Motor Vehicle Theft 4.22 75 5.89 8 
Possessing Stolen Goods 5.49 1,009 8.14 25 0 
Theft < $1,000 5.16 2,985 7.66 617 
Theft > $1,000 5.46 678 8.76 146 
Federal Drugs 6.91 1,871 9.40 573 
Gaming and Betting 0.72 1 
Municipal Bylaws 2.79 1 11.31 1 
Offensive Weapons 5.59 292 8.53 147 
Other CC 5.01 3,150 7.30 764 
Other Federal Statutes 5.71 8 1 10.10 3 7 
Prostitution 6.14 298 8.32 134 
Provincial Statutes 5.50 768 7.80 313 
Driving Offences 6.35 2,638 9.35 760 
Total Average 5.82 19,887 8.65 6,239 
Sentencing is the last decision point in the court system, the results of which 
determines the input into the corrections system. The number of people given jail sentence 
determines the number of people entering jails and the length of jail sentence is one of the 
m+ior factors in the time the inmates stay in jails. In the absence of empirical data for other 
factors such as that of parole, the sentencing results are the only empirical data that oilri be 
used to estimate the length of inmates staying in jails. 
As can be expected, the rate of guilty offenders given jail sentence and the length 
of jail sentence are directly related with the seriousness of the offences (Table 38). Over 
90 percent of homicide offenders, as an example of serious offenders, are given jail 
sentences. The jd time for them is also the longest on average. For motor vehicle thefi 
offenders, on the other hand, orily 27 percent are given jal sentences and the average jail 
time is 26 days. In comparison to adult offenders, young offenders, generally speaking, 
tend to be less likely to be given jail sentences and shorter jad time when they are f o ~ ~ n d  
guilty. 
Table 38 Sentencing Results 
I Types of Offence 
Abduction 
Assaults - non sexua 
Homicide 
Robbery 
Sexual Assaults 
Break and Enter 
Fraud 
Motor Vehicle Theft 
Possessing S. Goods 
Theft < $1,000 
Theft > $1,000 
Federal Drugs 
Gaming and Betting 
Municipal Bylaws 
Offensive Weapons 
Other CC 
Other Federal 
Statutes 
Prostitution 
Provincial Statutes 
Driving Offences 
Total 
Adult Cases 
#of Found Received Averagc 
persons Guilty Jail Jail Tim 
Charged Sentence (Days) 
Young Offenders 
#of Found Received Average 
persons Guilty Jail Jail Tirnr 
Charged Sentence (Days) 
CHAPTER VII. APPLICATION OF THE DYNAMO SIMULATION 
MODEL 
The legal aid system described in the model consists of many sub-systems which in 
turn consist of many parts at different hierarchical levels. The basic characteristic of such u 
complicated system is that all of the various parts at different hierarchical levels are 
interconnected. Changes brought about by decisions or exogenous factors in one part o f  
the system influence flows and decisions in other parts of the system. This chapter will 
explore the applicability of the simulation model developed in the DYNAMO simulation 
language to the complicated "real-world" legal aid system, with the focus on the 
interconnectedness within the system under different patterns. 
The model will be tested to run the base flow patterns to produce output at various 
stages in the legal dd system, which can then be used for comparison with the output from 
the model applied in various hypothetical scenarios. Then the impact of changes in crime 
pattern on the legal aid system will be studied. The consequences of h.ypothetica1 decisions 
of policy alternatives in the criminal justice system on the whole legal aid system will bc 
explored. The results of hypothetical policy alternatives by the Legal Services Society of 
British Columbia on the whole system will be analyzed. Finally, a projection of  the need 
for and cost of legal aid in the near future will be explored. 
BASE FLOW PATTERNS 
Before analy~ing alternative futures and proposed policy changes in the legal aid 
system, it is necessary to become familiar with the basic flow patterns of crime, charges, 
court procedures, application for legal aid and legal aid expenditure. 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the model is designed to track offence 
categories separately. Seven categories were used: serious persons offence, assault, auto- 
theft, other property offences, federal drug offences, other criminal code offences and 
municipal, provincial and federal statutes. Each offence category follows different flow 
patterns within the system. In 1993, for example, there were 214 homicide cases 
(including attempted murder) reported to the police and 173 persons were charged with 
homicide. For break-and-enter (B & E), in comparison, there were 70,745 reported cases 
and 6,522 persons were charged with B & E. The charge rate was 81% for homicide 
versus 9% for B & E. Obviously, this is because homicide is a low volume and high 
resolution crime, while B & E is a high volume and low resolution crime. Most people 
charged with homicide are represented by counsel paid by legal aid while only 30 percent 
of the people who are charged with B & E are represented by legal aid counsel. 
At the piea negotiation stage, an average of 34 percent of the people charged for 
homicide plead guilty while 74 percent of the people charged with B & E plead guilty, 
according to a sample of ail the legal aid cases i i ~  the Legd Services S ociety's information 
system in 1992 and 1993. Because of the differential funnel effect, which is used to 
illustrate that some ~riminals get out of the criminal justice system at a faster rate than 
others, it takes an average of 13.6 months from 'ling to disposition for a honlicidc case 
which goes to tria! and mly 5.5 months for a 3 & E case which goes to a guilty plea. The 
guilty plea route is almost three months shorter for all charge categories (8.7 months 
versus 5.8 months). 
Finally, the flow numbers presented are just averages. The actual values vary ovcr 
time. How would the impact of an increase in the homicide rate on the courts and on the 
legal aid expenditure be different than that of a slmilar increase in the rate of B & E? Evcn 
using the fixed branching percentages given above, the answer is not an easy one. IS the 
branching percentages are allowed to vary every time and to depend on the dynamics of 
the system, the calculations bec~nie xcessively complex. 
The DYNAMO simulation model of legal aid in BC is developed following a basic 
pattern of the system which is based on the systems analysis of the historical data from 
1984 to 1990 in order to handle such complex calculations. DYNAMO permits varying 
branching ratios. Throughout the model rates are smoothed or leveled; rates were 
increased or decreased depending on system characteristics. 
The basic flow pattern described in this section looks at the patterns at various 
stages and the assumptions used in building up the basic model. Although the model is 
developed to track criminal charges in seven categories, demonstrating the flows of all the 
detailed categories is really not feasible, for it will literally take too much space. As a 
result, aggregated patterns will be illustrated and discussed in the basic flow pattern. 
First of dl, the c ~ h e  pattern in British Columbia is generated, using the crime 
predictors as discussed in the previous chapter as ihe major input into the simulation 
model, namely population size, beer consumption, the rate of working women and r e t d  
volume. It is clearly shown in Figure 22 that, in general, the amount of crime shows an 
increasing trend. The seasonal variation of the amount of crime is also clear, in winter 
times fewer criminal offences are reported to the police and in summer times more are 
reported. This pattern is consistent with the actual crime pattern in BC in the seven years 
being simulated. 
Figure 22 Base Flow Pattern (a) 
-Crime Known to Police - Persons Charged -Pesons Prosecuted 
The number of persons charged is generated using crime known to the p o k e  as 
input and the parameters calculated in the previous chapter, namely the differential charge 
rates in summer time and winter time and some time delay between the time when offences 
are reported and the time when charges are laid. Basically, more persons are charged over 
time as the amount of crime increases. In summer time when more crime is reported, more 
charges are laid. Fewer charges are laid in winter times when there are fewer offences 
reported. 
The number of persons prosecuted is generated when the number of persons 
charged flow into the Crown Counsel sub-system. Since the Crown does not prosecute 
every single case as requested by the police, the parameters for the filter function 
calculated in the previous chapter are used and more time delay is simulated. It should be 
noted that the time delay as can be seen in the graph (Figure 22), where the peaks and 
valleys representing the number of persons prosecuted come a few months later than the 
persons charged, is not only caused by the Crown Counsel. When the police lay charges, 
they have to set a date for the appearance h court. The time used to simulate the number 
of persons prosecuted is actually the time for the first appearance in court, for no better 
data source is available. 
Cases flow through the court through various channels. Some plead guilty, some 
go to trial, some charges are stayed or withdrawn and some of the accused simply fail to 
appear. Using the output from the Crown Counsel, the basic case through the various 
channels is simulated. It can be seen in the graph (Figure 23) that the biggest volume of 
cases went through the court system by means of guilty plea ranging from 3,000 guilty 
pleas a month in 1984 to about 4,000 guilty pleas a month in 1990. A small number of 
cases go through trials, ranging from 1,000 cases a month in 1984 to about 1,400 a month 
in 1990. While the number of fad-to-appear cases remains fairly constant over the years, 
without much increase or decrease, the number of stays or withdrawals increased 
substaleidly from 700 cases a month in E 984 to about 1,000 cases a month in 1990. 
Figure 23 Base Flow Pattern (b) 
When people are charged with criminal offences, some apply for legal aid and 
some do not. Although the Legal Services Society changed the financial eligibility and 
coverage policy several times, which affects the ntlrnber of legal aid approvals and tile 
number of applicants, the general trend of the volume shows an increase between 1984 
and 1990. The seasonal variation has a different pattern than that of crime known to the 
police and charges. With crime known to the police and criminal charges, the peaks always 
occur in the summer each year. With legal aid application and legal aid approval9 the 
peaks occur several months later. As discussed in the previous chapter, those who arc 
charged with criminal offences do not apply for legal aid immediately after being notified 
of the charge, although they may have been informed of the availability of legal aid by the 
police. Most of them would wait until they appear in the court and are told by the judge to 
find a legal aid lawyer if they camot afford one. The time delay between charges and 
application for legal aid i s  thus simulated in the DYNAMO simulation model. 
The most striking feature in Figure 24 is the sharp increase of the cost of legal aid 
from 1984 to 1990 in comparison to the number of legal aid approvals. In the seven year 
period the number of clients served (legal aid approvals) increased from about 2,000 a 
month in 1984 to about 2,900 a month in 1990. The cost of legal aid, however, was tripled 
from about $400,000 a month in 1984 to about $1,200,000 a month in 1990. The sharp 
increase in the cost of legal aid is mostly caused by tariff increase, rather than by the 
number oT clients served. 
Figure 24 Base Flow Pattern (c) 
I - Leg4 AM Application -Legal Aid Appro~al - ~ & t  of legal Aid I 
-4s discussed earlier, the cost of providing legal aid varies across different types of' 
charges and across different court procedures. In order to simulate the difl'ercntial cost of 
legal aid, different tariff rate per court procedure is built into the DYNAMO simulation 
model. Figure 25 shows the impact of differential cost over different court procedures. 
Although much fewer cases go to trial (see Figure 23), the total cost of trial cascs is higher 
than guilty plea cases. 
Figure 25 Base Flow Pattern (d): Cost of guilty Plea Cases and Trial Cases 
Thousands 
-Cost of Guilty Plea Cases -Cost of Trial Cases 
There are four crime predictors used as initial input to project seven crimc scctors 
Bowing through the simulation model. Hypothetically, the crime pattern for any crimc 
sector for any future crime could be projected by altering any sector of the initial input. 
There are, in theory, a large number of future crime states which could be studied. To 
expiore the use of the model for studymg future crime patterns and the impact of the 
future crime patterns on the cost and the need for legal aid, an extreme situation is posited 
and the simulation run using the extreme crime projections. 
For the base calculations, the population in BC increased by one percent in 1985 
from that in 1984, then increased by two percent in 1986, then threc percent in 1987 (see 
Table 39). Thc population in 1990 increased by twelve percent in comparison to 1984 in 
h e  simulation model. 
f t  is hypothesized that the size of the population increased by approximately five 
percent each year in the seven simulated years. This series of cumulative increases in 
population will bring the population in the seventh year to over 3.9 million, which is 29% 
higher than that in the first year. 
Table 39 Population: Base Flow Pattern and Increased Pattern 
Population (Base Row Pattern) Population (5 % Incrcase Each Year) 
Population Compared to Compared Population Compared to Compared 
the Previous to 1984 the Previous to 1984 
year year 
1984 3,002,000 3,048,000 
Data source: CANSIM University Base (machine-readable data file). 1946-Present. 
SFUIRDL ed., Ottawa, Statistics Canada. 
Running the simulation under both the base conditions and the conditions with 
sharply increased population produces some interestirlg results. The simulation produces 
values for every month between January, 1985 to December 1991. To make the analysis 
of the results tractable, the values are aggregated at the annual level. 
First of all, under the conditions with increased population in British Columbiu, thc 
total volume of crime reported to the police rose from 460,140 in the first year to 749,340 
in the seventh year, an increase of 63 percent (Table 40). The total volume of crime 
known to the police increased at a higher rate than the growth of population due to the 
fact that the base simulation model is developed using data from 1983 to 1990. In thosc 
years crime rate was increasing, meaning that volume of crime reported to the policc 
increased faster than population growth, 
Table 40 Crime Known to the Police (Base Fiow Pattern Vs. increased Pattern 
CKP (Base flow Pattern) CKP (Increased Pooulation) 
CKP Cornparedto CKP Compared to Compared to 
1984 Base Flow 1984 
Under the extreme conditions, the total number of offences reported to the police 
rose from 460,140 in 1984 to 749,340 in 1990, an increase of 63%. The number of 
persons charged, as simulated in the model, increased from 78,5 12 to 101,491, an increase 
of 39%, not keeping up with the increase of crime (Table 41). This is a desired result as 
the simulation model attempts to simulate the discretion exercised by the police. Facing 
sharply increased crime and budget cuts, the police fde criminal charges at a much slower 
rate than the increase in crime, according to both of the conceptual model and the 
empirical analysis of the data. 
Table 41 Increased Crime Vs. Number of Persons Charged 
Crime Known to Police Number of Persons Charged 
Compared to Compared Compared to Compared 
Previous Year to 1984 Previous Year to 1984 
1984 460,140 73,253 
1985 496,780 8% 8% 78,512 7% 7% 
1986 541,910 9% 18% 83,691 7% 14% 
1987 587,270 8% 28% 87,430 4% 19% 
1988 642,600 9% 40% 92,343 6% 26% 
1989 691,340 8% 50% 96,878 5% 32% 
1990 749,340 8% 63% 101,491 5% 39% 
Facing increased demand for legal aid resulting from increased volume of persons 
charged with criminal offences, the Legal Services Society of British Columbia has several 
policy alternatives, mainly depending on the availability of its resources. If there is no 
restraint of resources LSS wdl normally keep its existing policy to expand services and 
increase tariff'in the same way as it did in the time period between 1984 and 1990. To 
cxanline the result of this scenario, the demand rate and approval rate for legal aid 
hypothetically remain the same as in the base flow model as if there were no resource 
limit. The tariff rates over the seven years remain the same as were used in the base tlaw 
pattern, too, as there were no resource limit or a second policy alternative. 
Table 42 compares the demand for legal aid when crime known to the police 
increases as a result of increased population with the demand for legal aid in the base flow 
model. It is clear that the demand for legal aid increased rapidly in comparison with the 
base flow model. In 1984 the increase would he about 1.1%. In 1990, however, thc 
demand would increase by 13.6%. 
Table $2 Demand for Legal Aid: Under Increased Crime Vs. Base Flow 
Time Demand for Legal Demand for % of Increase 
aid in Base Legal Aid with in Demand 
Flow Model Increased Crime 
1984 36,305 36,711 1.1 % 
Unrestrained Budget,for LSS with Increased Crime 
As the demand for legal aid increases, the need for legal aid increases as well if 
LSS does not change its eligibility and coverage poky (Table 43). In 1984, the need for 
legal aid increased by 2.2% in comparison to the base flow model and in 1990, it increased 
by 15.2%. The increase of the need for legal aid, as is shown in Table 43, is a little higher 
than the demand for legal aid (Table 42). This is because in the base flow model, the 
approval rate does not remain the same all the time. It is adjusted between two alternative 
policies: expanding service and restrict service given the amount of demand for legal aid 
and the budget restraint. In the current scenario, however, approval rate is allowed to 
remain unchanged, simulating a budget without any restraint, which results in a higher 
increase of approval rate as compared to the volume in the same year i~ the base flow 
rnodcl. 
Table 43 Need for Legal Aid: Under Increased Grime Vs. Base Flow Model 
Tune Need for Legal Need for Legal % of 
Aid in Base Aid with Increase 
Row Model hcreased Crime 
1984 25,094 25,653 2.2% 
1985 26,945 28,474 5.7% 
1986 28,126 30,832 9.6% 
1987 28,98 1 32,387 11.8% 
1988 30,005 33,859 12.8% 
1989 30,98 1 35,285 13.9% 
1990 31,766 36,605 15.2% 
Due to the increased need for legal aid, the cost of legal aid increased by more than 
eighteen percent in comparison to that in the same year in the base flow model, although 
the pay rates to the private bar for representing the accused remains the same as they are 
used in the base flow model. The higher-than-proportional increase in cost (18.1% cost 
increase vs. 15.2% need increase) is once again a result of simulating unrestrained budget 
in this scenario, whereas in the base flow model the attempt by the Legal Services Society 
to control tariff is simulated, which results in a controlled increase, 
Table 44 Cost of Legal Aid: Under Increased Crime Vs, Base Flow Model 
Cost of Legal Aid in Cost of Legal Aid with % of Increase 
Base Flow Pattern Increased Crime. 
1984 $ 5,23 1,000 $ 5,327,200 1.8% 
1985 $ 5,852,100 $ 6,112,400 4.4% 
1986 $ 7,433,600 $ 8,124,900 9.3% 
1987 $ 9,049,600 $10,222,100 13.0% 
1988 $10,906,600 $12,566,300 15.2% 
1989 $12,678,000 $14,790,000 16.7% 
1990 $13,873,000 $16,387.000 18.1% 
Restrained Budget for LSS with Increased Crime 
The LSS faces resource restraint from time to time even when the volume of crime 
increases and more people are charged with criminal offences. Consequently, it has to scek 
other policy alternatives to meet the tight budget, such as tightening the eligibility and 
coverage criteria, as has been discussed in the earlier chapters (the policy change that 
triggered the Mountain case and the removal of flexible test and coverage change in 1992 
and 1993), reducing the tariff to cut the cost per legal aid case, etc. 
Therefore, a more realistic policy alternative that LSS could take, facing rapid 
increase of the number of persons charged with criminal offences, would be one that aims 
to obtain more resources on one hand in order to serve more people, and to tighten the 
need for legd aid on the other hand to meet its budget. Adopting two measures at the 
same time will result in a limited increase (under-proportional increase) of the need for and 
cost of legal aid. 
To simulate the policy alternative, a switch is budt in the DYNAMO simulation 
model. When the demand for legal aid or the cost of legal aid reaches the designed level, a 
budget restraint policy would be adopted to reduce legal aid approval rate and ta rs .  Table 
45 and Table 46 show the effect of this budget restraint policy. 
Although the number of persons charged increased by 39 percent under the 
situation of increased crime, the demand and the need for legal aid did not increase at the 
same rate (Table 45). The demand for legal aid increased by 3 1 percent in year 7 from year 
1 and the need for legal aid increased by 28 percent. These under-proportional increases 
result from several factors built in the simulation model. One is the screening effect by the 
crown counsel. When there are big increases of criminal charges from the police, the 
crown will screen out more cases by means of diversion, caution letter, staying charges 
etc., partly because of the staffing restraint on the crown part which means they cannot 
handle the increased volume of caseload, partly because of the pressure of the court 
cseioad. The more direct factor that affects the demand and need for legal aid is the 
change of legal aid eligibility and coverage policy, resulting from the increasing cost of 
legal aid and revenue restraint. Built into the simulation model: there is a policy switch, 
representing the policy of expandkg service and the policy of restri-kg service. m e n  
more people are charged with criminal offences, more people will apply for legal aid. 
However, when the cost of legal aid reaches a certain level, LSS will face revenue 
difficulties, and consequently make stricter eligibility and coverage policy. When fewer 
people qu* for legal aid, not only the approval rate for legal aid decreases, the number 
of people applying for legal aid will also decrease, whch is refared to as the "deterrence 
effect" (Manitoba study). 
Table 45 Increased Charges, Demand for Legal Aid and Need for Legal Aid 
Time Charges Compared Demand for Compared Need for Coxnpaucd 
to 1984 Legal Aid to 1984 Legal Aid to 1984 
1984 73,253 36,711 25,400 
1985 78,512 7% 40,454 10% 27,933 10% 
1986 83,691 14% 43,415 18% 29,826 17% 
1987 87,430 19% 45,075 23% 30,815 21% 
1988 92,343 26% 46,267 26% 3 1,474 24% 
1989 96,878 32% 46,992 28% 31,853 25% 
1990 101,491 39% 48,086 31% 32,448 28% 
The seven-year period used for designing the simulation model's base flow pattern 
was a t h e  that saw rapid increase of the demand and need for legal aid. As well the cost 
of legal aid increased rapidly, too. The cost of legal aid in 1990 was about $13.8 million, 
over 100 percent increase over that in 1985. Although part of the reason for the cost 
increase was due to increased demand and need for legal aid, the rnqjor reason for the 
increase was the increase of legal aid tariff, the rate that is used to pay the private bar to 
represent the accused. 
The base patt.ern and the pattern with supposedly increased crin,,: are compared. 
Table 46 shows the results of this comparison. The most sigruficant difference in the 
increased patterns of increased crime and increased cost of legal aid can be seen in year 7. 
While the volume of crime known to the police in year 7 is 24.1 percent higher with 
supposedly increased population than the base flow figure in the same year, the cost of 
legal aid under the situation with supposedly increased population in year 7 was only five 
percent higher than that in the base flow model in the same year. This limited increase of 
legal aid cost results from many interconnected factors in the criminal justice system. The 
police cannot maintain the same charge rate under increased crime, the crown filters out 
some charges, more guilty pleas, more stays and withdrawals, fewer trials, and, last but 
not the least, the LSS controls the level of the need for legal aid and tariff rate. As demand 
for legal aid increases, LSS may have to reduce the need for legal aid by controlling 
eligibility and coverage, which in turn may reduce the demand for legal aid. The ESS can, 
as a policy alternative, reduce tariff rate in order to control the cost of legal aid. 
Table 46 Increased Crime Vs. Cost of Legal Aid 
Cfime Known to Poiice Cost of Legal Aid 
BaseFlow Supposed % of Base Row Supposed % of 
Pattern Increase Increase Increased Increase 
1984 455,930 460,140 0.9% $5,23 1,000 $5,267,900 0.7% 
1985 466,860 496,780 6.4% $5,852,100 $6,034,600 3.1% 
1986 482,360 541,910 12.3% $7,433,600 $7,926,900 6.6% 
1987 502,970 587,270 16.8% $9,049,600 $9,809,900 8.4% 
1988 537,390 642,600 19.6% $10,906,600 $11,795,100 8.1% 
1989 566,950 691,340 21.9% $12,678,000 $13,482,000 6.3% 
1990 603,920 749,340 24.1% $13,873,000 $14,635,000 5.5% 
POLICY CHANGES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The impact of increased crime on the need for and cost of legal aid, as analyzed in 
the previous section, is based on the assumption that the criminal justice system keeps its 
policies and practices unchanged as shown in the base flow model. In reality, however, the 
criminal justice system reacts dynamically to changes in its environment. This is especidy 
true when the input into the system changes, i.e. an increase in the amount of crime. 
Police may increase its staff level, thus are able to lay more charges against the 
suspected offenders; the Crown counsel may Nter out more or less cases, to keep in line 
with its own staff level or the court case load, which is often reflected in the size of thc 
case backlog. The court system may increase its staff level or change the procedures to 
speed up processing criminal charges. All of these policy alternatives will affect the need 
for and cost of legal aid. Tlus section will explore the impact of these possible policy 
changes in the crirlclinal justice system. 
Patterns under Increased Resources 
Throughout the criminal justice system, resource restraint is a major k t o r  [hat 
affects the case flow at every intersection: charge rate by the police drops in summer time 
because of increased crime and the police do not have enough resources to maintain the 
same charge rate as that in winter time; the Crown cannot prosecute all requests for 
criminal charges from the police because of lack of resource in the Crown sector as well ks 
limited resource in the court system that is always overloaded with case bwklog; the Legal 
Services Society cannot provide all of the accused with legal aid lawyers also because of 
limited resource. As was shown in the discussion of the impact of massive crime 
increases, resource restraints at various intersections will definitely affect the need for and 
cost of legal aid. On the other hand, although the legal aid system is being defrned and 
analyzed as a system in this study, in the real world it is not operated by the 
administrators as a system. Consequently, resource level can be changed by some 
administrators in some part in the system without changing the resource level in other sub- 
systems. It would be interesting to see how increased resource at one part of the system 
affects other parts of the system. 
First, it is hypothesized that the amount of crime known to the police remains the 
same as in the base flow pattern. However, more resources are allocated to the police, 
allowing the police to lay more charges when more crime is reported. The results are 
shown in Table 47. Although the amount of crime known to the police remains the same 
each year, the number of persons charged with criminal offences is getting larger in the 
situation with increased resources as compared with that in the base flow model, with the 
most substantial increase being 12% increase from the base flow pattern in 1990. 
Table 47 Number of Persons Charged when Police Have Increased Resources 
Time Base Flow Increased Resources 
Crime Known # of Persons # of Persons Compared to 
to the Police Charged Charged  ask Flow 
1984 455,930 65,275 67,800 4% 
Normally, the LSS aims to expand its services to more people. At the same time, it 
has to function within a restrained budget. The base model of the simulation was 
developed with these dual mandates as the foundation. In the model, two equations are 
developed simulating two policies; one is to expand service, the other is to stop expunsion 
and to start limiting services. Under the situation of increased resources, the Legal 
Services Society does not have to switch to the strict eligibility and coverage policy and is 
able to keep expanding services in the same way as it did in the seven-year period betwccn 
1984 and 1990, which means using the highest rate of applications made by the accuscd 
and the highest rate of approval for legal aid shown in the base flow model as thc 
consistent rate in the model of increased resources to the criminal justice system. 
As a result of increased resources to the criminal justice system, while the Legal 
Services Society keeps its highest approval rate in the seven-year period, the demand and 
need for legal aid rapidly increase (Table 48), although the crime level remains the sunc as 
the base flow model. T i e  largest increase happens for the year of 1990, where the dcmand 
for legal aid increase by 15.9 percent and the need for legal for legal aid increase by 14.7 
percent when more resources are available to the Legal Services Society. 
Table 48 Demand and Need for Legal Aid: Increased Resources Vs. Base Flow 
Time Ease Row Pattern With Increased Resources 
Demand for Need for Demand for Compared to Need for Compared to 
Legal Aid Legal Aid Legal Aid Base Row Legal Aid Base Row 
1984 36,305 25,400 37,821 4.2% 26,426 4.0% 
10115 39,036 27,933 41 ,09 1 5.3% 28,671 2.6% 
1986 40,796 29,826 43,348 6.3% 30,210 1.3% 
1087 41,095 30,815 45,079 7.3% 31,445 2.0% 
1988 43,505 3 1,474 47,756 9.8% 33,292 5.8% 
I989 44,959 31,853 50,848 13.1% 35,418 11.2% 
1990 46,109 32,448 53,461 15.9% 37,228 14.7% 
Along with the increase in resources for the criminal justice system, the greatest 
impact on the legal aid system is the cost. In 1990, for example, the increase would be 
over 21 percent (Table 49). This increase is out of proportion to the increase of the 
demand iind need for legal aid (Table 48), in spite of the fact that tariff rate remained the 
same as in the base flow model. One of the m+ix reasons for this higher-than-proportional 
increase in the cost of legal aid is due to an increased volume of trials. 
Table 49 Cost of Legal Aid: Increased Resources Vs. Rase Flow 
Time Base Flow Under Increased Compared to 
Pattern Resources Base Flow 
1984 $5,231,000 $5,750,000 9.9% 
As it is illustrated in Table 47, the number of persons charged shows il sharp 
increase along with the increase in the resources to the police. ranging from 4% in 1984 to 
12% in 1990, Consequently, the volume of trials will also increase. Table 5 0  shuws the 
volume of trials under increased resources to the police, to the Crown counsel md to the 
court system. It can be seen that the increase in t h ~  vr>lume of trials is hgher than the 
increase of charges. For the year of 1990, for example, the volume of trials undor the 
situation of increased resources go up by 15% in comparison to thc 12 % incrcue of 
charges in a sirmlar situation. This can be explained by the fact that, in the base Ilow 
model, the crown counsel, under the pressure of resource restraints to its own st;tff lcvcl 
and to the court system, has to initiate more guilty pleas and more stays and withdraw 
more charges, when the court case load increases. With increased rcsourccs to the court 
system as well as to the Crown staff level, the Crown can keep the rate of guilty pleas and 
staylwithdrawals at a relatively lower level without much fluctuation according to the case 
load. 
Table 50 Number of Trials: Increased Resources Vs. Base Flow 
Time Base Flow Under Increased Cornpaced to 
Pattern Resources ~ a s e  Flow 
1984 12,875 15,502 20.4% 
A comparison of the volume of guilty pleas under increased resources with the 
volume of charges under increased resources and the volume of trials under increased 
resr3urces further illustrates the impact of increasing resources on the criminal justice 
system and the cost of legal aid. In the base flow model (Table 51), the guilty plea rates 
range from 55.8% in 1984 to 59.1% in 1990. The increase of guilty pleas is mostly due to 
the increased volume of charges and the limited resources to the Crown and the court 
system. When resources are increaed, more cases go to trial and fewer cases will go 
through guilty plea bargaining. For the year of 1990, for example, the guilty plea rate goes 
down to 57.7% under increased resources, as compared with that of 59.1% in the base 
flow model. This is consistent with the conceptual model as discussed in the previous 
chapter. When more resources are available to the Crown and to the court system, there 
wi!Z be mere &ids md fewer g u i j  p!ez.s. 
Ta'nie 51 Guiity Pieas: Increased Resources Vs. Base Fiow 
Time Base Flow Pattern Under Increased Resources 
Persons Guilty Plea % of Guilty Persons Guilty % of Guilty 
Charged Plea Charged Plea Plea 
1984 65,275 36,412 55.8% 67,799 36,194 53.4% 
Inflexible Crown Counsel 
The guilty plea has k e n  frequently criticized for fading to do justice. In spite of ail 
the criticism, the guilty plea has been a major procedure for criminal cases to go through 
the criminal justice system. As has  bee^ discussed in the earlier chapter, over 50 perccnt of 
all cases resulted in a guilty plea. The proportion of guilty pleas tended to increase over 
the years as the caseload in the court system increased in the seven year period. In addition 
to guilty pleas, the Crown also seemed to be staying and withdrawing more char&&: Ft\ over 
the years. This is also likely to be a reaction to the increasing caseload in the court systenl. 
An interesting policy alternative would be to explore with the DYNAMO simulation 
model the situation where the Crown counsel remains mflexible in regard to guilty pleas 
and charge stays no matter what the caseload is in the court system. 
The situation of having inflexible Crown counsel has to be highly hypothetical. 
Although it is estimated that over 50% of all criminal cases go through thc system by 
means of guilty pleas, it is not clear how many of them went through "orgaining with the 
Crown who gave a "good deal" either by means of reducing charges or by dropping some 
charges. Some of the accused would simply plea guilty, with or without a "good dcal" 
from the Crown. Quite arbitrarily, it is determined that the rate of thc guilty plca would be 
reduced by 10% from the lowest guilty plea rate in the base flow modcl and remains 
unchanged in the hypothetical model. 
Figure 26 shows the comparison between the monthly volume of guilty pleas at the 
rate in the base flow model and the monthly volume of guilty pleas at the rate rcduced by 
ten percent over ail types of charges. As the Crown becomes inflexible there would be 
fewer guilty plea negotiations than in the base flow model, in which the Crown has the 
propensity to negotiate guilty bargains when pressured by the caseload in the court 
system. The gap between the volumes in Figure 26 gets wider and wider it1 the later years 
in the simulation mainly because in the base flow model, when the caseload increases in 
the later years, the Crown is simulated to initiate more guilty pleas, whereas in the current 
scenario, the guilty plea rate remains unchanged, resulting in a relatively slower increase. 
As the number of guilty pleas goes down, the number of trials will go up. 
Figure 26 Guilty Plea: Idkxible Crown Vs. Base Flow Pattern 
1  e educed -Base Flow 1 
Figure 27 shows the output from the simulation model with reduccd guilty plea 
rate. The number of trials in 1984 increased from about 1,100 cases a month to about 
1,400 cases a month. In 1990, the number of trials increased from 1,400 to a h o s t  2,000 a 
month. This basically illustrates that the output from this scenario is consistent with thc 
conceptual pattern. 
Figure 27 Month Volume of Trials: Reduced Plea Rate Vs. Base Plea Rate 
1-~ria1.s at Reduced Plea Rate -Trials at Base Plea Rate 1 
When the number of guilty pleas is reduced and the number of trials goes up, the 
major impact would show on the cost of legal aid. A case going through trial costs much 
more than a case going through on a guilty plea. In 1991, for example, trial cases cost 
about $1,100 per case, whereas guilty plea cases cost only around $400 per case. 
Consequently, the total cost of legal aid would go up, as can be seen in Figure 28. 
Annually, the total cost of legal aid would go up by more than 14 percent (Table 52). In 
1990, the total cost would increase by about two million dollars. 
Figure 28 Cost of Legal Aid at Reduced Plea Rate Vs. Base Plea Rate 
2 2 2 j 4 
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-Cost at Reduced Plea Rate -Cost at Base Plea Rate 
Table 52 Cost of Legal Aid: Inflexible Crown Vs. Base Flow 
Time Base Flow Cost with Compared to 
Pattern Inflexible Crown Base Flow 
1984 $5,23 1,000 $5,997,900 14.7% 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES BY THE LEGAL SERVICES SOCIETY 
The Legal Services Society of British Columbia is mandated, ;ts stated in the 
Legal Sewices Act, to provide legal izid to those who need legal counsel and would not be 
able to afford it without legal aid. Meanwhile, the Society is restrained by limited 
resources. In order to fulfill its mandate with limited resources, the Society has generally 
two leverages to maneuver. One is to m o d e  the tariff to change the cost per case and the 
other is to redefine the need for legal aid within acceptable interpretations of the Legal 
Services Act, This section will explore the applicability of the DYNAMO simulation model 
in the scenarios where the Legal Services Society adopts different hypothetical p o k y  
alternatives in regard to tariff modification and redefinition of the need for legal aid. 
Legal Aid Eligibility Expansion 
As aforementioned, the seven-year period from 1984 to 1990 was a time to see 
legal aid expansion. New legal aid field offices were set up, making legal aid more 
accessible to the needy. Flexible income eligibility test was introduced in this A L. period, . . 4 
allowing more people to be financially eligibie for legal aid. What would happen if LSS did 
not expand the service, i.e., if the Society did not introduce the flexible eligibility test and 
did not set up new offices. Operationally, the simulation model is supposed to assume that 
the rate of legal aid application by those who were charged with criminal and the approval 
rate for legal aid by LSS remain at the lowest level in the seven years. 
Table 53 shows the differences in the volume of legal aid applications between the 
base flow pattern and the simulated scenario. If the LSS did not expand its services during 
the seven-year period, fewer people would come to LSS to apply for legal aid, and an 
increasingly greater impact would be noticed over the years. For the year of 1984, for 
example, only 0.1 percent of applications would be affected. In 1987 and forward, the 
change became -2.9 percent. 
Table 53 Volume of Legal Aid Applications If LSS Did Not Expand Service 
Time Base Flow Without LSS Volume % Change 
- 
Pattern Expansion Change 
1984 36,305 36,27 1 -34 -0.1 % 
Greater impact can be seen in changes in the volume of legal aid approvals. In 
1990, for example, 2.9% fewer people would apply for legal aid (Table 53). The volume 
of approvals, however, would decrease by five percent (Table 54). This is in line with both 
the conceptual model and the empirical model. When LSS expanded its services, it set up 
more offices and increased its approval rate for legal representation. When simulating the 
removal of expansion of services, the increase of approval rate in the seven years is also 
removed as well as the increase of the application rate. 
Table 54 Volume of Legal Aid Approvals If ESS Did Not Expand Service 
Time BasePattern WithoutLSS Volume % Change 
Expansion Change 
1984 25,400 25,071 -330 -1.3% 
1985 27,933 26,654 - 1279 -4.6% 
1986 29,826 27,550 -2276 -7.6% 
1987 30,815 28,135 -2680 -8.7% 
1988 3 1,474 29,131 -2342 -7.4% 
1989 3 1,853 30,075 -1778 -5.6% 
1990 32,448 30,837 -161 1 -5.0% 
When fewer clients are served, the cost of legal aid will naturally decrease, which 
is shown in Tabie 55. Comparing Table 54 and Table 55, however, it can be seen that the 
cost of legal aid does not change in a linear manner with the number of clients served. In 
the frse year (1984), the number of approvals decreased by 1.3 percent. This decrease in 
the number of clients served had no impact on the cost in that year. This can be explained 
by the fact that there is a time delay between the time when an application is approved and 
the t h e  when the cost is incurred, which is the time the criminal justice system takes to 
process the accused. Another interesting pattern about the non-linear change between the 
number of clients served and the cost of legal aid is that the decrease in cost is always 
much lower than that in the number of clients served, which is mainly due to time elapsed 
between approval and cost and the increasing tariff during the seven- year period. In other 
words, the increased tariff reduced the amount of savings that would have been achieved 
by reducing the number of clients served. 
Table 55 Cost of Legal Aid If LSS Did Not Expand Service 
Time Base Pattern Without LSS Change in 9% Change 
Expansion Dollars 
1984 $5,231,000 $5,23 1,000 $0 0.0% 
Legal Aid Tariff 
In the seven-year period, which is used to build the base DYNAMO simulation 
model, LSS increased the tariff several times (see Chapter 1 for details). It would he 
interesting to find out what the cost of legal aid would be if the tariff remained unchanged 
since 1984 while serving the same number of clients? Using the DYNAMO simulation 
model, this question can be easily answered. As can be seen in Table 56 if the tariff that 
was used in 1984 were used in 1990, the cost of legal aid would be less than half in the 
base pattern. Comparing Table 56 and Table 55, it is also clear that the expansion 01' legal 
aid service accour,t,s for little of the increase in the cost of legal aid. It is the tariff increase 
in the seven years that account for the great increase in the cost of legal aid. 
Tabfe 56 Cost of ,f,egal Aid with Unchanged Tariff 
B a% Pattern If 1984 Tariff Was Used 
Time Cost in Base Hypothetical Volume % Change 
Pattern Cost Change 
1984 $5,231,000 $5,231,000 $0 0.0% 
1985 $5,852,100 $5,425,700 ($426,400) -7.3% 
1986 $7,433,600 $5,612,900 ($1,820,700) -24.5% 
1087 $9,049,600 $5,798,900 ($3,250,700) -35.9% 
1988 $10,906,600 $5,997,600 ($4,909,000) -45.0% 
1989 $12,678,000 $6,209,800 ($6,468,200) 51 .O% 
1990 $13,873,000 $6,390,400 ($7,482,600) -53.9% 
Using 1992's Legal Aid Tariff 
In the seven-year period used in the base flow model, the Legal Services Society 
used a relatively low tariff in spite of the increases as discussed earlier. In the summer of 
199 1, legal aid lawyers had a successful job action, which resulted in doubling the tariff in 
June, 1991, the highest tariff in the legal aid history in BC. This tariff lasted for 19 months 
till December 1992, when LSS had to reduce t a r 8  by 15 percent. While the earlier 
scenario was to explore the impact of the lowest tanff in the simulation model, it would be 
equally interesting to explore what would be the cost of legal aid if the tariff that was used 
between the summer of 199 1 and the end of 1992 was applied to the period between 1984 
and 1990 while serving the same number of clients. Table 57 shows the simulated impact 
in this scenario. 
Table 57 Cost of Legal Aid with The Nighest Tariff 
Time Base Pattern Use Highest Change in % Change 
PROJECTION OF THE FUTURE 
The primary objective to develop a simulation model for legal aid is to forecast the 
cost of and need for legal aid with the model when changes take place to other parts o f  the 
legal aid system. It explores the possibility of answering such questions as, what if crimc 
increases rapidly, what if the police make more charges, what if more trials go through the 
court system, etc. The scenarios that are discussed in the first part of thrs chapter illustrate 
that the model is able to answer these questions. 
The DYNAMO simulation model that has been built in this study has two features 
that technically allow the projection of the future state of the legal aid system. First, thc 
model has the capacity to nm more than 84 time points, which, in this study, stand for 84 
months in the base flow model. Second, the initial input into the model, which is the crime 
predictors, is designed in such a way that it allows either manual data entry of the crime 
predictors for the future, or that the model can generate the crime predictors by extending 
the seasonal variation and the trend in the base Row model into the future. This section 
will expiore the applicabiiity of the model in this perspective. 
Projecting the future state of a system has to be based on many assumptions. The 
behavior of the system, for example, is assumed to have a slmilar pattern as it has had 
hefore. The current trend is  assumed to extend to the near future. These are the major 
assumptions in fbrecasting the future with the DYNAMO simulation model. This is 
especially true with the way in which the values of the initial input, the crime predictors 
arc generated. Without much manipulation of the model and by simply letting the model 
run for 60 time points (each time point in this model stands for on3 month and 60 time 
points stand for five years) in addition to the 84 time points in the base flow model and 
earlier scenarios, the model, as has been programmed, identifies the general trend and 
patterns in seasonal variation and extends the general trend and pattern thus identified to 
the additional time pints. 
Table 58 Crime Predictors Used for Forecasting the Future (1) 
Time Beer Compared to Retail Volume Compared to 
Consumption Previous Year ($'OOO) Previous Year 
Future Projection: Crime Predictors 
Tables 58 and 59 have the initial values for the crimc predictors that are cither 
manually entered or genersted by the simulation model (The values from 1984 to 1990 lire 
original ones manually entered into the base flow model. The values from 1991 to 1?95 
are generated by the simulation model using techniques described in the prcviaus 
paragraph.). Since three crime predictors used in the base flow model demonstrate 
increasing trends in the seven years, the generated ones also show similar incrcslsilig 
trends. The population, for example, grows by about 2% each year both in the base flow 
model md in the projected time period. An exception to the increasing trend is the retail 
volume which shows a decreasing trend in the last two years in the base flow pattern. 
Consequently, the simulation model generated decreasing values for the later five years. 
Given the economic situation in British Columbia, this seems to be an unlikely situation. 
On the other hand, however, it would be interesting to see how the whole system would 
react to a situation where crime would increase year by year since the increasing trend of 
beer consumption, rate of working women, population growth and decreasing trend of 
retail. volume work together to predict crime increase, which will be illustrated later in this 
section. 
Tablife 59 Crime Predictors Used for Forecasting the Future (2) 
Time Rate of Working Compared to Population Compared to 
Women Previous Year (,mo) Previous Year 
19x4 54.0% 35,911 
1985 54.4% 0.8% 36,221 0.9% 
1986 55.2% 1.5% 36,719 1.4% 
1987 56.2% 1.8% 37,402 1.9% 
1988 57.3% 1.8% 38,383 2.6% 
1989 58.1 % 1.5% 39,390 2.6% 
1990 58.5% 0.7% 40,169 2.0% 
1991 59.1% 1.3% 41,027 2.1% 
1992 59.6% 0.7% 41,930 2.2% 
1993 59.8% 0.4% 42,755 2.0% 
1994 60.4% 1 .O% 43,557 1.9% 
1995 61.1% 1.2% 44.455 2.1% 
Future Projection: Crime Known to the Police and Charges 
Based on the crime predictors, the simulation model generates crime patterns fcr 
the future in addition to the base flow patterns. The figure below shows that the crime 
pattern is very close to the predicted pattern in the earlier paragraph. The volume of crime 
known to the police keeps increasing for the entire projected time period. The number of 
persons charged also increased in the projected time period. However, the increase of the 
number of persons charged is at a lower rate than the increase of the volume of crime 
known to the police. In 1995, for example, the amount of crime reported to the police was 
3 1 % higher than that in 1990. The number of persons charged in 1995, however, was only 
17% higher than that in 1990. This is consistent with the conceptual model in that when 
the police face more reported crime they are unable to keep up with the earlier charge rate 
because of the restriction of resources. 
It should be noted that when charges drop to a certain level. police forces ;uc 
likely to increase staff level i~ order to be able to lay more charges. A ~ripger could be 
built into the model to simulate the possible resomx increase. 
Figure 29 Future Projection: Crime Known to Police and Charges 
=Crime Known to Police EXharga 
Future Projection: The Court System 
With increased number of persons charged in the projected time period, the court 
system has to speed up processing cases. One alternative is, to increase the number of 
guilty pleas, stay more charges and withdraw more charges in addition to limited increase 
in resources. Figure 30 gives the outputs of the model simulating the projected court 
a&xit,y. It is shorn that the model assumes that the couz would t&e ikis dtemativz. The 
volume of guilty pleas, as illustrated in the figure, shows an up-going trend that is greater 
than the voSurnes of any other procedures. In 1995, 54,757 cases would be completed by 
way of guilty plea, an increase of 18.5% than that in 1990. Staylwithdrawal increased by 
18.9%. Trials, on the other hand, increased by 11.1% in the same two-year comparison. 
Figure 30 Future Projection: The Court System 
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16.412 39,803 41,154 42.088 43,336 44,957 46,195 48,059 49,984 51,668 53,138 
8,033 8,924 9,283 9.520 9,809 10.194 10,497 10,922 11,361 11,754 12,098 
12,875 13,829 14,429 14.837 15,222 15,677 16,020 16,399 16.755 17.145 17.437 
[*fail to Appear +Guilty Plea A.StayMlidrawl +Trial ] 
Future Projection: the laJeed for and Cost of Legal Aid 
The amount of demand and need for legal aid generally correlates with the volume 
of charges. When there are more charges there should be more demand and more need for 
kgd aid. However, the Legal Services Society can redefine the need for legal aid in order 
to control the cost of legal aid. 
Figure 31 shows the projected demand and need for legal aid and the cost of 
providing legal aid. In comparing the volumes in 1995 with th& in 1980, it is shown that 
the demand for legal aid increased by 15% and the need for legal aid increased by 15%. 
These increases are a little lower than the increase in the number of persons charged (17% 
as in Figure 29). This is the result of Legal Services Society's policy alternative when 
facing a substantial increase in criminal charges. It makes its eligibility policy more strict 
so that fewer people would quahfy for legal aid. In turn, the demand for legal aid would 
also decrease, as a result of the "deterrence effect7'. 
The cost of legal aid increased by only 12.4% in 1995 as compared with the cost in 
1990, although 15% more people were actually served. This is likely due to greater 
increase in the volume of guilty pleas, stays and withdrawals and less increase in the 
volume of trials, which cost more than twice the cost of guilty plea cases. 
What is more striking in the cost of legal aid in Figure 3 1 is the relatively flat upper 
slope in the projected time period in comparison to the steeper upper slope in the base 
flow time period. As discussed earlier, the great increase in the cost of legal aid was 
mostly due to the tariff increases over the seven years. In the projected time period, 
however, the tariff rate for 1990 is used without any tariff increase. 
Figure 31 Future Projection: Need and Cost of Leg& Aid 
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CHAPTER VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The legal aid system in Canada is having crisis in funding after nearly twenty years' 
expansion. When both the demand for and cost of legal aid services are growing at an 
unprecedented rate, the Legal Services Society (LSS) of British Columbia is Yaccd with 
the dilemma of how to meet the increased need for services while implementing cost 
containment measures required to reduce its growing deficits. To help legal aid planners 
make nolicy decisions, this exploratory study examined legal aid in the context of the 
whole criminal justice system and developed a planning tool to forecast the impact of 
changes in the criminal justice system on the need for and cost of legal aid in British 
Columbia. 
The legal aid system in British Columbia is a basically government-funded multi- 
million dollar business, with expenditures exceeding 100 &on dollars in the fiscal yeai- 
1993-94. Many factors have contributed to the increase in the need for and cost of legal 
aid. This study examined the contributing factors found within the British Columbia legal 
aid system, such as the historical development of legal aid, the mode of providing legal 
aid, the scope and operations of legal aid services including the financial eligibility criteria, 
service coverage policy, tariffs, and accessibility to legal aid services. 
Governments funding is crucial to the existence of the legal aid system. Funding 
from the government and the legal profession have made it possible for the indigent people 
in the province to have access to legal services. In the meantime, cuts in funding have had 
equally important impacts on the legal aid system and pressed the LSS to take substantial 
measures to reduce its deficits. In addition to funding cuts, legislation and court decisions 
have also affected the need for and cost of legal aid. For example, this study demonstrated 
the impact of the proclamation of the Young Oflenders Act on the cost and operations of 
legal aid. While the impact of the legislation seemed minimal in its early stage, the cost for 
court directed cases went up to over two million dollars in 1994 after a decade of 
enforcement of the Act. This study also discussed the impact of the changes in the LSS' 
eligibility policy and coverage policy. As the result of the adoption of stricter eligibility 
and coverage policies, more people failed to meet the approval criteria and were turned 
down while more youths had court directed counsel rather than LSS appointed counsel. It 
is cautioned that it may take many years to see the full impact of a new item of legislation. 
This study also pointed out that the interpretation of existing legislation by courts at 
different levels has had a significant impact on the need for and cost of legal aid in British 
Columbia. The cases of Regina vs. Brydges, Mountain vs. Legal Sewices Society, 
Gonzalez-Davis vs. Legal Services Society, and Regina vs. Rowbotham were discussed to 
support this argument. 
The role of private lawyers in providing legal services for the eligible people in the 
province was exambed in the study. It is no doubt that, without private lawyers' 
participation in k g d  z5d activity, the legal Gd system would cease to function. However, 
kcaiise of their iftSkpemai>ie parkipation in the legal aid system, the private lawyers' 
role has had a sigruficant impact on the policy making by the LSS, and on the need for and 
cost of legal aid. 
This study argued that repeated requests to increase tariffs have been the major 
reason for the increase in the cost of legal aid and for modifications of the LSS' policy. 
For example, as a result of a job action by the private bar lawyers in the summer of 199 1, 
the tariff was doubled and the cost of providing legal aid in the province was more than 
doubled in the following fiscal year, which forced the LSS to redefine its eligibility policy 
to meet its budget. 
This study emphasized the dynamic nature of the crirninal justice system. The 
criminal justice system that consists of many parts is under continual flow pressures. It is 
argued that the flows of people through the system are constantly changing. Crime rates 
fluctuate and monthly crime patterns vary greatly. Laws, and the organizational structures 
of the criminal justice agencies are also changing. This study examined such milor actors 
as the police, the prosecution, the courts, the correctional agencies, and some crime 
generators which were thought to be key elements in the prediction of the need for and 
cost of legal aid in British Columbia. It is believed that all different components of the 
criminal justice system are interconnected, although they may pursue conflicting goals. 
The success of each subsystem is dependent on the behavior of all the rest. Legal aid as a 
criminal justice subsystem is inevitably influenced by the behavior of the whole criminal 
justice system. The behaviors of the prime actors in the criminal justice system are also 
interrelated with each other and then indirectly affect the need for and cost of legal aid. 
It is believed that the police, as the key pkyers in the criminal justice system, 
basically control the quantity and quality of the input into the crimjnal justice system. They 
have great discretion in exercising their control by identlfyrng more or less crime, by laying 
more or fewer charges, 3y encouraging the public to report more or less crime, and by 
focusing on some specific types of crime. The major output from the police that becomes 
the m+jor input into the legal aid subsystem is criminal charges laid by the police. With 
other variables remaining constant, the more charges the police lay, the more need for 
legal aid there will be. This study examined the major factors that might a•’fect police 
charge rates. 
It is argued that, from a systems point of view, the court subsystem is different 
from all the other parts in the criminal justice system in that it is the only subsystem that 
can control both its input and output. The input control is conducted by Crown counsel by 
means of screening cases out of the system or by directing cases along different routes into 
the court system. The Crown has substantial discretionary power in exercising many 
options in disposing criminal cases at different stages. Therefore, the practice of the 
Crown counsel has tremendous impact on the administration of the subsystems of the 
court and legal aid. On the other hand, the output from the court has even greater impact 
on the whole criminal justice system, especially through the sentencing decisions made by 
the judge. While the sentencing decisions by the judge have a direct impact on the 
population in the corrections subsystem, which affects the need for and the cost of prison 
legal Gd, they also indirectly affect crime patterns. Crime patterns will, in turn, affect the 
I?& for cost of legd aid. h is believed that kprBoment is over-used in C m d a  and 
yet it has the most significant impact on the legal aid system. With the new legal aid 
coverage policy, which uses the probability of imprisonment for all offences in any specific 
region as one of the major criteria for legal aid approval, the changes in sentencing 
practice will have significant impact on the legal aid system. 
Corrections is also an integral part of the criminal justice system. Corrections 
receives input from within and without the criminal justice system and not only sends 
output out of the criminal justice system, but also input into the criminal justice system. 
However, the corrections subsystem does not have any direct control over the input and 
its output is largely dependent on the decisions made in other subsystems. The operations 
of corrections have a direct impact on the need for legal aid because of the provision of 
prison legal aid services and they have an indirect impact on the need for legal aid through 
their effects on crime patterns. 
All the major actors in the criminal justice system have their unique functions that 
have their share of impact on the administration of legal aid, and on the need for and the 
cost of legal aid. They produce direct input into the legal aid subsystem. The police 
basically control the caseload of legal aid. The courts affect the cost of providing legal aid 
for each case. The correctional subsystem influences the need for prison legal aid. In 
addition to the direct impact they have on the administration of legal aid, the interactions 
among the major actors may have a greater impact on legal aid and make it more difficult 
to forecast the need for and the cost of legal aid. 
The behavior of legal aid as one of the subsystems in the criminal justice system is 
closely related to the behavior of the major actors in the system. Legal aid is dependent on 
these actors in the criminal justice system for its input. Therefore, the behavior of legal aid 
sriq only be best understood by studyhg the whole criminal justice system. As its main 
purpose is to develop a planning tool for the legal aid planner, this study tested the 
feasibility of using computer simulation modeling to demonstrate the interconnectedness 
among various parts of the criminal justice system and forecast the impact of changes in 
the system on the need for and cost of legal aid in British Columbia 
In this study, systems analysis and simulation modeling were utilized to explore the 
system dynamics of legal aid. Being regarded as an approach, systems analysis is 
concerned with connectedness and wholeness, so it emphasizes the interconnections 
among the various components that constitute a whole system. It was adopted in this 
study because of its holism concept and its stress on the interdependency among various 
system parts. As the operations of legal aid depend on the other parts in the criminal 
justice system for its input and output, a systems analysis will reveal the interdependency. 
Moreover, the legal aid system itself is a complex system consisting of many sub-systems 
which consist of many parts at different hierarchical levels. Simulation modeling is one of 
the most commonly used techniques to study such a complex social system from the 
systems perspective. It is believed that using simulations helps better understand the 
behavior of a system over time. Computer simulation methodology is considered a highly 
integrative form of model building and can dezl with systems of greater complexity. 
This study discussed and compared the applications, advantages and limitations of 
three criminal @stice models representing three major approaches, i.e. JUSSIM by Belkin, 
Blumstein, and Glass (1974); DOTSIM by Public Safety Systems of Smta Bxbwa, 
California (1973); and the Florida model by F. i. Brantinghiim (1977). it is argucd that 
the model builder should start by reviewing existing well-developed simulation models and 
compare their compatibility with the system to be simulated once the problem has been 
defined for simulation. As no simulation model had been developed for the purpose of this 
study, the feasibility of using simulation programming languages was explored in this 
study. DYNAMO, a time dependent simulation language based on h e a r  and non-linear 
difference equations, was selected as the simulation programming language because it is 
specifically developed to provide a language for analyzing a dynamic system characterized 
by the interconnectedness between various parts within the system and time-dependent 
continuous feedback. The execution of a simulation model in this language provided a 
time ordered picture of how a system operated and changed. 
Three sets of data were collected for this study: crime predictors, criminal justice 
system data, and legal aid daia. The data covered the period from 1984 to 1993. The main 
purpose of data collection in this research was to provide accurate estimates of the 
parameters needed to make the simulation model a true representation of the actual legal 
aid system and its interaction with the criminal justice system, based on which future 
projections can be made. 
The discussions in Chapter II and Chapter 111 defined the problem and significant 
variables for the study. They served as the basis for developing tbe conceptual model of 
simulations. The conceptual model, shown through causal relationships, feedback 
structures and the development of flow charting diagrams, causal loop diagrams and the 
DYNAMO flow diagrams, provided a useful link between a verbal description of a system 
and its representation as difference equations in the DYNAMO simulation model. The 
causal loop diagrams were produced to demonstrate various factors mfluencing the need 
for legal aid, which included socio-economic conditions, demographic characteristics, 
crime rate, law enforcement, court procedure, policies for legal aid services, the 
availability and accessibility of legal aid, etc. 
The socio-economic-demographic factors may influence the need for legal aid. 
Such factors as percentage of males, percentage of females, percentage of young people, 
percentage of single parent families, unemployment rate, percentage of people on welfare, 
and migration rate are interrelated. Changes in the socio-economic-demographic situations 
can bring about changes 111 crime patterns which may affect the need for legal aid. 
The conceptual model illustrated that the need for legal aid heavily depended on 
the operations of the criminal justice system. Many aspects of the procedures of the 
criminal justice system may influence the need for legal aid. These may include charging 
practices, trial rates as compared with guilty plea rates, stay and withdrawal rates, the 
changing and fixed features of the Criminal Code, the Narcotics Control Act and other 
legislation including the Young Offenders Act, as well as sentencing practices. 
Z 
It was demonstrated in the conceptual model that the administration of legal aid 
itself influenced the need for and the cost of legal aid services, which, in turn, influenced 
the criteria for determining legal aid need. The tariff structure, the use of judicilrc versus 
staff lawyers, administrative practices, financial eligibility criteria, types of service to 
provide, service coverage policies, and the distribution of services, etc. were all within the 
maneuver of the legal aid administrators. It was also shown that the utilization of legal aid 
services was largely dependent on the availabdity and accessibihty of the services, mostly, 
the number and location of intake points. 
The DYNAMO flowcharts are simplified representations of the DYNAMO 
simulation program per se. In t h  study, the people flow in the system was divided into 
seven offence types and separately traced young offenders and adult offenders. Since 1111 
the people were not represented by legal aid lawyers, the people flow in the model was 
also categorized by legal aid representation and non-legal aid representation. Thus, people 
of different types of charges, young or adult and legal aid or non-legal representations 
were treated differently at various decision points and went through different sets of court 
procedures. 
Six modules were developed to make it possible to structure the model of macro 
structure of legal aid that showed the interconnectedness of various variables influencing 
the need for and cost of legal aid in British Columbia. These were: the crime module, the 
police module, the prosecution module, the judicial module, the corrections module, and 
the administration of legal aid module. These modules were shown to be interconnected 
with both infomation and people flowing among them. 
This study also demonstrated micro structures of each of the six modules. Causal 
h p s  were drawn to demonstrate the relationship of different variables. Criminal events 
are the major input into the legal aid subsystem as well as the criminal justice system. The 
simulation model consisted of monthly crime patterns by offence and various socio- 
economic and demographic variables that were used as crime predictors. For the police 
module, people were processed through the police agency at a certain charge rate and 
with some time delay, which were affected by the volume of crime known to the police, 
police resources, the piuportion of serious crime versus less serious crime, and 
unexplainable factors. 
The prosecution module showed that a number of factors affected the Crown in 
hisher exercise of the discretion to dispose cases. Among them, the caseload influenced 
the Crown's decisions about disposal. However, Crown could control their own workload 
and the caseload in the system by rejecting or proceeding with requests for criminal 
charges without much scrutiny. The judicial module showed how criminal cases were 
processed in the court system. It was believed that the major decision point in the module 
was that of whether there was a guilty plea and that the Crown played a major role in the 
plea bargaining process. The corrections module showed that the input of the corrections 
system was dependent on the number of people given jail or prison sentences. The 
sentencing pattern determined the length of the stay of the inmates in the corrections 
system and the release rate. In the meantime, it received feedback from the corrections 
system. 
After being released into society, a certain proportion of the former inmatcs would 
commit crime again, which constituted the feedback into the criminal justice system. In the 
module of legal aid administration, the inputs were mady from the police module and the 
corrections module. The number of people approved for legal aid had the greatest impact 
on the cost of legal aid, and the cost of legal aid affected the approval rate through a 
policy switch, which normally occurred when cost increased faster than resources. The 
tariff for different procedures, while having a positive impact on the cost of legal aid, was 
inversely affected by the gap between the cost of legal aid and the budget. 
The modules demonstrated that the interactions between legal aid administration 
and the criminal justice system were dynamic . The people flow and information flow from 
the earlier decision points affected the decision alternatives, but feedback from later 
decision points affected earlier decision points as well. In general, changes at any point 
would affect the performance of the wholc system. 
As the development of a simulation model required an understanding of the wholc 
system both conceptually and empirically, an empirical analysis of the legal aid system was 
done to reveal the behavior of the various major actors and their interrelationships within 
the legal aid system. In the analysis, empirical data were used to provide various 
parameters needed for developing the ;imulation model. At the highest level of' the system, 
the need for legal aid was a function of various factors including, in this model, crime 
h o r n  to the police, persons charged, prosecution behavior, court behavior, corrections 
behavior, legal aid tariff, and budget of the LSS. Each of these factors was also a function 
of a number of variables at a higher level of resolution. 
The relationship between the crime pattern and various socio-economic and 
demographc patterns was analyzed in order to develop the simulation model. The findings 
revealed that the number of people receiving unemployment insurance had negative 
correlation and the number of people receiving income assistance had little relationship 
with crime known to the police. It was also shown that such socio-demographic variables 
as beer consumption, percentage of women participating the work force, retail volume and 
population were highly correlated with crime known to the police. The results from these 
analyses gave strong support to the pattern theory and routine activity theory in that the 
variables that are found highly correlated with crime are the factors that the two theories 
believe to contribute to the three essential elements for a crime to be committed, namely 
the presence of a targethctim, the abseme of a guardian and the presence of a potential 
offender. As a result of the analysis, four variables were chosen to be used in the 
simulation model: volume of beer consumption, percentage of working women, retail 
volume and the total population in British Columbia. 
This study explored the applicability of the simulation model developed in the 
DYNAMO simulation language to the complicated "real-world" legal aid system. The 
model was tested to run the base flow patterns to produce output at various stages in the 
legal aid system. Then, the base flow patterns were used for comparison with output from 
the model applied in various hypothetical scenarios, which included the impact of changes 
in crime patterns on the legal aid system, the impact of hypothetical decisions of policy 
alternatives in the criminal justice system on the whole legal aid system, and the impac t of 
hypothetical policy alternatives by the Legal Services Society of BC on the system. 
The base flow patterns showed that more persons were charged over time as the 
amount of crime increased from 1984 to 1990. It also showed that the largest volumc of 
cases went through the court system by means of guilty plea and that the number of guilty 
plea cases per month was increasing. Cases going through trials also increased. During thc 
same period, the number of fail-to-appear cases remained constant, while the number of' 
stays or withdrawals increased substantially. 
The analysis revealed a dramatic increase in the cost of legal aid, which was tripled 
from $400,000 a month in 1984 to $1,200,000 a month in 1990. However, the increase 
was mostly caused by txifT increase, rather than by the number of clients served. It was 
also shown in the model that, although many fewer cases went to trial, the total cost of 
vial cases was higher than that of guilty plea cases. 
Several scenarios were explored to test the applicability of the simulation model in 
forecasting the impact of changes in the criminal justice system which included legal aid on 
the need for and cost of legal aid, i.e. patterns under increased crime, policy changes in the 
criminal justice system, and policy alternatives by the LSS. It was hypothesized that, under 
increased crime brought about by population growth, there would be an increased demand 
for legal aid resulting from increased volume of persons charged with criminal offences. 
Thus, the LSS could have several policy alternatives depending on the avadabjlity of its 
resources. The analysis of the scenarios showed the changes in the need for and cost of 
legal aid under increased crime when the budget of the LSS was unrestrained or 
restrained. The scenario of unrestrained budget of LSS showed that, due to the increased 
neeci for legal aid, the cost of legal aid increased by more than eighteen percent in 
comparison to that in the same year in the base flow model, assuming that the tariff 
remained unchanged. However, with the scenario of restrained budget, the LSS could 
tlghten the eligibility and coverage criteria, or reduce the tariff to cut the cost per legal aid 
case. 
This analysis examined these policy switches and revealed that, although the 
number of persons charged increased by 39 percent under the situation of increased crime, 
the demand and the need for legal aid increased by only 31 percent and 28 percent, 
respectively. The under-proportional increases were brought about by the tightening legal 
eligibility and coverage policy built in the simulation model. As the major reason for the 
increase in the cost of legal aid during the period from 1984 to 1990 was the increase in 
the legal aid tariff, the simulation model showed dramatic effect on cost when this factor 
was unds  control. The analysis showed that, while the volume of crime known to the 
police increased by 24 percent, the cost of legal aid was only five percent higher than that 
in the base flow model. 
In [ems of the impact of policy changes in the criminal justice system on the need 
for and cost of legal aid, the simulation model showed that, with increased resources for 
the police, more charges were laid by the police, while the amount of crime known to the 
police remained the same. As a result of increased resources to the criminal justice systcm, 
the demand and need for legal aid rapidly increased while the crime level remained 
unchanged. Moreover, the greatest impact on the legal aid system was cost which showed 
an out-of-proportion increase in relation to the increase in the demand and need for lcgal 
aid, in spite of the fact that tariff rate remained unchanged. On the other hand. with 
increased resources for the court system, the guilty plea rate went down as compared with 
that in the base flow model, for more resources available to the Crown and to the court 
system resulted in more trials and fewer gudty pleas. 
The simulation model explored what would happen when the Crown counscl 
hypothetically remained inflexible in regard to guilty pleas and charge stays with the 
caseload remaining constant. The results showed that, as the Crown became inflexible, 
there were fewer guilty pleas than in the base flow model. As the number of guilty pleas 
went down, the number of trials would go up dramatically. Consequently, the cost of legal 
aid was affected. In the simulation model, it showed that the total cost of legal aid went up 
by more than 14 percent as compared with that in the base flow model as a result of 
reduced plea rate. 
LSS policy alternatives were explored and analyzed in the simulation model. It was 
believed that the LSS had two major possibilities for maneuver when faced with limitcd 
resources, i.e., to m o d e  the tariff, and to redefine the need for legal aid. As the period 
from 1984 to 1990 experienced an expansion in the provision of legal aid in British 
Columbia, the scenario of legal aid eligibility expansion was simulated to reveal what 
could have happened if there had not been the expansion. The results suggested that, if the 
LSS had not expanded its services during the period, an increasingly greater impact would 
have been noticed over the years in terms of number of applicants and number of legal aid 
approvals. More significantly, the cost of legal aid would be reduced in a non-linear 
manner with the number of clients served. The decrease in cost was always much lower 
than that in the number of clients served. This is believed to be caused by time elapsed 
between legal aid approval and the actual incurring of the cost for providing legal aid. It is 
also because that, in that period, the legal aid tariff was increased several times. The 
increased tariff reduced the amount of savings that would have been achieved by reducing 
the number of clients served. The patterns of the output in this scenario implied that 
reducing the number of persons served would save less money than reducing the cost of 
providing the same amount of service. 
This implication was confirmed by another scenario which was made to explore 
what the cost of legal aid would be if no changes were made for the tad' rate while the 
same number of clients was served. The results showed that if the tariff rate used in 1984 
had been used in 1990, the cost of legal aid would have been less than half of that in the 
base pattern. Comparing the two scenarios, it was shown that it was the tariff increase that 
accounted for the sig&cant increase in the cost of legal aid, whereas the impact of the 
expansion of legal aid service on the cost was comparatively minimum. 
As discussed in Chapter I1 and Chapter VI, the successful job action taken by legal 
aid lawyers in 1991 brought about the highest tariff in the BC legid aid which 
lasted 19 months till December, 1992, when the tariff was reduced by 15 percent. A 
scenario exploring the simulated impact of the kghest tariff showed that the increase in 
the cost of legal aid would have ranged from 171 percent for the year of 1990 and 488 
percent for 1984, had the highest tariff rate been applied to the period from I984 to 1990. 
Based on the discussions and scenarios made in earlier chapters, a projection of' thc 
need for and cost of legal aid in the near future was produced by extending the gencral 
trend and patterns identified into additional time points standing for five years in thc 
future. The projection showed that, as the result of the LSS7 stricter eligibility policy, thc 
increase in the projected demand and need for legal aid was slightly lower than the 
increase in the number of persons charged. Moreover, while more people were served than 
in the year of 1990, the increase in the cost of legal aid was comparatively low in 1995. 
From the legal aid planner's point of view, the systems approach and ~ h c  
interconnectedness in the system as demonstrated in the simulation model are extremely 
important. The various scenarios examined in this study demonstrate that simulation 
modeling is able to forecast the impact of changes in certain part@) of the criminal justice 
system, including the legal aid subsystem itself, on the need for and cost of legal aid. 
This study presented the development of a dynamic simulation of the criminal 
justice system and the legal aid system. The simulation was designed to model the complex 
interrelationships within the system, to identlfy flow linkages, and to respond to dynamic 
changes %I the crime patterns and the major decision points such as chargimg, guilty plea, 
sentencing, approving legal aid and changing tariff structures. The equations used in the 
simulation were designed to model the flow breaks at these important decision points and 
the information feedback from other agencies and processes within the system. 
The DYNAMO simulation model that has been built in this study technically 
allows the projection of the future state of the legal aid system. The model has the 
capacity to run more than 84 time points which stand for 84 months in the base flow 
model. Moreover, the initial input of the crime predictors into the model is designed to 
allow manual data entry of the crime predictors for the future. The model can also 
generate the crime predictors by extending the seasonal variation and the trend in the base 
flow model into the future. 
Within the field of criminal justice, planners have two major problems in malung 
predictions and exploring the impact of change. Fist, conceptual models of the operation 
of the system which have an orientation towards planning are rare. Second, tools to 
cxplore time dependent changes are not readily available. This study has attempted to fill 
the gaps by constructing a useful conceptual model and an analytic tool for exploring 
change, The simulation model developed in this study can be used to help the planners of 
legal aid understand that the provision of legal aid should not be planned in isolation from 
the rest of the criminal justice system. In addition to the volume of applications for legal 
aid and the tariff structure for legal aid which are frequently the only variables used in 
legal aid planning, all the major decision points in the criminal justice system should he 
taken into consideration. 
When considering policy alternatives, planners tend to assume that other factors 
are constant. In fact, in a complex system such as the legal aid system in which all major 
decision points are closely interconnected, other factors can hardly remain constant when 
changes are initiated at one major decision point. The simulation model built in this study 
assumed that all the system parts remained dynamic all the time. When changes happened 
to one component, the rest of the components in the system would respond to the initial 
change and send feedback to the system simultaneously. This simulation can be helpful thr 
the planners to foresee the possible dynamic changes when policy alternatives are being 
considered. When legal aid administrators plan changes to the tmff structure, for example, 
they can use the simulation model to predict the system reactions to the various 
alternatives. How are the private bar lawyers responding to the changes in thc tariff fkes 
for guilty and trials? Is the change likely to encourage the counsel to challenge more cases 
in the court? How is the Crown Counsel going to react to defence if defence patterns 
change? How do the chain reactions in the system ultimately impact upon the need for and 
the cost of legal aid? The simulation model will help the planners to answer such 
questions that would either require very sophisticated calculations or result no answers at 
all without a simulation model. 
The development of a simulation model of the legal aid system in thh research has 
demonstrated that using simulation modeling in forecasting has a unique advantage: it 
allows the researcher and/or legal planners to analyze simultaneously the dynamic 
interactive impact of many factors on the need for and the cost of legal aid. Additionally, it 
has demonstrated that simulation modeling can successfully identify certain factors as 
having the most significant impact on the system. Both in the process of empirical analysis 
of legal aid in the past and in the process of applying the simulation model to the legal aid 
system in the real world, changes of the legal aid tariff have been identified as the most 
important factor that affects the cost of legal aid, which eventually feeds back into the 
system to affect changes in policy alternatives in regard to the need for legal aid. The 
capacity to identify effectively the most important factor among many different interrelated 
factors will be most useful for legal aid planners in the process of decision making. The 
fact that changes in legal aid tariff have the most significant impact on the cost of legal aid 
also implies that the private bar plays an important role in the provision of legal aid. 
Basically, the private bar overrides the three heuristics which are used in the process of 
collective decision making, namely, representativeness, availability of instances or 
scenarios and adjustment from an anchor (Kahneman et al. 1982). 
This study has its lirrrtations. When computer simulation modeling was introduced 
into the field of planning thirty years ago, simulation developers recognized the practical 
problem of inadequate data and costly data collection. Today, the situation with data 
availability has significantly knproved, thanks to advanced computing capacity at lower 
cost. In spite of all the signifkmt dvmces, bowevex, it is still frqiieotly found in the 
research process that more data are needed than available and, in this case, the validity and 
reliability of the simulation model could be greatly improved if more data were available. 
A difficulty frequently encountered in the research is related with w h ~ t  ciin be 
called the non-system feature of a system. In this research the crimind justice system is 
treated as a system with legal aid defined as a subsystem. W e  the various criminal 
justice agencies including the LSS should be regarded as a system in terms of their 
interconnectedness and intzrdependence, these agencies all enjoy a great degrec of 
autonomy which result in the non-system characteristics. One consequence of these non- 
system characteristics is the different definition of cases. For example, the police system 
counts cases by the number of persons charged. The court system counts cases by the 
number of charges. The LSS counts cases by persons with a six-month-reapplication 
(later, three-month) rule, and the correctional system counts the number of persons under 
custody and supervision, This non-system approach to the definition of cases creates great 
difficulty in research which requires a standard deb t ion  of cases. As a result, a 
compromise has to be made in order for the research to be carried through at the cost of 
some accuracy and reliability in the model. 
A simulation model is based on many assumptions made by the researcher. Thus, 
developing a simulation model of a complex system such as the one of legal aid in British 
Columbia requires a good conceptual understanding of the legal aid system, the criminal 
justice system, and the complex relationshrps between the various system parts within the 
system. The validity of a simulation model is always as good as the researcher's 
understanding of the system to be simulated. Although the criminai justice system is much 
better understood now than before, there is still much more to be learned about the 
system. It should be admitted that there is a h i t  to the researcher's understanding of the 
complexity of crime patterns, of the criminal justice system, of the legal aid system, and of 
the relationships between them. While the simulation model will improve as the 
researcher's understanding improves, developing a simulation model greatly enhances the 
researcher's understanding of the system. This is, in fact, a long lasting interactive process. 
Changes in legal aid tariff have been identified in both the empirical analysis in 
Chapter VI and the simulation modeling in Chapter VII as one of the major factors that 
affect the overall cost of legal aid in British Columbia. Tariff changes, however, are not 
controlled by the Legal Services Society. They are usually the results of the interactions 
between the private bar, the level of legal aid funding and the administrators of legal aid. 
Since the private bar is regarded as part of the environment in the simulation model, the 
impact of the private bar on tariff changes is not built into the model and cannot be 
simulated, which limits the model to forecast the changes in legal aid tariff, and eventually 
limits the model's ability to forecast the cost of legal aid in the long term. 
Future research in this area can be conducted in several directions. First of all, 
more scenarios can be run under various hypothetical conditions using the model that has 
been developed in this research. What will happen if, for example, the amount of crime 
decreases dramatically in the next five years? What if f&y percent of the criminal law cases 
are handled by the LSS staff lawyers and staff lawyers are likely to negotiate significantly 
mare guilty pleas (Brantingham, 1982)? What will happen to the whole system if the court 
system can handle more cases more quickly than the current situation? 
Second, the simulation model as developed in the research can be refined in nxtny 
ways. More research can be conducted to im~rove both the conceptual mode! a d  the 
parameters used in the model. In the plea bargaining process. for example more research 
should be conducted to find the roles plaid by the defence counsel, the accused and the 
Crown Counsel and the parameters in this process such as the proportions of the 
initiations of guilty plea by the defence and by the Crown respectively. More research can 
be conducted to fmd more reliable crime predictors which are the initial input into thc 
simulation model. More research can be conducted to find out recidivism rate. Morc data 
should be collected on probation patterns in BC. The model would haw more accurate 
results if offence categories can be broken at finer levels than the seven categories as used 
in the model. In short, almost all aspects of the simulation model can be refined by 
conducting more research and collecting more data. 
Third, the simulation model developed in the research can be used by other 
criminal justice agencies with minor modifications since, the model includes almost all thc 
import decision points in the criminal justice system. It can be used by courts to predict 
future case loads; it can be used by the Crown counsel to predict the impaci of changes in 
the plea bargaining rules; it can be used by the police to predict the impact on their 
workload of changes in parole rules; it can be used by the corrections to predict the impact 
on their workload of changes in sentencing policy or the proportion of defendants givcn 
legal aid. 
APPENDIX A: SPSS OUTPUT OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
ANALY •˜IS 
SPSS Output 1. 
Dependent Variable: Grand total of crime known to the police 
Independent Variable: 
Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
Beer consumption in BC 
Total population 
Percentage of working women 
* * * *  M U L T I P L E  R E G R E S S I O N  * * * *  
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ALL-CKP Grand total of crime known to 
the police 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter BEER WORKWOMN POPULATN RETAIL 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1 .. RETAIL Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
2.. BEER Beer consumption in BC 
3.. POPULATN Total population 
4.. WORKWOMN Percentage of working women 
Multiple R .93645 
R Square -87693 
Adjusted R Square 37254 
Standard Error 2612.68254 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 4 5447810391.07230 1361952597.76808 
Residual 112 764524323.23539 6826110.02889 
F = 1 99.52 1 04 Signif F = .U000 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - e m - -  Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
BEER -001445 1.0207E-04 .582620 14.156 .OOOO 
WORK6QOMN 949.145665 232,160297 ,280440 4.088 .0001 
POPULATN ,022884 .002503 .608323 9.142 .000Q 
RETAIL -12.115857 1.642905 -.394644 -7.375 .OOOO 
(Constant) -94800.15704 7890.209350 -12.015 ,0000 
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered. 
SPSS Output 2. 
Dependent Variable: 
Crime known to the police-other criminal code offences 
Independent Variable: 
Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
Beer consumption in BC 
Total population 
Percentage of working women 
* * * *  M U L T I P L E  R E G R E S S I O N  * * *  * 
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. OTHER-CC Other Criminal Code Offen 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter BEER WORKWOMN POPULATN RETAIL 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
I.. RETAIL Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
2.. BEER Beer consumption in BC 
3 .. POPULATN Total population 
4.. WORKWOMN Percentage of working women 
Multiple R 94349 
R Square .89017 
Adjusted R Square .88625 
Standard Error 689.7 1200 
Analysis of Variance 
DP Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 4 431830547.17215 107959636.79304 
R e s i d u a l  112 53278696.02443 
F = 226.94353 S i g n i f  F = .0000 
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
Variable 
BEER 
WORKWOMN 
POPULATN 
RETAIL 
( C o n s t a n t )  
B SE B B e t a  
2.143433-04 2.69463-05 .309268 
444.933522 61.287103 -470447 
,005339 6.60803-04 .507841 
-1.887040 .433704 - .219958 
33028.40501 2082.905978 
T S i g  T 
7.954 .oooo  
7 .260  . O O O O  
8.079 . O O O O  
- 4 . 3 5 1  -0000  
-15.857 . O O O O  
End B l o c k  Number 1 A l l  requested variables entered. 
SPSS Output 3. 
Dependent Variable: 
Crime known to the police - auto theft 
Independent Variable: 
Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
Beer consumption in BC 
Total population 
Percentage of working women 
* * * *  M U L T I P L E  R E G R E S S I O N  * * * *  
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. AUTOTHEF Auto theft 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter BEER WORKWOMN POPULATN RETAIL 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. RETAIL Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
2.. BEER Beer consumption in BC 
3.. POPULATN Total population 
4.. WORKWOMN Percentage of working women 
Multiple R .94958 
R Square .90170 
Adjusted R Square 298  19 
Standard Error 158.57734 
3hnctlysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regre-&ion 4 25833988.27080 6458497.06770 
Residual 112 2816438.65227 25146,77368 
F = 256,83204 Signif F = ,0000 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
BEER 3.08671E-05 6.19553-06 .I83263 4,982 ,0000 
WORKWOMB7 -17,669054 14.091020 -.076875 -1.254 ,2125 
POPULATN ,002414 1.51933-04 .944772 15.886 .OOOO 
RgTAIL -, 014234 ,899717 --006827 -.a43 .8867 
(Constant) -5918.902972 478.897997 -12,359 .OOOO 
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered. 
SPSS Output 4. 
Dependent Variable: 
Crime known to the police - property offences 
Independent Variable: 
Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
Beer consumption in BC 
Total population 
Percentage of working women 
* * * *  M U L T I P L E  R E G R E S S I O N  * * * *  
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. PROPERTY 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter BEER WORKWOMN POPULATN RETAIL 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. RETAIL Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
2.. BEER Beer consumption in BC 
3 .. POPULATN Total population 
4.. WORKWOMN Percentage of working women 
Multiple R .87076 
R Square .75822 
Adjusted R Square -74959 
StandardError 1358.26720 
Analysis of Variance 
DB S m  of Squares lean Sqyese 
Regression 4 647982889.01629 161995722.25407 
Residual 112 206627656.94952 1844889.79419 
F = 87.80780 Signif F = .0000 
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
Variable B SE B B e t a  T S i g  T 
BEER 5.320503-04 5,30663-05 .578381 10.026 ,0000 
WORKWOMrJ -63,406261 120.694234 -.050511 -.525 .6004 
P O P U U ~  .012153 .001301 ,871038 9.339 .OOOO 
RETAIL -4.780831 ,854105 -.419854 -5.597 .OOOO 
(Constant) -16909,78248 4101.919173 -4.122 .0001 
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered. 
SPSS Output 5. 
Dependent Variable: 
Crime known to the police - persons offences 
Independent Variable: 
Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
Beer consumption in BC 
Total population 
Percentage of working women 
* * * *  M U L T I P L E  R E G R E S S I O N  
JOMP 
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. PERSONS 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter BEER WORKV 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1 .. RETAIL Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
2.. BEER Beer consumption in BC 
3.. POPULATN Total population 
4.. WORKWOMN Percentage of working women 
Multiple R .95415 
R Square .91040 
Adjusted R Square .907 19 
Standard Error 195.18389 
Analysis of Variance 
$ POPULATN RETAIL 
BF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 4 43351491,77398 10837872.94350 
Residual 112 4266835.91833 38096.74927 
F = 284,48288 Signif F = .0000 
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
Variable B SE B B e t a  T S i g  T 
BEER 4.635363-05 7,62563-06 .213473 6.079 .0000 
WORKlffOMBJ 62 .TO3067 17.343840 .211610 3.615 .0005 
POPULATN .002574 1.8700E-04 .781621 13.766 .OOOO 
RETAIL - ,407328 .122755 -.I51543 -3.319 .0012 
( C o n s t a n t )  -8653.536077 589.448469 -14.681 .OOOO 
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered. 
SBSS Output 6 
Dependent Variable: 
Crime known to the police - robbery 
Independent Variable: 
Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
Beer consumption in BC 
Total population 
Percentage of working women 
* * * *  M U L T I P L E  R E G R E S S I O N  * * * *  
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable., ROBBERY Robberyoffence 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter BEER WORKWOMN POPULATN RETAIL 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. RETAIL Retail Volume in BC (Adjusted) 
2.. BEER Beer consumption in BC 
3.. POPULATN Totd population 
4.. WORKWOMN Percentage of working women 
Multiple R .89513 
R Square .go126 
AdjustedRSquare .79416 
Standard Error 34.12473 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Msan Square 
Regression 4 525834,60636 131458.65159 
Residual 112 130423 ,71843 1164.49749 
F = 112.88874 Signif F = ,0000 
Variable I3 SE S B e t a  T S i g  T 
BEER -2,441783-06 1,3332E-06 -.095789 -1.831 -0697 
WORKWOMH -16.069363 3.032289 -.461952 -5.299 ,0000 
POPULAT3 4.982813-04 3.2694E-05 1.288733 15.241 .a000 
RETAIL -. 010384 -021458 -.032909 -.484 ,6294 
(Constant) -309.701612 103.055497 -3.005 .0033 
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered. 
APPENDIX B: DYNAMO SIMULATION MODEL OF LEGAL AID 
m BC 
* Base Flow Pattern 
* 
* Four variables are used as predictors of crime: 
* 
* Beer consumption in BC 
* Retail volume 
* Rate of women participating in the labour force and 
* Population 
8 
* These four variables will appear in the same order in the following arrays. 
* 
T ClUMEG=l8750949,1235.6,53.7,2989358 
* 
* Table CRIMEG provides the initial values of the crime generators, 
* which are the average monthly values in 1985. 
* 
T CGTRN(*,1)=0.0,0.0339547,-0.004358,0.0004521,0.0584729,0.0338273,0.0042247 
T CGTRN(*,2)=0.0,0.045412,0.056675,0.04504,0.075558,0.13 1526,-0.09768 
T CG~Y(",3)=O.O,O.O~9926,0.036689,0.026354,0.016039,0.008979,0.U0933 
T CGTRN(",4)=0.0,0.0102419,0.0145973,0.0209145,0.0258806,0.0279621,0.0235614 
* 
* Table CGTRN provides the crime predictors' index over the 7 years between 
* 1985 and 1991. Each value is calculated by subtracting the average monthly 
* value of twelve months in the previous year tiom the average monthly 
* value of the twelve months in the current year and dividing the difference 
* by the previous year's average value. When simulation time is over 
* 84 time points the last two values will be repeated. 
* 
T CGMF(*, I)=-0.2360,-0.28 13,-O,lOl6,0.0305,O.Ol 69,0m0640,0. 1963," 
0.2016,0.1092,0.0426,-0.0637,0.0214 
T CG~(*,2)=-O.1570,-0.1846,-0.0426,-0.0244,0.~28,0.0296,0.0234,A 
0.0333,-0.0157,0.0047,0.0447~0.2550 
T CGMF(*,3)=-0.0202,-0.0153,-0.0114,-0.0042,0.0032,0.Q094,0,0163," 
0.0139,0.0081,0.0029~0.0007,-0.0033 
T CGMF(*,4)=-0.0088,-0 0076,-0.0063,-0.005 1,-0.0033,-0.0016,0.001~2," 
0.0025,0.0048,0.0071,0.0084,0.0098 
* 
* Table CGMF provides the monthly fluctuation of the crime predictors. 
* 
N MONTHC=O Initial value of monthly counter 
* 
FOR I== 1,4 
* 
L MONTHC.K=MONTHC.J+DT*(I+PULSE(-12,1,12,12)) MONTHLY COUNTER, CYCLIC 
* 
N CRIMEGI (I)=CRIMEG(I) 
* 
L CRIMEG 1. K(I)=CRIMEG 1 .JO)+DT*(CRTMEG(I) *(TABHL(CGTRN(*,I)," 
TIME.J, 1,73,12))/12) 
* 
A CRIMEG2.K(I)=CRIMEGl,K(I)*TABHL(CGMF(*,I),MONTHC.K,1,12,1) 
* 
* The amount of monthly fluctuation is calculated. 
* 
A CRIMEC4.K(P)=CRIMEG I .K(I)+CRIMEG2.K(I) 
* 
* Integrating the trend of crime predictors with monthly fluctuations. 
* 
FOR H=1,3 
A NOISE1 .IC(H)=NOISE()*(CRIMEGl. K(H)/25) 
A CRIMEG3 .K(H)=CRIMEG4.K(H)+NOISEl K(H) 
A CRMEG3.K(4)=CRTA/IEGl .K(4)+NOISE()*(CR 
* 
* CRIMEG3 has all of the crime predictor index with noise added 
* 
* 
* .............................................. 
* CRIME KNOWN TO THE POLICE SUB-SYSTEM 
* ................................................ 
* 
A CRIMT. K=(-~~~~~)+(CRIMEG~.K(~)*~.OO~~~~)+(CRIIV~ZG~.K(~)*(-~ 2.1 159))+" 
(CRIMEG3.K(3)*949.1457)+(CRIMEG3.K(4)*0.022884) 
* 
* CRIMT includes all offences knmn to the police: criminal code offences, 
*. federal drug offences, other federal statutes, provincial statutes and 
* municipal bylaws. CRIMT is generated by using the constant and B value 
* fiom SPSS regression analysis. 
* 
A CCT. K=(-60077)+(CRIMEG3.K(1)*7.9664E-O4)+(CRIMEG3. K(2)*(-7.1604))+" 
(CRIMEG3. K(3)*475.925)+(CRPMEG3.K(4)*0.020084) 
* 
* CCT is all criminal code offences 
* 
A OTROTRCC.X=(-33028)+(C~G3.K(1)*2.1434E-O4)+(CRIMEG3.K(2)*(-1 ,88704))+" 
(CRIMEG3.K(3)*444.9335)+(CRWIEG3.K(4)*0.005339) 
* 
* CYFR-CC includes 14 UCR offence categories: Arson, Bail violations, 
* Counterfeit cunency, Disturb the peace, Escape custody, Indecent acts, 
* Kidnapping, Pubhc morals, Obstruct police office, Prisoner at large, 
* Trespass at night, Mischieflproperty damage over and under $1000 
* ariO o&m txi-al code, which includes Criminal Code offences not 
* covered by a specific UCR offence category, i.e. breach of probation, 
* obscendthreatening phone calls, extortion, computeddata miscEef, 
* loitering at school yards, playgrounds or swimming pools, etc. 
* 
A OTHERCC.K=(-345 14)+(CRIME63.K(1)*2.1823E-W)+(CRIMEG3.K(2)*(- 1.9722))P 
(CRIMEG3.K(3)*476.63)+(CFUMEG3.K(4)*0.005356) 
* 
* OTHERCC includes OTR-CC as well as prostitution, gaming and betting, and 
* possession of weapons 
* 
A PERSON.K=(-865 3.54)+(CRIMEG3.K(l)*4.635E-O5)+(CRIMEG3. K(2)*(-0.407328))+A 
(CRIMEG3.K(3)*62.703)+(CRIMEG3.K(4)*0.002574) 
* 
* Offences against the person include homicide, attempted murder, 
* sexual and non-sexual assault, robbery and abduction. 
* 
A DRUG.K=(-10246)+(CRLMEG3.K(l)*6.5972E-05)+(CRI~~3.K(2)*(-07461))+A 
(CRIMEG3.K(3)*91.4755)+(CRIMEG3.K(4)*0.002939)-person.k 
* 
* Federal drug offences are derived from an SPSS procedure which produces 
* a total of person offences and drug offences 
* 
A ATHFT.K=(-6352.05)+(CRIMEG3.K(1)*2.7694E-O5)+(CRI~G3.K(4)*0.00225 1) 
* 
* Auto theft 
* Non-sexual assault 
* 
A CKP.K(l)=(PERSON.K-ASLT.K) 
* 
* Serious offences against the person, including homicide, 
* attempted murder, sexual assault, robbery and abduction. 
* 
A CKP.K(2)=ASLT.K Non-sexual assault 
d. 
c- 
A CKP.K(3)=ATHFT.K Auto theft 
* 
A CKP.K(4)=(CCT.K-PERS0N.K-0THERCC.K-ATHFT.K) Property offences 
* excluding auto theft 
A CKP.K(5)=DRUG.K Federal drug offences 
* 
A CKP, K(6)=OTHERCC.K Other Criminal Code offences 
* 
A CKP,K(7)=CRIMT.K-CCTK Municipal, provincial and other federal statutes. 
a 
* 
FOR .J= 1,7 
* 
A CKBN. K(J)=CKP.K(J)+NOISE()*CKP. K(J)/4O 
* 
* NOISE IS ADDED TO CRIME KNOWN TO THE POLICE 
* 
A CKPNT. K=SUM(CKPN.K) 
* 
* 
* Grand total of all types of offences. This value will be needed to 
* adjust charge rate. 
* 
* ............................................ 
* CHARGE SUB-SYSTEM (POLICE) 
* ............................................ 
* 
* 
FOR M=l,l 
FOR N=2,7 
FOR YOA=A,Y 
* 
T TIT=O.98,0.96,0.94,0.92,0.90,0.88,0.86,0.84,0.82,0.80,0.78 
* 
A ACRM.K(J)=CKPN.K(J)*T~HL(TIT,CKPNT.K,37000,77000,4000) 
A ACRMT.K=SUM(ACRM.K) 
* 
* The number of charges that can be laid by the police is not 
* proportional to the amount of crime reported to the police. 
* When there are increases in CKP charge rate decreases. 
* This equation aims to make such adjustment. 
* 
A ATOTAL.K=SUMV(ACRM.K, i ,7) 
* 
T TCRG(*,A)=0.2894,0.2886,0.0565,0.0939,0.6036,0.0837,0.1376 
* 
* Decimal fraction of charges agaist adults 
* 
T TCRG(*,Y)=0.0585,0.0331,0.0538,0.0LC47,0.05~,0.0176,0.0646 
* 
* Decimal fiaction of charges against youths 
* 
A AS AN.K(J,YOA)=ACRM.K(J)*TCRG(J,YOA) 
* 
* Base level of potential charges for both adults and youths. 
* 
* When there is more crime, police cannot keep up with the normal 
* charge rate. This is more reflected in the less serious offences. 
+ 
T TCHG=O.990,0.98,0.970,0.96,0.950,0.94,0.93,0.925,0.92,0.915,0.91 
T TCHS=0.995,0.99,0.985,0.98,0.975,0.97,0.965,0.96,0.955,0.95,0.945 
A ASAN2. K(M,YOA)=ASAN. K(M,YOA)*TABHL(TCHS,CKPN. K(1),700,1300,60) 
A ASAN2.K(N,YOA)=ASAN.K(N,YOA)*TABHL(TCHG,CKPN.K(1),700,1300,60) 
A ASANl .K(M,YOA)=SMOOTH(MAN2K(M,YOA), 1) 
A AS AN1 . K(N,Y OA)=SMOOTH(ASAN2.K(N,Y OA), 1 .O) 
* 
* Charges of more serious offences is smoothed by 1 
* Charges of less serious offences is adjusted by the amount of more 
* serious offences. 
* 
A NOISE2.K(J,YOA)=NOISE()*SQRT(ASANl .K(J,YO A)) 
* 
A ACCL.K(J,YOA)=ASANl .K(J,YOA)+NOISE2.K(J,YOA) 
* 
* Some noise is added to the volume of clearance. 
* 
A ACCLT1 .K(YOA)=SUMV(ACCL.K(*,YOA), 1,7) 
* 
A ACCLT. K=SUM(ACCL. K) 
A ACCLYA.K(J)=SUM(ACCL.K(J,*)) 
* 
A RECITI .K(J,YOA)=DELAY 1 ((INMATESSK(J,YOA)*O.30),l 2)+NOISl .K(J,YOA) 
A NOIS1.K(J,YOA)=NOISE~*INMATESSK(J,YOA)*O.Ol 
* Re-peated offenders getting back into the system some time after 
* released from the institution. 
* 
A ACCLT3.K=SUM(ACCL.K)+SUM(RECITl.K) 
Total volume of RCC (request for criminal charge). 
THE CROWN SUB-SYSTEM 
.......................... 
Not all the cases submitted to the Crown Counsel go to the court. 
The Crown Counsel has several options in regard to the disposition 
of the cases. In addition to sending cases to the court, they return 
some cases to the police for more information, hold some for more 
information, divert some cases, send caution letters to some cases, 
and drop some charges. 
On average, 85% of all cases are sent to the court. This proportion 
varies over time, over different types of offences, over accused adults vs. 
accused youths (youths are likely to have charges dropped or diverted 
* than adults) and over different jurisdictions. More serious offences 
* are less likely to be diverted, or dropped, or issued caution letters. 
* Although they u e  equally likely to be returned to the police for more 
* information, they will eventually come back to be prosecuted. When there 
* are more serious cases, less serious cases are more likely to be dropped, 
* diverted or issued caution letters because of the restrains of the 
* Crown's workload. 
* 
T TJFD(*,A)=0.99,0.98,0.97,0.96,0.95,0.93,0.90 
T TJFD(*,Y)=O.97,0.96,0.94,0.90,0.88,0.86,0.84 
* 
* Decimal fraction for filing charges 
* 
A AJFB.K(J,YOA)=ACCL.K(J,YOA)*TJFD(J,YOA) 
* 
* Base number of prosecution filings by the Crown 
* 
A AJFV.K(M,YOA)=SMOOTH(AJFB.K(M,YOA), 1) 
* 
A AJFV.K(N,YOA)=SMOOTH(AJFB .K(N,YOA),2) 
* 
* Serious offences and less serious offences are smoothed differentially. 
* 
A AJFS.K=SUMV(AJFV.K(*,A),1,2)+SUMV(AJFVAJFVK(*,Y),l ,2) 
A AJFL. K=SUMV(AJFV. K(*,A),3,7)+SUMV(AJFV.K(*,Y),3,7) 
* 
A AJFSL.K=AJFS.K+AJFL.K 
* 
* Totals of serious charges and less serious charges 
* 
T TPDROP=l.0,0.99,0.98,0.97,0.96,0.95,0.94,0.93,0.920.91,0.90 
A AJUST.K(M)=l.O 
A AJ UST. K(N)=TAB HL(TPDROP,AJFS. K,8OO, 1800,100) 
* 
A AJFW .K(J,Y OA)=AJlV. K(J,YOA)*AJUST.K(J) 
A AJFW4.K(J,YOA)=NOISE()*0.01 *(AJFVl .K(J,YOA)) 
A AJFW5 .K(J,Y OA)=AJFVl .K(J,YOA)+AJFV4.K(J,Y OA) 
A AJW2.K(J,YOA)=AJFVS.K(J,YOA) 
* 
* 
* When there is a large increase of serious charges, the Crown is likely to 
* adjust the charges against the less serious charges 
* 
A AJFVA. K=SUMV(AJFV2. K(* ,A), 1,7) 
A AJFVY .K=SUMV(AJFV2.K(*,Y), 1,7) 
A AJFV2T. K=SUM(kTEV2. K) 
A AJFVYA.K(J)=SUM(AJFV2.K(J,*)) 
* 
* 
* Total number of persons charged with criminal offences by the Crown. 
* 
* 
* ........................................ 
* DEMAND FOR LEGAL AID 
* .......................................... 
* 
A &A1 .K(1 ,A)=AJFV2.K(1 ,A)*O.95 
A ALA1 .K(1 ,Y)=AJFV2.K(1 ,Y)*O.99 
A ALA2.K(l,YOA)=ALAl.K(1 ,YOA) 
* 
* Most of those who face serious charges apply for legal aid as soon as 
* they are notified of the charge(s) and thus no time 
* delay is simulated behxen charges and legal aid application. 
* 
FOR P=2,7 
ALA1,K(P,YOA)=smooth(AJFV2.K(P,YOA),1)*0.30 
N A 2 .  K(P,Y OA)=s1nooth(I-aJFV2, K(P,Y OA) ,2) *0.20 
ALA3.K(P,YOA)=smooth(AJFV2.K(P,YOA),3)*0.30 
ALA4.K(P,YOA)=smooth(AJFV2.K(P,YOA),5)*0.20 
ALA5.K(P,YOA)=ALAl .K(P,YOA)+ALA2K(P,YOA)+ALA3. K(P,YOA)+ALA4. K(P,YOA) 
ALA3.K(l ,YOA)=ALAl .K(l ,YOA) 
ALA4.K(1 ,YOA)=ALAl .K(1 ,YOA) 
ALM.k(l ,YOA)=ALAl .K(l ,YOA) 
Most of the charged persons do not apply for legal aid immediately after 
* they are charged. They wait until after they appear in the court. The 
* equations above attempt to simulate this time delay between charges and 
* legal aid applications. 
* 
T ALA(*,A)=0.85,0.67,0.55,0.54,0.52,0.50,0.59 
T ALA(*,Y)=0.94,0.75,0.65,0.55,0.50,0.58,0.65 
* 
* Tables for demand for legal aid. 
* 
* Not all of those who are charged with criminal offences demand legal 
* aid. Some believe that they do not need lawyers; some hire their own 
* lawyers whom they can afford and some feel they do not qualify for 
* legal aid (although some of whom actually do). 
Demand for legal aid changes over the years. The changes can result from 
discrete policy changes. New offices, for example, were set up in areas 
* that did not have offices before in order to provide more service. 
* 
* When the volume of cases reaches a very high level, LSS will stop expanding 
* service and make its coverage and eligibility more rigid, which have some 
* deterrence effect on the demand for legal aid. Thus, a switch between two 
* alternative policies. 
* 
A ALAA. K(J,Y OA)=ALA5 .K(J,YOA)*ALA(J,YOA)*APAJ.K+NOISE3.K(J,YOA) 
A NOISE3.K(J,YOA)=NOISEO*SQRT(ALAS.K(J,YOA))*2 
* 
* Base number of legal aid applications 
* 
* 
A ALAAA.K=SUMV(ALAA.K(*,A), 1 7) 
A ALAAY .K=SUMV(ALAA. K(*,Y),l,7) 
A ALAAT.K=SUM(ALAA.K) 
A ALAAYA. K(J)=SUM(ALAA.K(J, *)) 
* 
* Grand tdal of legal aid applications 
* 
T TLAG(*,A)=O.83,0.78,0.73,0.71,0.67,0.66,0.63 
* 
* Tables for the base rate of legal aid approvals for adult offenders. 
* 
T TAPA.J=-0.01,-0.01,-0.01,-0.01,-0.01 
A AAPAJ .K=TABHL(TAPAJ,ALAAA,K~3500,5500,500) 
* 
A ALAP.K(J,A)=ALAA.K(J,A)*(TLAG(J,A)*O.85+AAF'AJ.K) 
A ALAP.K(J,Y)=ALAA.K(J,Y) 
* 
* Base number of legal aid approvals 
* 
A ALAPA.K=SUMV(ALAP.K(* ,A), 1,7) 
A ALAPY.K=SUMV(ALAP.K(*,Y),1,7) 
A ALAPT. K=SUM(ALAP. K) 
* AIAPT is the monthly total of legal aid approvals. 
A ALAPYA.K(J)=SUM(ALAP.K(J,*)) 
* 
* ...................... 
* COURT SUB-SYSTEM 
* .k********************* 
* 
FOR LA=LS,NL 
* LS stands for cases represented by counqel paid by LSS. 
* NS stands for cases not represented by legal aid counsel. 
* 
A ACC.K(P,YOA,LS)=ALAP.K(P,YOA) 
A ACC.K(P,YOAJ\JL)=ALAS .K(P;YOA)-ALAP.K(P,YOA) 
A ACC. K(l ,YOA,LS)=DELAYl (ALAP.K(1 ,YOA),2) 
A ACC.K(l ,YOA,NL)=DELAY 1 (ALASK(1 ,YOA)-ALAl'.K( 1 ,YOA),2) 
A ACCTT.K=SUM(ACC.K) 
* 
* Calculation of all new court cases. Category 1 cases are delayed by 2 
* to simulate the time difference between charges being laid and first 
* appearance in court. 
* 
* 
* ............................... 
* CALCULATION OF GUILTY PLEA 
* ............................... 
* 
T TGPRB=0.545,0.55,0.65,0.65,0.58,0.59,0.55 
* 
* Table for guilty plea rate by type of charges. 
* 
T TGPAJ=0.99,0.995,1,1.01,1.015,1.020 
A AJGPRT. K(J)=TABHL(TGPAJ,ACCTT.K,5500,7500,400) 
* 
* 
A AJGPR1 .K(J)=TGPRB(J)*AJGPRT.K(J) 
* 
* Adjustment to base guilty plea rate by adding the 
* current propensity to induce guilty plea by the Crown. 
* 
A AGP.K(J,YOA,LA)=ACC.K(J,YOA,LA)* AJGPR1 .K(J)+NOISE()* ACC. K(J,YOA,LA)*O.O 1 
* 
* Guilty plea cases 
* 
A AGPT.K=SUM(AGP.K) 
A ACCT.K=SUM(ACC.K) 
A GPRATE.K=(AGPT. WACCT. K)* 100 
* 
* Rate of guilty plea 
* 
T TPTAP=0.015,0.05,0.05,0.06,0.05,0.06,0.05 
* 
* Table for calculation of the number of cases that fail to appear in 
* the court. According to the database of LSS, the proportion ha5 been 
* fairly consistent over the past ten years. 
* 
A AFTAP.K(J,YOA,LA)=ACC,K(J,YOA,LA)*TFTAP(J)+NOISE~*ACC.K(J,YOA,LA)*0.005 
A AFTAPS .K=SUM(AFTAP.K) 
* 
* Failure to appear cases. 
* 
T TSTAY=0,08,0.13,0.14,0.12,0.14,0.15,0.16 
* 
* Base withdrawallstay rate by type of charges 
* 
T TSTAYAJ=1.01,1.015,1.017,1.02,1.023,1.025 
A AJSTAYR.K=TABHL(TSTAYAJ,ACCTT.K,5509, 
* 
A AJSTAY.K(J)=TSTAY(J)*AJSTAYR.K 
* 
* Adjustment to base withdrawaVstay rate. This auxiliary will be modified by 
* adding adjustment. 
* 
A 
ASTAY. K(J,YOA,LA)=ACC.K(J,YOA,LA)*AJSTAY. K(J)+NOISE()*ACC.K(J,YOA,LA)*O.OO 
5 
A AST.4YT. K=SUM(ASTAY. K) 
* 
A STAY RATE.K=(ASTAYT. WACCT.K)* 100 
* 
A TRIALS.K(J,Y BA,LA)=ACC.K(J,YOA,LA)-ASTAY.K(J,YOA,LA)-AFTAP.K(J,YOA,LA)" 
-AGP. K(J,Y OA,LA) 
* 
A TRIALT.K=SUM(TRIALS.K) 
* Calculation of trials 
A TRIALRT. K=(TRIALT.K/ACCT.K)* 100 
* 
* 
* .................................. 
* COURT CASE BACKLOG 
* .................................. 
* 
. T TGTDmAY=5,4,3,3,4,3,4 
A AGPDELAY. K(J)=TGPDELAY (J) 
* 
* Table of delays for those who plea guilty 
* 
T TSTDELAY=6,5,4,3,3,3,4 
A ASTDELAY. K(J)=TSTDELAY(J) 
* 
* Tdblc of delays for charges withdrawed or stayed 
* 
T 1TRDELAY=10,8,7,7,8,6,9 
A ATRDELAY. K(J)=?TRDELAY(J)+ATRDLAJ. K(J) 
T TRDLAJ=0.5,0.0,0.5,0.0,0.0,0.5 
A TRIALTI. K=DELAY 1 (TRIALT.K,l) 
A ATRDLAJ.K(J)=TABHL(TRDLAJ,TRIALTl .K, 1250,2250,200) 
* Table of trial delays 
* 
T TFADELAY=5,3,2,2,3,1,4 
A AFADELAY .K(J)=TFADELAY(J) 
* 
* Table of delays for those that fail to appear in court 
* 
* 
FOR C=G,F,S,T 
* 
* G stands for guilty plea cases 
* F stands for fail to appear cases 
* S stands for withdrawaVstay cases 
* T stands for trials 
* 
A CB ACK.K!G,J,Y OA,LA)=DELAY 1 (AGP. K(J,YOA,LA), AGPDELAY. K(J)) 
A CGP.K(J,YOA,LA)=DELAY 1 (AGP.K(J,YOA,LA),AGPDELAY .K(J)) 
A CGPT.K=SUM(CGP.K) 
A CGPA.K(J,YOA)=SUM(CGP.K(J,YOA,*)) 
A CGPYA.K(J)=SUM(CGPA.K(J,*)) 
* 
* CGP=Guilty plea cases 
* 
A CBACK.K(F,J,YOA,LA)=DELAY 1 (AFTAP.K(J,YOA,LA),AFADELAY .K(J)) 
A CFA.K(.T,YOA,LA)=DELAY 1 (AFTAP. K(J,YOA,LA),AFADELAY .K(J)) 
A CFAT. K=SUM(CFA.K) 
* 
* Failure to appear cases 
* 
A CBACK.K(S,J,YOA,LA)=DELAY l(ASTAY .K(J,YOA,LA),ASTDELAY.K(J)) 
A CST.K(J,YOA,LA)=DELAY I (ASTAY .K(J,YOA,LA), ASTDELAY .K(J)) 
A CSTT.K=SUM(CST.K) 
* 
* Staylwithdrawal cases 
* 
A CB ACK.K(T,J,YOA,LA)=DELAY 1 (TRIALS.K(J,Y C>A,LA),ATRDELAY. K(J)) 
A CTR.K(J,YOA,LA)=DELAY 1 (TRIALS.K(J,YOA,LA),ATRDELAY. K(J)) 
A CTRT.K=SUM(CTR.K) 
A CTRA.K(J,YOA)=SUM(CTR.K(J,YOA,*)) 
A CTR11. K(J,LA)=SUM(CTR.K(J,*,LA)) 
A CTRYA. K(J)=SUM(CTRl 1 .K(J,*)) 
A CTR1. K(YOA,LA)=SUM(CTR.K(*,YOA,LA)) 
A CTRLA.K(LA)=SUM(CTRl .K(*,LA)) 
* 
* Number of trials 
* 
T TFG(*,A)=0.5726,0.5607,0.5789,0.5545,0.5828,0.5759,0.5324 
T TFG(*,Y)=0.5615,0.6838,0.6667,0.5344,0.600590.5639,Q.3333 
* 
A A,F;C.I((J,YOA)=CTflA,K(J,YOA)*TI;G(J,YOA) 
A AFGT.K=SUM(AFG.K) 
* 
* Number of cases that are found guilty in trials. 
* 
A AGUILT.K(J,YOA)=AFG.K(J,YOA)+CGPA.K(J,YGA) 
* All caves that are found guilty through guilty plea and trial by 
* type of charge an8 YOA/aduIt. 
* 
A COMPT.K=SUM(CB ACKK) 
* 
* 
* 
* ************** 
* SETENCING 
* ************** 
* 
T TJAILA(*,A)=O.628,0.337,0.270,0.45 1 ,0.442,0.499,0.250 
T TJAILA(*,Y)=0.452,0.222,0.217,0.210,0.123,0.361,0.095 
* 
A JCGPA.K(J,YOA)=CGPA.K(J,YOA)*TJAILA(J,YOA) 
* 
* Base equation for the number of people who plea guilty and are sentenced 
* to jail. 
* 
T SNTNAJ=0.97,0.95,0.93,0.91,0.89,0.87,0.85 
A SNTNA.K=TABHL(SNTNAJ,CTRCGP.K,3000,5400,400) 
A CTRCGP.K=AFGT.K+CGPT.K 
* 
* CTRCGP is the grand total of guilty cases including guilty pleas and 
* found guilty through trials. 
* 
A JCTRA.K(J,YOA)=CTRA.K(J,YOA)*(TJAILA(J,YOA)*SNTNA.K) 
* 
* Number of people who are found guilty and sentenced to jail. 
* 
A JAILAL.K(J,YOA)=JCGPA.K(J,YOA)+JCTRA.K(J,YOA) 
A J AILALT. K=S UM(JA1LAL. K) 
* 
* Total of jail sentence. 
* 
* *************** 
* CORRECTIONS 
* *************** 
* 
T JAILTM(*,A)=l3,2,1,2.5,2.5,1.5,1 
T JAILTM(*,Y)=5,1,2,2,2,1.5,1 
* 
* Tahk of avenge length of jail time. 
* 
A INMATES.K(J,Y OA)=DELAY 1 (JAILAL. K(J,YOA) ,JAILTM(J,Y OA)) 
A INrn. K=SUM(INMATES.K) 
* 
* Total number of jail inmates. 
* 
* ************** 
* COST OF LEGAL MD 
* .............................. 
* 
T TCOSTG(*,A,LS)=2431,779,779,779,779,5 16,5 15 
T TCOSTF(*,A,LS)=2040,599,599,599,599,369,335 
T TCOSTS(*,A,LS)=3 138,745,745,745,745,398,307 
T TCOSTT(*,A,LS)=l25@4,2719,2719,2719,2719,1090,1154 
* 
T TCOSTG(*,Y,LS)= 194,723,723,723,723,478,5 14 
T TCOSTF(*,Y,LS)=794,44O~44OI440,44O,28 1,411
T TCOSTS(*,Y,LS)=895,5 l6a6,5 l6,5 l6,347,3 19 
T TCOS1T(*,Y,LS)=5550,1799,1799,1799,1799,1091,1271 
* 
* Tables of the cost of legal aid per case by charge type, by 
* court procedure and by young offenders and adult offenders. 
* The cost figures are calculated using cases approved for 
* legal aid in 1992. 
* 
A LAREF.K(J,YOA,LS)=CGP.K(J,YOA,LS)+CFA.K(J,YOA,LS)+CST.K(J,YOA,LS)A 
+CTR.K(J,YOA,LS) 
LSCF. K(J,LS)=SUM(LSCOSTF. K(J, *,LS)) 
LSCG.K(J,LS)=SUM(LSCOSTG.K(J,*,LS)) 
LSCS. K(J,LS)=SUM(LSCOSTS.K(J,*,LS)) 
LSCT. K(J,LS)=SUM(LSCOS'IT.K(J,*,LS)) 
LSF. K(LS)=SUM(LSCF. K(* ,LS)) 
LSG.K(LS)=SUM(LSCG.K(*,LS)) 
LSS.K(LS)=SUM(LSCS.K(*,LS)) 
LST.K&S)=SUM(LSCT.K(*,LS)) 
LSCOSTA. K(LS)=LSF.K(LS)+LSG. K(LS)+LSS. K(LS)+LST. K(LS) 
A CYOAS.K(YOA,LS)=SUM(LSCOSTS.K(*,YOA,LS)) 
A L'Y OAT. K(YOA,LS)=SUM(LSCOSTT.K(*,YOA,LS)) 
.A COSTYOA. K(YOA,LS)=CY OAF. K(YOA,LS)6CYOPlG.K(YOA,LS)+CYOAS. K(YOA,LS)A 
i-CYOAT.K(YOA,LS) 
* 
A LSINDXG.K(J,YOA,LS)=CGP.K(J,YOA,LS)*nNDXG(J,YOA,LS) 
A LSINDXF.K(J,YOA~S)=CFA,K(J,YOA~LS)*TINDm(J,YOA,LS) 
A LSINDXS. K(J,Y OA,LS)=CST.K(J,YOA,LS)*TINDXS(J,YOA,LS) 
A LSiNDXT.K(J,YOA,LS)=CTR.K(J,YOA,LS)*TINDXT(J,YOA,LS) 
* 
A CINDXG. K=SUM(LSINDXG.K) 
A CINDXF. K=S UM(LS1NDXF. K) 
A CINDXS .K=SUM(LSINDXS .K) 
A CINDXT.K=SUM(LSINDXT.K) 
A LSINDEX. K=CINDXG. K+CINDXF. K+CINDXS .K+CINDXT.K 
* 
L TARIFCL. KzTARIFCL. J+DT*(l+PULSE(- 15,1,15,15)) 
N TARIFCL=O 
* 
* Discrete tarif changes over the years. 
* 
* When total cost of legal aid reaches a level at which fblnding is mcult 
* LSS can reduce its tariff in order to keep the cost at a certain level. Thus 
* the switch (FIFGE) of tarif policies. 
* 
A TCOSTG1 .K(J,Y OA,LS)=TCOSTG(J,YOA,LS)*TARIFR. K
A TCOSTFl .K(J,YOA,LS)=TCOSTF(J,YOA,LS)*TARIFR,K 
A TC03TS 1. K(J,YOk$S)=TCOSTS(3,Y OA,LS)*'. K 
A TCOS'TTI . K(J,YOA,LS)=TCOSTT'(J,YOA,LS)*TARIFR.K 
* 
* 
* ........................... 
* SUMMARY OF VARTABLES 
* ........................... 
* 
* 
* CKPNT = Grand total of crime known to the police 
* CKPN = Crime known to the police by offence 
* ACCLT = Grand total of persons charged with criminal offences 
* ACCLYA = Number of persons charged by offence 
* AJFV2T = Grand total of persons prosecuted for criminal offences 
* AJFV2YA = Number of persons prosecuted by offence 
* ALAAT = Grand total of legal aid applications 
* ALAAYA = Legal aid applications by offence 
* ALAPT = Grand total of legal aid approvals 
* ALAPYA = Legal aid approvals by offence 
* LAREFT = Grand total of legal aid referrals 
* CGPT = Guilty plea cases 
* CGPYA = Guilty plea by offence 
* CFAT = Fail to appear cases 
* CSTI' = Staylwithdrawal cases 
* CTRT = Trial cases 
* CTRYA = Trial cases by offence 
* LSCG = Cost of guilty plea cases 
* LSCT = Cost of trial cases 
* LSCOST = Total cost of legal aid 
Control Statements 
SAVE ckpnt,ACCLT,AJFV2T,ALAAT,ALAPT7CGPT,CFAT,CSTT,CTRT,LSCOST 
SPEC DT=l/LENGTH=.145/SAWER=l 
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